CTRL/SHIFT - 13 06 2026 CHAPEL STAGE - SOHIL TIWARI - SECURITY IN POST QUANTUM WORLD

Hello, hello. Oh, yeah. Okay, great. Um it's It's okay. Do you have to stand somewhere or I can No.

Okay, up to you. You I'm at your mercy. Standing is okay. I'm going to move a little. Um so, that was great from Wolfgang.

One more round of applause. It was intense. Intense, really intense. So, buongiorno. And that is the extent of my Italian.

I learned one more word today, allora. So, which I'm going to keep using. Um but after Wolfgang and and then after that it's you, right? So, I'm sandwiched between really great experts. And so, you have to bear with me for some more time.

Um so, where are we in terms of the post-quantum world? Um but before we go into post-quantum world, as I was asking the organizers as to what are the things that I should be staying away from, not touching, you know, not speaking in front of this crowd. And they said, "No, no, go for it. Anything. The stage is yours.

You can talk about anything and everything." So, I thought let me start with something that is very interesting. Uh this year there the FIFA decided to increase the number of teams from 32 to 48. And guess which country did not meet the cut? Uh no, no, no, no.

I India also did not meet the cut. So, I'm basic originally from India, where there are 1.5 billion people, and we cannot find 11 good players. So, there's your math. And and it's it's because I don't think there is a level of focus, commitment, and vision.

And that's exactly what's happening in quantum security today. Only 5% of the organizations and institutions are focused on setting their systems up for post-quantum cryptography. And this is an information from a global survey. A lot of institutions are still bogged down by their regular day-to-day audits, regular day-to-day issues, and not have the vision of being prepared for the future. Um and somebody asked a question, is it coming?

It's not. It is It's It's dependent. Not really. So, it's really important that companies start focusing on preparing themselves for post-quantum cryptography. You know, they are They think that, "Hey, they have time."

But honestly, the other 95% are still working on converting their legacy systems to current systems. So, they are very far away to converting to post-quantum cryptography. And you know, we have We have debate on deadlines. We have debate on timelines. 2030, 2035.

But right now, EU has come up with 2030 in terms of their critical infrastructure. So, that deadline is coming fast. We think it might be 4 years away. But honestly, it's really short time. Time is going to pass really fast.

And you heard Wolfgang talk about the Google research. So, that's coming, too. And um you know, there is expensive time is is money. So, you know, you got to really move fast or things will turn really expensive for people who are not moving as per their timelines. Because uh you heard again Wolfgang talk about NIST and the standards.

The standards are there. You all know what the standards are. Standards have been released by NIST. They went through a detailed review of like 26 or different standards and finally came down to four right now, which need to be migrated. So, standards are ready.

Institutions are far behind. Institutions need to get ready and and prepare themselves because time is moving fast. We uh I won't go into a lot of detail, but as I was progressing in my career, one of the things that was told to me by a CEO is that whatever you're doing, you need to explain to a 6-year-old. And so, I'm going to cut down everything that is happening in terms of all the charts and all the, you know, the data and and and all the technology is basically the RSA um is going to be broken. And it's not it's not it's not that the codes will be broken.

It's the lock itself will be disassembled. And that's what's going to happen through quantum computers. Um Shor's algorithm is going to make that make that happen, right? And the RSA and the elliptical curve that we all talk about is will will completely dis- disassemble in front of us while we are watching and while we are trying to, you know, figure out as to why this is happening and how this is happening, but it's it's going to happen. You know, the the math problems today uh uh which RSA and ECC uses takes a lot of time to solve, and as a result, they are very strong today.

What we know is that tomorrow, 2 years, 4 years, 5 years later, it's not going to be relevant. And that's why we got to be prepared for that. Uh we you touched a little bit on H N D L, harvest now decrypt later, store now decrypt later, whatever you want to call it, but it's already happening. It's It's been happening for a long time. Uh whether it's state actors, others, they have been stealing data and harvesting data and storing data.

Once quantum quantum relevant computers come into play, these they will they will emerge and all the data that has been stolen will be, you know, could be encrypted and used, misused, whatever you want to call it. I can tell you when I was going through my some application for government, they had this this thick file on me. So, just imagine millions of people whose whose records are with the government and harvested, it's so much at risk and that is that is critical. Uh, we we talked about the Google research paper um which has dramatically increased the ECC timelines. And it it I personally think, and this is my view, is that research paper along with AI and the progress and the and the advancement that is happening on AI needs to be factored, which would accelerate that timeline further.

So, you know, we got to be prepared, we got to add um additional variables that would expedite um the the quantum relevant computers and expedite uh the issue that we are that we are having in hand. So, as a result, what is at stake? What do you you know, this is you know, fine fine to know, but what exactly is at stake? We know cryptocurrencies is at stake, right? We talked about all that.

But literally everything everything there is today about like say 16 trillion of of digital assets, right? Including stable coins, including tokenized deposits, tokenized loans, tokenized collateral, everything. But that's that's on the left side. That's what you see on digital assets. You know, the the private key exposed, the smart contracts uh you know, forged, etc.

etc. But what we also need to be prepared is is I won't call it a catastrophe, but close to that, right? Is everything which is beyond digital assets, which is beyond Bitcoin, which is beyond Ethereum. So, about payment trails, sweet miss swift messaging systems. You know, swift is also transitioning to blockchain.

Uh defense communications. So, for a while HNDL, so they have been harvesting a lot of data. Um when I say it's bad actors, state nations, whatever you call it. And that is all at risk. Long-lived data.

Health care records are required to be held for 30 years. And that's just an example. Long-lived data are stored and held. That is at risk. Um you know, it's it's it's really important that beyond that, telecom data.

We have we know signal, for example, is already moved into that direction, into PQC direction. But you know, uh there are energy grid issues, ports, airports. So, uh there are it's beyond digital assets and as we go into, you know, quantum relevant computers, it becomes essential that all institutions start thinking through how they are going to transition into a post-quantum cryptography world. Um whether they are in critical infrastructure, the 5% number that I initially mentioned, it that includes, you know, uh banks, large banks, banks too big to fail, but also institutions. And they are it's it's scary thought that all this is at risk and only 5% of the institutions are working toward that.

So, what does this I wanted to spend some time on this, on the geopolitical piece. And it's important to know this because it's the the the the the the uh nations um that are that have been focused on quantum. China. So, China has this big um investment back 10 years ago in making them the quantum supreme or drive quantum supremacy. Um and they have been investing since then um in in creating quantum relevant computers in actually you know figuring out how they can not just create this this computers, but also all the data that exists today uh across the world, how those how that data can be harvested and stored.

So, they have been at it for a long time. In fact, uh President Xi Jinping recently, as recent as last year in the recent 5-year plan, committed additional um investment for this going all the way up to 2035. So, in a scenario where we are looking at uh at only 5% of institutions being ready, we are looking at uh state actors actually investing to not just protect themselves, but also figuring it out as to how they're going to harvest and decrypt that data. So, that is really important for us to know. Um Russia has been at it.

So, Russia has been the uh a silent killer. They have been at harvest and decrypt data for a long time. Um maybe maybe longer than China. And um and there is data that exists. It's only when we actually start implementing post-quantum cryptography, we will be able to secure that harvested data.

Um what is US doing? Um So, US has put in some strict guidelines, especially NSA, the National Security Agency, has put in some strict guidelines in terms of transition because um of of some um national uh defense important uh requirements. And that continues to be uh progressed in the US. Um the timeline that NSA has given for that piece of um conversion is 2030 and it's it's mandated. So, um in my in my opinion, our institutions, organizations that are critical uh provide critical infrastructure like airports, sports, energy, water are uh it becomes really important for them to actually follow that timeline.

Not many people know, but as as everybody knows, the geopolitical environment right now it's very vulnerable. With with Iran and Lebanon and and Israel on on that side, plus Russia, Ukraine. Um what gets hidden in the news is our our some significant breaches. Um not many people know that as soon as the Iran war started, there was a very significant breach in a large pharmaceutical company. The stock took a hit, but hey, it wasn't big news, so it bounced back.

When Q-Day happens, and Q-Day we don't know when it's going to happen. Um many people in this room are too young to know Y2K. But people who went through Y2K, year 2000, we had a set time to transition. We had year 2000, 31st December 1999 to transition to a 4M YYYY scenario and the world would not come to an end. Planes won't crash.

Q-Day, nobody knows. Q-Day is a day in the future which when quantum relevant computers are in play and would start, you know, messing with with all the infrastructure that we have. And as a result, NSA is very very clear and it started mandating uh conversion from uh current cryptography to post-quantum cryptography. EU, as you know, EU fines first and asks questions later. Um and and as we all know, you know, it's uh basically US innovates, China imitates, uh and EU regulates.

And EU has done that successfully and continues to do that successfully. There are There's a litany of regulation around post-quantum cryptography. And that continues um and will continue, which would potentially help secure um the ecosystem, the entire environment in the in the uh European Union. And specifically uh focusing on long-lived data. So, uh that's that's an overview of what's happening around the world, um just to give you an idea.

Um so that, you know, we know we are ready in terms of we can learn best practices, we know what's what uh some state nations are doing, we know what some progressive nations are doing in terms of driving innovation in this area. Um migration timeline, the cost of waiting is significant, is exponential. Uh and and honestly, it has to be done now. Reality is, you know, it would take time to to migrate to post-quantum cryptography. It would take at least, you know, if if organizations have not started yet, they're too late.

If organizations and institutions have not started thinking about post-quantum cryptography, you know, they it would be really tough for organizations to actually put their act together. Because a few things will happen, right? Q-Day is going to come sooner than later. There will be a rushed implementation. There will be an increased cost.

And and there will there will be mistakes, right? Which would drive huge impact on reputation. And guess what? If there is an impact of reputation, there's an impact on the stock price. You do not want your companies to be on the front page of Financial Times.

And that's why it's really important that you know, we are as as an ecosystem, we migrate organizations to what a post-quantum cryptography world. Um as as of H&D data is already compromised. And um you know, there there are regulatory fines in place if uh if transition doesn't happen uh sooner than later. And uh so, we talked about this already. Sorry.

And and we This is the harvest now decrypt later timeline. You know, it has been happening since 2020. And I in my mind, I think it's been happening before that. Um but the Q-Day window anywhere between 2029 to 2031. Uh progressing in uh how AI progresses.

And you know, if there is anything that we know with uh with all the investment that is going around the world in AI, you know, it's potentially going to accelerate some of this timeline. And that is my personal point of view. And as a result, going into 2030 and 2031, only institutions that have migrated into post-quantum cryptography would be, you know, able to retain that data and that confidence with their customers, investors, um and stakeholders. Um and you know, we little bit I think Wolfgang touched little bit on on the um on the various standards. And uh you know, obviously the standards are there on NIST.

Uh we can actually specific standards address specific things. And um the Falcon depends on whom you ask, finalized, not finalized. But you know, it's it's out there. There's a lot of email traffic on Falcon right now, which will tell you, hey, you know, there are it's they're ready to move forward with it. Um and sorry, I keep going back.

Okay. Migration timeline, this is uh important if you are thinking about PQC migration. It's important to know that it's like a 36-month timeline. You got to start with inventory, um looking at what you have in terms of your own systems. Um you got to invent like create inventory, look at prioritize where what's important, how do you actually bring in things that are really key.

Um and most importantly, I I would focus on um building a crypto agility capability, where you continue with your current uh cryptography, transition slowly into um into PQC, and then finally migrate everything to PQC. I think that would keep your business as usual running, and and would enable your current processes to perform the way they need to perform. Um and finally, um I think the time is now. It's important that everybody actually focuses on this um and migrates towards uh towards the new standards, migrates towards um a post-quantum cryptography. Uh everybody they are harvesting, so we got to be ready, and we got to ensure that the data continues to stay protected and and safe.

Um and as I said, crypto agility is important for the next 5 years, and we continue to uh enable crypto agility going forward. So, that's it from me. Uh if you have any questions, you can ask Wolfgang.