PANEL: Stablecoins (Devcon5)

I'd like to start off with introductions so my name is Eva as mentioned I work on various projects in the etherium ecosystem and super close with GFI and maybe if you guys can start and say what you're working on and how that relates to stable coins sure so I'm Victor Rourke that I work with the our dive project and for those of you that are familiar it's an open source non-profit money lego protocol that's created by Francesco Renzi and me Alistair Chang earlier this summer it's sort of one sentence pitches programmable interest payments it takes dye as the underlying asset and invests in no loss lending pools like compound dy/dx our fulcrum and then takes that interest that's streaming back to the user account and allows the user that holds the die to direct that interest outside of their own account so you can use it to pay for services you can direct it to charities open source projects and for me it kind of constituted a my third fall down the rabbit hole in in crypto so the first one is the one everybody talks about when you first understand Bitcoin and come out the other end and you start saying things like fiat money instead of dollar bills and then my second trip down the rabbit hole is learning about maker Dow understanding how those kinds of systems which seem incredibly complex can result in this really wonderful system that that opens up all kinds of new affordances for human financial behavior and then the money Legos that are built on top of it are fascinating and so when I when I heard about our die I started building on it and I recognized that it's not only a cool money Lego but it actually kind of hurts a cognitive bias that are sort of circumnavigates a cognitive bias that we've always had whenever we pay for things out of pocket which is lost version doesn't feel good to see your number go down and your bang and so anything you pay for you have to overcome that obstacle so our die when you can direct interest to things that you support it seems to alleviate some of that loss aversion that it thinks and you know kind of gets me spinning thinking about the different possibilities that you can build out a payment system and a payment network that is an entirely different structure with a lot more fluidity and a lot more possibility for supporting things that we think of now as these kinds of you need to add support models or surveillance capitalism the support but with the directed interest micropayment kind of platform like our die you really do have some really neat models that come out of that so excited to build it's not on main men yet but that'll be a couple of months away so I encourage everybody to check it out hopefully you make me fall down the same rabbit hole I did yeah rune Kristensen CEO of the mega foundation and for those of you that didn't hear it yesterday we just announced that full version of die x that also includes the die savings rate is launching of the memory team I'm Dan Robinson I'm a research partner paradigm which is a crypto asset investment firm but I'm here representing my own views and not those are the fun I mostly work on to the research and the currency and defy and recently published a paper called the yield protocol which is about a way to do essentially secured zero coupon bonds on ethereum so for example one wide eye is where it is the demon bull for one die at a particular future date and is secured by some to youth collateral so unlike unlike I die I'm like unlike it's it's not a petrol and it's also not meant to target stability so it's a way to get to rehab to the the wide I traded some discount and you can infer from the discount what the implied interest rate is that the market sets on this particular maturity of debt and so it's it's a protocol essentially for interest rate discovery on it there awesome so something that's been really exciting that came out of this world of dye that makers created is all these derivatives like our dye Ellis died she died but a lot of that has to do with the interest rate that people can earn right so these opportunities that for example hence adapt is creating arbitrage between a maker CDP and lending a compound but how do you guys see interest rates evolving as our ecosystem involves and maybe Dan will start with you given Y tokens are a little bit relevant sure yes and so wider exam obviously hasn't been implemented yet but once you do just from sort of the market on chain you can get what the markets just for the prices of various maturities you can infer what the market predicts the term structure of interest rates will be which is the two-threes of the future path of interest rates I think if you did that now and this is a very sort of unjustified opinion I think it would be an inverted yield curve in that I think people think that the current yields are gonna go down in the future that would be that would be probably my guess maybe I'm not sure if the other panel if it is gray yeah I mean I I really have no action we talked about it yesterday like I really have no idea what the yield curve would look like if there is one and also I think it would be really difficult to even construct one right because we need to have a lot more liquidity in ecosystem and maybe what we do get to that level of liquidity that you know the economy has stabilized a little bit and who knows it'll still be inverted though I actually agree with you right now that rates do seem to be going down and and so to the question of like these yields are critical for for all of these like derivative essence what I think is really interesting is that with what the dye savings rate is going to add now this would be the first time a defy that you can get a type of yield that doesn't add any additional risk to the underlying stable point and and yeah and I think that will really allow for even more types of of innovation like this or at least it'll make people feel a lot more safe doing it because for instance if you wanted to use something like our die and donate it to charity if you're using compound right you actually alike like you're not just donating money to charity for free because you are taking some risk and there are some real nuns your risk that you could you could end up with a loss because of compound having like a you know nothing you could cover liquidation and that's where the die savings rate is it's really interesting embedded you know there really is no downside to to like sending it out so it really is like free money in a way that you can also give away and really have no sense of no no possibility of a loss so yeah also I this is not the boxing match part of the panel this is not me really fighting with each other I agree that the rates are artificially high now because of all kinds of sort of one time or you know system issues with the platform risk it's more contract risk with compound being on the level and the fact that died savings rates coming out I think we're gonna see a massive kind of paroxysm those kinds of rates and things will stabilize in number of months if not years but I don't think that this is sustainable at the current levels but I think that there still is a very high probability that these defy technologies will enable you know some sort of above inflation type interest rates that uh that could be quite useful for going to the protocols awesome yeah I think something that's cool and it sort of the elephant in the room is that the makers stability fee almost acts like a LIBOR today and so people started debating you know how is the compound lending interest rate dictated and really that's probably a new proxy to what makers stability fees today maybe when you can speak a little more to how the DSR will be decided and how the stability fee has also been decided lately just for those in the room who aren't aware that process yes so right so the maker stability fee is what you have to pay right now in order to generate die by putting a collateral into to maker and it started out at a half percent when they launched two years ago and it stayed stable at a half percent for like I think almost a year like very clearly in very in that state very low rate for almost a year and then suddenly last spring it just like shut up and became like hit a high point of twenty and a half percent of it and the reason why it changes at all it's because it's actually cooler so it's empty our was it's a governance of maker that decides what disability is and they have like this weekly decision-making process that sets a new one every week but that decision is made entirely based on data on the price of died in the market because what you use rates for is you really use that to stabilize the died estate upon itself and make it as stable against the US dollar as possible and this is actually analogous to how central bank's that that manage affect currency they have to always modify their rates so that they can keep their pigs and it's a really the very basic logic is that if you're currently if you want your currency to go up in value you have to increase the rates in maker what happened was that around spring this year the diaper I suddenly fell below like filter like 96 cents or something and what was happening is too many people were taking advantage of the fact that they could borrow divert cheaply and then sell it more Eve and then dead like better exposure to eat so the response of the government was to then just increase the rate until peeps double stop borrowing that much dye right and so basically like the supply was going up too much demand was only like staying at this level I guess you could say rather than the high rates like push the supply back down to be in line with demand so the price could remain stable so and what's happening now is the rates are going back down and that's basically actually I think because of this new dimension of dye demand where people buy dyes and they can put into compound into like these derivative by type of products and then itself is then dragging the rates down and I think that really shows to hold the nature of the feedback loop they're like as there's more demand for CDP's the more amenable for borrowing because the rate is so low the raid on Amanda goes and now there's all this demand for compound and like for all of these ways to earn an it like a return on your on your on your own stable points and they're those rates then go down and I think once we get into the I savings rate and once the ego system matures a bit more we might finally get to a point where the rates in general start being a bit more stabilized because I think really the whole journey we've been through like this extremely high like extremely low raise to extremely high rates and then coming back down that is like exactly what you would expect from like a brand new economy right like it doesn't really people kind of like making having the wrong assumptions sometimes like trying to extrapolating the wrong things and over time as the market goes through this like a learning process I think she's stabilized a lot more agreed I think that some of the factors that dictate that our eath price maker decision making and then also organic demand for dye that will dictate these interest rates but dan in your protocol like what variables were you taking into account when you were building your yields group sure yeah so spending those panel with stable coins because basically that the defining feature in the useful feature about wide perkins is that they're not stable so Meeker you know through a really really sort of ingenious mechanisms I managed to achieve these two things perpetuity and stability that are really necessary to have a $1 in change and I'm buttering up now because I think we're gonna we're gonna come close a little more later on an attack I I think what wide open does is just just abandons us says this is no longer perpetual it's and we're not gonna talk its ability but as a result you actually get quite by removing these four these parameters from from the system and just letting the price quote freely you actually at the market to tell you what it thinks the interest rate is for this particular tenor and I think that's that's useful it's useful potentially as an input into systems like maker compound to help inform their formulas or governess decisions and Italy usually somebody looking for a fixed term loan for the amount of time but but ultimately no depends I think on this kind of rock-solid unit of account look died I was becoming interesting I feel like this is the time that we should switch gears so the hot topic is multi collateral die and so figuring out what is the process and what will be included and maybe ruin if you have any context you can provide about what we know of how the process is gonna be bootstrapped that might be useful yeah so maker maker governance is notoriously complex because we're really talking about like governance aware of a full monetary system so we have this extremely dedicated core community that actually spent the time it takes to like you know follow all the sort of the the most detailed research and actually even creating research themselves so there is actually a very well liked thought out like like base level theory around the whole the whole concept of how we're gonna do make your governments and multilateral die that has been worked on for years at this point and the foundation has then like contributed a lot to this conversation of selves and then ultimately also to seem like the organic conversation coming out of the community and all the ideas and then like formulated a very basic you know what we're calling an interim kind of like just like an initial framework that's that should work for the very early stages right and and we really just extrapolating what's already there which is the this weekly cycle that sets the rates in your system and then creating a new monthly cycle because it's more it deals with nothing more advanced so it's going to be on a monthly basis and actually in addition to the already existing weekly cycle that will continue to exist and that's how the rates will continue to be set in some of the in the short term but then in this every monthly cycle you have this like end to end process of like evaluating new collateral tokens and also evaluate existing collateral tools seeing whether you want to unfold new collateral and and also how you want to the parameters for existing collateral types and the goal is always to try to get as much like as broad discussion it's kind of I guess as rational and and as little as possible of kind of like a popularity contest so we actually try to in a way like actively prevent NPI holders from having too much influence at the granular level so it's just like you know whoever whatever an NPI will like whatever random coin that they like gets like the special treatment right but instead having it all focused on like always getting a hold of data and then applying like models that have already been agreed on and then through that coming to like this this common understanding of how we can securely include new collateral types right so essentially there's two facets to how you're deciding multi collateral die one is the degree of collateral summing victor sedums interesting is having different types of eath like ethos the collateral but different collateral rates and also the asset and so the fundamental question is should we be including trusted assets in multi collateral die and I know there's a bit there's a bit of controversy so maybe we'll start with Dan on your perspective on that sure yeah so I think as you said you know major governance is extremely complex process and right now it's as far as active governance decisions it's basically just setting one number right and it's still it's still like a relatively hard to get this right and the mechanisms for it um I think I still sort of like being involved and and improved and so by at you know by moving to all the collateral dies it doesn't recognize you know that you're really dramatically increasing the number of decisions of this but this process has to has to make and in my view I think that that quite possibly increases the risk much more so than the diversification maybe maybe reduces it and then as even mentions there's there's also this there's risk regulatory risk that comes in if you're starting to use tokens that can be that can be prison by government or custodial risk if it's something that's backed by by actual asset being held by a PI custodian but I think maybe most important to me anything is model risk it's just the idea what if maker governance isn't up to the task evaluating this ability and relevant sort of relative risks of a really diverse before portfolio of assets and maybe it's worth talking about sir what you see as in the future these assets being because I think is not great it's not just on chain assets as you said and I think you know that's I think that kind of risk is maybe what scariest to me because that's that's the kind of thing that caused the 2008 financial crisis where you know there's the smartest people in the world had models that was fundamentally wrong and things that they thought were like triple-a rated debt were actually zeros and that doesn't that kind of going from going from valuable there's nothing you see that happen a lot in these more complex instruments I don't think that's likely to happen in an in a simple asset like aetherium so that's why I'd say I think the when you see appearance would drive down we saw an maker destiny survived a 95% almost dry down in the price of you when you see this happen like it happens gradually enough that the system actually is able to handle it to liquidations whereas again if you would have an event like the 2008 financial crisis and a lot of this sort of like I don't know what behind mortgages that you would have back in it where did your not be zeros that seems like I was like I likely different data crisis yeah okay so there was a lot of points and I'll try to like I mean I think learning the the fundamental point are like one of the really crucial fundamental points is this like this question of the complexity of governance and finance in general and I mean I think the most basic thing to understand is that that risk is is always there right like finance and money it's just incredibly complex and just because you because you ignore the complexity or don't address it doesn't mean it goes away and and there's actually no like when you think about like models and and sort of like how to think about risk and so it like that the truth is a sector that like there's never there's never like and anyway to kind of solve this problem I said you just like make it good enough model or something like that and that's kind of like solid solid prop in fact sometimes thinking that you've you know the biggest risk is thinking that you've solved the problem risk and now there's no longer any more risk right and in my opinion that really is there's really is only sort of like only one sort of like rock-solid truth that you can grasp onto and that you can depend on and that is that diversification helps with risk right that's because in the end if you think about risk as like you know purely in terms of blacks ornaments so like that you never know if whatever Bitcoin or you or etherium or housing or anything like you never know if it's all just like a big lie and it's all you know it doesn't make sense at all and everyone was just getting really excited about something that really didn't make sense at all right or whatever there could be some hidden financial engineering build-up that's gonna make it all pop or something like that right and if you assume that that could happen to anything and there's no way you can ever prevent that or like predict that then the only way you can defend yourself is by making sure that you can survive that happening to like a piece of the portfolio of that right so that even if all real estate takes completely that shouldn't take that right or even if all of crypto goes to zero that also shouldn't kill the system right or and and the most important like what you really want to achieve is like a situation where you can have several of these scenarios happening at the same time sort of stacking on top of each other and the system can still survive because this like the other critical point of this is like is maker governance up to the test right like maybe even though you know the foundation has obviously been very careful in how all them cow is distributed and really like and in terms of like them the models until the model risking like the like just like them the methodology the focus has always been on trying to get experts from the traditional space but like very you know very broadly and like very diverse but but ultimately like at least rely as much as possible in traditional models so that's just at least there's something already there that can don't ABBA but even if that turns out to not work so well the whole like the whole concept of maker is that when there is a loss they pee ah homeless they have to have salt that loss right and that actually creates this dynamic that over time you can see makers this like evolutionary system that rather than just like thinking really hard and like totally like solving risk and that sort of problem it won't be just be so smart which is unlikely to be how things play out right it'll be basically this like process of trial and error and like very real consequences of errors that then make it very clear that you know it is there's a big advantage to actually getting it right and and making sure that this system evolves in the right direction is our concern for me in terms of trusted assets is if we were to play this out right let's say using token s real estate from you know that was underwritten by investment banks like Goldman you know the financial crisis the problem was these assets were mis appropriately tagged right and that's an incentive problem really these banks were more incentivized to do it incorrectly than then accurately and even if we have this very open decision making you know transparent maker process we aren't necessarily going to go all the way down to the way that that debt or real estate the mortgage was issued and so how do you see that counterparty risk playing in or make or even maybe a leaving like are you going to start creating risk teams that go all the way downstream to how the asset was created or simply at the level of what assets should be included in multi collateral well I certainly think that that exact problem is something where blockchain gives us the best shot ever at getting you know very granular data but I also but actually I think and such an important point right is that if you look at something like the financial crisis it really was like the fundamental thing that went wrong was really greed right and like and like misaligned incentives but more than that really like greed and and bad culture and that's where I think I mean what make him realize on in this it's like lots of Russian very very basic psychology of like yeah you might be greedy but then you're gonna get slept with you know the entire loss that you create right whereas the bankers they knew that the government had to deal with the fallout right which is this like horrible you know like perfect storm of like Reid and bad incentives and that structure and so on right but like but actually to like the only way you can only like you always have to take it back to diversification it's like even if you whatever like solve greed or like you know have this like have this like you know at least like it's clear consequence to being overly greedy and and you also like dig all the way down and get all the data about the specific assets and so on you still have to always assume that you might be wrong regardless so again the only thing you really do and they can still hold on to us being something that that that it's very likely to work is to you know don't depend too much and go with sex only might make sure you also depend on all the other investment base and also all the assets that don't even have anything to do with invisible things and why does he's and so on and so on right and basically accept the fact that many times you're going to be wrong but you'll get to learn from those mistakes and also on a whole if the portfolio is well enough diversified it'll you know it'll just be absorbed and sort of be a part of the general process of the system so we can potentially solve for greed here I'm a little bit concerned that like if that's what makers trying to do that's that's really running at an almost bigger target than a government's process could ever handle and I guess I I think of the financial crisis is motivated not so much by greed but by opacity like we didn't know what those things were we didn't know who owed what to who and how these things would compound and so I think that the maker process could potentially benefit so much from the fact that it's all Unchained and that all the assumptions are Unchained to like how we're evaluating these assets how we're looking at these things becomes a major difference in how the 2008 financial crisis played out and I think that that's my thought to your dan I mean I think you're exactly right there's no way the maker token holders can be doing the evaluation of each and every one of the decisions that come across you know that they're they're sure here with you know what should we price this one person's mortgage at but I think the idea is that we have a lot more transparency and I think we build systems that over time start to have their own support networks and they don't film they filter up in a way that maker token holders are incentivizing them to filter up right if there's some sort of bounty for alerting the system right that's one way you could design a crypto economic incentive here for people to report up dangerous you know flaws in some sort of model and and it's a long process I don't think we're getting there right away but I think that's that's the sort of long range of you that it's not about making direct decisions but kind of like how we're gonna do the process thing and I think like for me the model days like Wikipedia that's like the maker token allure to become the mods but they're not the ones that are actually contributing all the actually data of like this is what we're gonna look at here and it's it's a you know not perfect analogy but I think it's one that is at least optimistic right that there is a way to do this kind of decentralized you know project that nobody really thought could work and generate a public good in this case information in makers case you know value but I guess I'm bullish but I think that uh we should be solving for transparency first yeah yeah I just typically I mean I don't think that you can solve greed either and there wasn't I mean it's a joke that like even if you solved it that you still actually haven't fixed the problem right because they're still stupidity into it but I mean yeah you can't can't solve stability you can't solve greed these are like natural human characteristics right but but you're totally right with transparency we're like proper incentives and then crucially very strong transparency around those incentives right and around those consequences you can at least like yeah like right like you can use people's self-interest towards something positive rather than again in the case with the financial crisis the self-interest really was like just misaligned with the public interest entirely person's shareholders were incentivize right in the same way maybe that maker holders are and you know ends up being a zero I think like you know all the bids potentially where the equity shareholders that were wiped out or the Saudis leave discount like there were a lot of incentives there but the problem is because of just just the inherent complexity like you set up finance you necessarily have to delegate these kinds of decisions to to experts and ultimately you know that introduces the same principle agent problems that you that you're having in big banks and yes certainly I can I think like a lot of the of the individual actors maybe of those banks where we're not correctly incentivized to act in the best interest of ultimately the shareholders an ultimately stability the system that I don't see how you get around that and in fact like in maker may even it may even be more dangerous because because you have this risk that fee that MPR shareholder for example could be could be bribed in order to to make a decision that this may be to the best interest of the attacker but not and to their best interest but isn't ultimately in the messengers of the value for system of stability of a system so you have the view of these new sort of you introducing a lot of new principal agent problems they're actually these do exist in traditional finance of in short anything short or like your derivatives to reduce your exposure back when you own five i if you you know this does end up like in some ways increasing right a lot of the indirectness that cause surprises yeah you make me look too much of a celebrity so the first one is that shareholders and banks had the same reset it's that MK almost have in the financial crisis which I mean which is is true right and it to some extent is how like it on one hand it is how things are meant to play out but I think also at the same time exactly if you look at like the way that that public companies are currently structure and like the way they exist in in society like the framework itself actually recognizes that there really is a major disconnect between shareholders and the actual management a whole organization and even you know you up and say that like there's like a fight between them right and they're using some legal means to always battle over the resources between each other right and I mean if you what I think the analogy of Wikipedia like imagine if in the lead up to the financial crisis you actually had the technology that allowed you know shareholders to get sort of like a clear visualization of what what you know what they were cooking up in there where like all this those derivatives and kind of like you know for instance just see something like what like what's our what's our level of diversification right like how much exposure do we have to two particular things right and then ultimately you know at a much more granular level individual decisions would have to be okayed on a you know and on a recurring basis with like a you know almost like an apple some imagine like a shareholder app where then they'll be like okay we're gonna do all these like new CEOs and we're doing them like you know like here's a video explaining how we're doing all these things yes or no kind of right like that I mean I think if you imagine that type of scenario and especially with like blockchain technology and I guess also most crucially like a very focused education campaign that's sort of like you know towards the shareholders and and combining all of these things together I definitely think that you you would have a much more higher likelihood of like you know catching something like this in the aect so okay so that's so that's like the the first element up right then the second thing you're talking about I think it's very interesting is like this a tech MPI Hollis can be bribed because so now we're getting into crypt economic attacks which is like a whole class of like crazy things you have to think about when you do defy and and blockchain apps in general and maker actually has a very strong defense against this entire class of attacks really right because what we like basically that but what we are what we are getting into is like the point where MPI holders might decide that they're better essentially using their ability to control the system for something else than keeping dice table right until you I mean I think like the thing is once you get into governance attack scenarios and cryptic atomic attacks there's you very quickly get into let's try to steal all the collateral so maker is needs to be built so that it can you know even survive like everything like all em calendars colluding and saying we're gonna correct we're gonna steal look level and the basic the basic defense is that there's always like security delayed on all governance decisions so that they can be scrutinized to see whether you know whether like is this actually like a decision that's just getting pushed through completely circumventing the governance framework and circumventing all like the transparency and and all the sort of the you know the day are driven models that are supposed to drive governance and if and if that's the case it's very likely it's an attack and then in the in the worst case scenario what you actually do is that you you you actually like do what's called emergency shutdown so you shut down the system entirely and then you take the attackers and Kia and you you can rip like once you have the system shut down you can remove the Tigers I'm care entirely you redeploy the system do like a migration process that's quite similar to how we upgrade to multiple level die will work now and this is a very extreme scenario but it really is like I mean the the mechanism has to be there because of course it would never work if you could just like you know steal a collateral or like damage the system just because you you control API building power so I think we have about 10 minutes left and I think this is a good time to open up the floor for any questions so if you have any questions please come up to the mic up here if you don't have any questions we can continue you know one victim good morning I have a question regarding the migration and the deprecation the first single collateral by and I've asked around a few times in but most of the time the answer comes down to the overhead of having to system to manage and I personally find that it's somewhat of a weak argument considering the amount of money involved and I feel uncomfortable with the fact that the system would eventually be forcefully deprecated versus the market choosing which version of die to prefer yeah and so on just so clarifying questions are you specifically talking about that you think is it would be desirable to have a version of die that's back to only by you correct yeah so I mean so so the first part of that is right it's really like the thing is that there are there are level of like security measures and especially crypto economic defense solutions built into the multilateral by code base that just means that over time it really makes no sense to hold on to like to single at all die even I mean even though single that'll die it's it's been incredibly security tested right it's been battle tested for years at this point but you know the multi level of like code base is actually older than the single and all that code base like multi-level that has gone through this incredibly long like multi-year research and development process that has produced like some you know like code with a level of sort of security s like principles that are you know an order of magnitude better than what you haven't seen for let will die so from a technical perspective it really is like I mean if you want to look at like a timescale of decades it really makes a lot more sense to rely on the MCD code base but then to the second point about there the fact that there might be demand for a stable and it's only backed by Eve I mean this is something that we we that started really coming up in the community once like basically a parodic group and just like the people who are involved in maker crumblin started realizing that maker governance had for years been you know figuring out how can we scale the dye supply and how we needed real-world assets for that and this a solution that was proposed by I mean actually some some guy on Twitter in in this conversation was that because maker will support synthetic assets anyway right so they'll also be like a euro stable kind and makers revenants can actually create whatever kind of synthetic asset they want that means they could also create a new asset so like a new single collateral die which is NI like right now I refer status a purely died right so like an like a new stable point that's backed only by eath but using the multiple level type framework so it has all those advantages of security and also something like that you know the die savings rate and that's kind of easy and I'm like the full set of features and so I think that if they're really turns out to be a critical mass of demand for that then it'll be trivially easy for maker governance to like create a follow-up single a little die and then another thing to consider is a single titled I will actually continue to run in the background for quite a while even after multi-level buy launches although much of liquidity will probably immediately move to multiple diet like it's not gonna be forcefully go away immediately so they should like evasion I think in the end as long as them there's enough demand there it'll be possible for people to to stay with the kind of stable toy they want and if I if I understand the way the system works correctly I think you are free to make a proposal to the maker multi collateral die system to make this single collateral based one so you know it's not something that you have to rely on maker making that call you can also participate thank you if there are any other questions I guess if we are simulating a world where we are using off chain assets which assets would we use and maybe we have different perspectives on that I mean I think the bit like I think it's cool to look at is that act like the actual proposals and actual like collaborations that the foundation at least has been been looking at recently and okay one really cool example is paper chain so this is a blockchain start-up that's tokenizing royalties for light like music artists that are selling music and spotify and they are and and if you're not like a really big shot musician you you actually have a lot of issues who like how do you even like finance your your you know like you're near recording and all this stuff and and they were I don't think that like they were not very good infrastructure for people who who weren't like at the very high level and so this thought I was trying to solve that issue by enabling them to tokenize you know the claim on their on their future royalties for something like Spotify and and then this asset can actually like and that ain't gonna be like it did so easy 20 token that will fit straight into into maker and I think I think that's like a really cool example of like some very you know very like out there like type of exposure then it's incredibly no it's like it creates a lot of diversity of is the compared to something like just having it all be real estate or having it all be crypto but then beyond that I mean real estate there's there's several startup sort of trying to figure out how to get how like get real estate into multiple adult I over you know I mean it's a large journey because of all the regulation that's involved of course and the same goes for for trade finance and there's actually also anything is pretty cool is like fluidity the creators of s well they have completely unknown without any sort of like without ends of collaboration involvement from the media foundation create their own like the whole like own step and and proposal and kind of like approach of how they want to introduce t-bills s collateral especially in order to like generate sufficient liquidity for dialing enabled it to like scale in a much more elastic fashion when there's like big swings in the market right that's really just think then did you have them just like that yeah so I mean I I think real estate I certainly see the demand for borrowing against real estate but I I think you know there's very clear sort of like systemic risks around it and in fact I think like you know practically every credit crisis ever has all that has been driven by some kind of real estate bubbling firing again some leverage in real estate and so I think I think I think there's that risk and I understand the points about about diversification but ultimately like quite often when such a crisis happens it hits the whole sector hits everything what weirdly enough I think the ailing like when you if you if you actually just are tied to an asset like either I think we've seen that even the sort of a dramatic fall in the price of ether over the course of a year was it was it was perfectly fine for a single collateral die I don't yeah I think I don't think we've ever seen a case where you've had like a commodity of Model T crash like that fast or having a crisis or a or a boom or a bubble driven just by like a single commodity as Christ and sorry that's part of I suppose my argument for why I sort of arguably not the first fine at all makes more sense from retrospective yeah and I think it's a good point that most credit bubbles in the past have been based on real estate and it I mean I also think what's especially interesting to look at is how the financial crisis was really this example of like a crash and really where it really you know it wasn't like the theory of crash to die survive right it really was like a 1 to 0 type of crash but I mean they're also examples of crashes that had nothing to do real estate and I think the one that's most relevant crypto is obviously the dot-com crash right and and here and like the thing is the problem with time to die only to eat and lie creating a stable coin and creating like a monetary system that's based only on like that you know something that is it like it's a little bit equivalent to like a tech stock right like I mean like a tech asset right is that what you're essentially doing is you're like taking it I mean okay this is very very simplified right but imagine if you took the same dynamic up like CEOs and derivatives upon derivatives upon derivatives that had been applied to real estate in the financial crisis imagine if that had somehow been applied to like tech stocks in the dot-com bubble right like because and because then that would have could husband have been even more insane and violent than then the dot-com bubble already was right so in the end I mean I think this dynamic of like and and well actually I think a really critical point is that like things only really go ever go wrong when Finance kind of like starts putting the cart before the horse right and that's the that's the problem with with a decentralized stable coin or like a single collateralized stable point isn't that it works great when eath it's kind of like driving the the show right and like die is kind of like relying on Eve for its value but if we end up in a situation where Eve is suddenly being like propped up by die because die is now like this big monetary system and it's creating all this light it's channeling all this credit into a theorem and and that way you actually end up with it like with die driving a theory in price instead of a theorem like driving or like or like stabilizing that price then that's when if the if the market starts turning and the theory price that's falling or it just the die supply starts shrinking because it turns out there's a better stable going to something with that that's when you can get what's referred to as a death spiral where you know as the etherium price falls the die supply shrinks because of liquidations and because the dice like die is driving the eve price as a die surprise shrinks eath fault even more and that's when you can get that kind of like 0 like 1 to 0 2007 and where real estate turns out to be worthless type of scenario and again their I mean the only known way to deal with is to assume that it'll have them at some point and diversify as much as possible so a happy medium the way I'm seeing that is you know you can diversify and also maybe have on chain assets when we can have other crypto assets on aetherium so things like TBT see once that's live that might be really interesting to put in multi collateral die i think our time is up so thank you all for joining us this early morning and hope you can follow the multi collateral dark eyes