MEV Redistribution - Anton Bukov, Tom Schmidt, et al.

tom do you want to the stage is yours and i ask all panelists and moderator to turn on your camera while everyone else turn off your camera cool the questions uh for the panels have been shared in the mev.wtf agenda okay i think we're all here do you wanna do like a round of intros um to start maybe uh vaughn if you wanna start hi i'm yvonne and i i've been doing me research for a while and particularly front running and then i'm advising dragonfly capital and building mining dao which i think john mentioned in one of his previous slides i guess i'll take it from here hi everyone i'm wurri clarkman ceo and co-founder of blox route we've been working on the network layer of blockchains which has a lot to do with defy and frontrunning and pretty much get your transaction faster to pools also with my hat off back run me which tom mentioned earlier and it's super cool to be here kinda like here with tom and ivan and joey this is like whoa all the friends stand together and kind of go let's do a panel together uh jaron i love no less but like this is an opportunity hi joey hi everyone i'm joey zackerel and i'm a founder at keyboard all where we provide infrastructure for capturing and distributing mev um to users and keepers and a variety of others as well with the goal of making d5 more secure and profitable and my background includes trading market making automation engineering decentralized exchanges and cyber security hi my name is anthon i'm co-founder of one inch i'm also uh interested in discussing uh different uh blockchain related things like consensuses of different projects to economics and of course uh minor extraction value uh yarn or your own i'm sorry i don't know how to pronounce your name uh yeah hi yeah so i'm your own founder of be protocol which shift uh well it was profit to the users in learning platforms previously the cto of kyber network we were doing a lot of on-chain market making and previously one of the founders of smart pool which was the first decentralized mining pool on ethereum i'm uh i'm glad everyone get together this is really like a stacked panel so i'm glad you guys are all here um i i guess you know we've sort of been talking a lot i think at the event about um you know where does he come from who's who's taking it what what do you do as a protocol and these are these are kind of around like you know any of you mitigation techniques and things like that but i think at a certain point to an extent nav is always going to exist um and so i think the question is almost like um is there a fair distribution of mev in your mind um where you know who which actors do you think sort of deserve some amount of med and how how do you actually go about achieving something like that i can try to volunteer on this one i guess the way i think about mev is kind of after you've accounted for everything med is what remains uh it's kind of this like weird thing at the agile protocol and so i would say kind of fairness is a second order thing it's much more important to minimize it and kind of by the time you define like what it is and what fairness is you might as well fix it and there's specific examples of that where the vast major at least like half of all meds like front running uniswap and uh even flashpots which kind of started on the idea of like making it fair right now it's kind of this backdoor way of solving it where you could now send transactions as privately on 85 hash rate or you could do use background dot me and so kind of if you can do kind of the 10x step and avoid front running kind of why would you work on on kind of redistributing it fairly it doesn't super matter whether it like goes to like a kid doing of the bot it's kind of worse if it goes to a pool but still fine um i'd like to start maybe by saying what is a bad fare but is it really unfair distribution or a bad distribution and i think the situation and and this i think goes kind of like against the idea of flashbacks here which is something i like i want to push against is the idea if if we really optimize and maximize so you have like searches trying to get as much mev and possible and then they try to out to beat one another and almost all that value goes to the pools and pools being um competitive with one another would probably be forced to pass these revenues to their miners right so they'll keep just a tiny thing and that goes back to the miners making mining more competitive therefore more miners join and we spend more electricity on mining and so we took all that money we passed it along leaving very very small crumbs along the way and eventually paid it all to like electricity companies so that would be an unfair way so i think i'd kind of like want to point out that when thinking about fairness it's not like well the user should have it it's about like how much the miner should have let's i think it's important maybe not to optimize it to a race to the bottom maybe try to think about it as can we have some reasonable like x goes to the minor y goes to the user but not to make it an optimization race which at the end of the day might be worse off even if it's like economically optimized and you're essentially taking something that you know has some negative connotation to it kind of spinning it and making it healthy and livable and help it make the system grow and and distribute to you know various other people involved um and so the way that we like to look at the various parties you know there's there's users there's keepers or searchers you could even consider liquidity providers there's there's d5 products and then there could even be a market maker which could be like an automated user or automated liquidity provider um you know trying to kind of make this mev something more healthy and less unhealthy and distributed around makes a lot more sense especially when you focus on the users who you know historically were kind of um i guess you know abused and sandwiched and front run and tailgated yet they received zero of it you know it's a lot of times they're actually the ones who are responsible for making the profit opportunity you know to to have existed in the first place by some action that they performed maybe it was a a lending position maybe it was a trade that they made um you know and so if these you know as mentioned earlier if these kind of like leftovers as a result of people interacting with these protocols generating these mevs opportunities you may as well you know distribute them um that's maybe a good segue to the sort of the second question which is um it seems like you know a year ago or two years ago really the answer was sort of like um it's some sort of split between minors and and bots and people started participating in pga and now everything they were talking about is is sort of shifting um uh the these this mev to daos or to individuals directly sort of like with with background me for example um which of these do you think is kind of more likely to prevail in in the long run or maybe the next few years is it sort of you know individuals basically get to reap their own mvv maybe you could argue rfq or like isn't something like that or a background or something like that or like a d5 saver or something like that or do you think it's going to be sort of more darified where it's um you know the liquidations and the arts go back and do like some sort of pool on chain and we all sort of sort of benefit from it yeah okay so maybe to answer you know the first question first uh thinking in my opinion you know like fairness in mev is eventually the point where you know traders and users don't need to have you know some kind of specialized personal connections or business collect connections with the players you know in the ecosystem for example miners etc uh which eventually you know currently they must have some in order to become profitable and eventually this just keep you know players out of the game very similar to how now you you know you cannot be as serious ago traders if you have unfair benefits and you know centralized exchange arenas so you know me as an average trader will not go into bitmex because i have no you know fair chance there so i think same should be applicable also for defy and you know right now if you have to have some connections with miners or have some specialized knowledge to use the flashlight boats etc uh so in my example this is also some kind of unfairness in mv yeah that's very it's like uh i guess that's sort of the flashbots idea right which is like okay we can do it but like you know make it kind of auction and transparent so like everyone gets access to it instead of you know having some special hookup with a minor and tom to your question i think maybe me and joey are kind of like on the two ends of the spectrum kind of like between keepers and backgrounds so i think and and i'm not sure me and joey feel very like bad about it i think both options are kind of okay and both are are livable with right you could do something like like keeper in which the platform itself have all these actors so it's a dao it's a product or whatnot and the users can come into that knowing oh what are the pros and cons and so maybe if like if they know what they're getting into and if it's not competitive they'll go somewhere else and therefore just like if you uni swap takes like right they'll like take 0.3 and that's fine so maybe keeper taking the mev and if that's comparable then that's also fine and so there's a question like that's one i think okay solution rn on iron would say well you know who mentioned it earlier was it that i think so that providing the order book is actually providing value if i'm kind of like if i have or the transaction stream me as the user has the power i can make this trade here or there like i could choose to do it on c5 or d5 or which protocol specifically so i i'm i'm going to want a piece of of of the profit if you want my transactions and so like the user will hold some of it i assume a bunch of it will go to again whether searcher or or miners or whatever but definitely the user holding a significant piece and i think maybe that kind of like defines a spectrum yeah yeah so this wasn't intended to be sort of like uh which you think is like right or which do you think is like ethical it's more like what do you think is more more likely and i guess the other question is is there a third option like i kind of see people on so i was gonna just say since uri and joey offered kind of the two opposing options i'm gonna do a third one uh and i think this is kind of like a more long-term hypothesis but curious what you think so if you think okay like who really owns med it's like is it kind of the anime avatars on twitter like do they own the information that the user is trading on union swap the answer is of course no they were just like the first to figure out you could extract value that way and so now that there's a lot of avatars on twitter 90 of that goes to the miners in terms of fees but if you ask okay do the miners own that the answer is still no the miners are entitled to be paid for block space but not for like the full value of the transaction if somebody is trading a billion dollars like they're not entitled to extract all of it and like that's the core of the med crisis but there's private transactions and so on and so if you like really kind of unroll that game into the future and try to think like who actually owns the interactions i think the answer is wallets because there's nowhere up the stack to go and kind of wallets are the ones that that really do the the user interaction and so i think kind of the the long-term outcome is kind of that value according to like metamask or it may be gnosis safe because it's like that's where the big transactions are or like fire blocks and so on and by the way like if you guys read money stuff by matt levine which is fantastic if you if you don't like you totally should he keeps saying that you know crypto rediscovers traditional finance kind of step by step and stumbles and like all the same places and so i would say like maybe now is the time to rediscover like the robin hood plus citadel type sort of payment forward or flow situation where there's like the wallet that owns the user and some are azure that sort of does you know the background but not the front running kind of like the way background me does that and so we out hypothesized that to be the the long-term equilibrium so so that's a really good interesting point and so first of all i'll say don't say bad things about like anima on twitter 0x2 would come for you i'm not saying that um second that's an interesting like i love this thesis here this is like oh you think it could go up to the wallets and wallets would be happy about it because up until metamask started to make money i think like a year ago or something like that like there was a huge question of how wallets are actually going to to kind of like monetize all their users and it wasn't that easy for them but then i'm not sure i agree that's the last step like if you have metamask and metamask is making tons of money in comes i don't know competitor number one and said you know what i'm going to give you exactly the same experience and i'm going to give you part of that and so it goes back to i think the user the user is standing on top of the wallet maybe the wallet will take a chunk there's a question of like network effect and like like how which one would use what but i'm not sure i agree with you that well you have to stop there i would argue that the user can totally choose to use a different wallet if the wallet passes a giant a big chunk of these values both disagree so like first off definitely love the fact that there's a way to monetize wallets you know they've been sort of sitting on they they've been doing useful things for years and years but then second i think kind of wallets are this like scary thing to replace with like your seed that could get stolen so i think there's definitely kind of a baseline where if it's if i'm getting paid like a cent i'm not i'm just not going to do this and then finally kind of the other part part of that equation is like once you're trading on one inch or not you're a swap there's no backgrounds and there should be no front runs in the first place so like i definitely agree with you that sort of med like as a percentage of the ecosystem turns down to zero but like as the ecosystem explodes wells are still in a pretty good position to capture kind of a small percentage of it i guess i think back to the comparison of uh individuals versus dowels i think that line is a little bit blurred too because dowels really are made up of individuals and dowels tend to cater towards the individual and kind of try to empower them as a group um and then even if you want to think about it from the searcher or the keeper's perspective um you know you could have you know a keeper i actually you know someone and i'm one right too as well who essentially would you know use this tool and that tool you know they may use a background me and they may use keeper down and they may also use flashbots and anything else as well so i think i think the line is a little bit blurry there i don't necessarily think that you know just individuals or just uh dowels or just uh some third option has to win yeah guys let me add um i i'm pretty sure everyone noticed what happened to flashbots after flashbots was launched some of the dubs starting to start to exploit flashbots to hide from flashbot active users so if you would even like in one inch we have flash transactions it's not working with metamask but would work with your ledger because metamask will send it to mempool uh it's not possible to prevent it yeah but you can put your transaction into flashbots it and it will be mined without disclosing it before it will be included into blockchain or in case of reordering uh reorganization it could happen that it will be shared but what i actually uh think that mev belongs to users and we need some kind of layer one protection like blockchain layer protection from front running and from uh abusing users uh because right now uh i believe that miners and uh all these arbitrage traders they are like handling all these issues but they're like uh trying to earn things which not belongs to them and there are a number of projects who are working right now on general prevention of front running but not back running for sure uh i've heard of uh metrolabs and starkware so in the perfect world we would see a maybe vdf pdf based solution to prevent front running background is not that much a problem for user because uh it usually happens because of inefficient trades if a user shifts the market significantly and this uh creates arbitrage opportunity uh anyone can background this transaction to earn this uh inequality on different prices uh but as far as as far as med belonging to users and uh sort of you you mentioned flashbots as well so like do you think basically flashbacks plus one inch solve md or at least on the on the sort of not the like liquidations but at least on the sort of buying and selling side like there's no front runner there's no backgrounds no no i think it's i think actually it's abusing of flashbacks functionality and next step flashbots should share these bundles with everyone who would like to listen like if any service would like to use flashbots to to just send transactions flashbots should share these bundles with anyone to allow anyone to replace these bundles rub these bundles to do anything with these bundles because uh actually it is amazing i agree it is abusing but it's a good thing right they've built this thing and now you could use it sort of for the user and as they transition to sgx there there would be a way to do this without even relying on honesty assumption so like it doesn't matter sort of how we ended up here right there it seems like a solution i i believe it will work only in short term and next version flashbots would just share this painting bundles with everyone i hope that i wonder if tina wants to find on this i don't know um but i i want to be contrary again for a second there is a very big difference between front running and mev and we're all kind of like focusing well backgrounding is solvable right if you just like route it around to everybody raise the entire market and it's not entirely true because you'll raise the entire market what but what about c5 right so you can do d5 c5 arb and you can't do that from within d5 so but maybe like unless you're moving giant chunks of money i think maybe it's good enough but mev is about minor extractable value right if you're the miner you're about to create a block and all of a sudden price crashes on coinbase you see that and you're the miner and you can put a transaction you're not frontrunning anybody um i think sunny called it to the blind front running or something like that the idea of the miner has value which it can capture because it organized a transaction it's something which i think is inherent and we're we're not going to solve that easily so maybe we can solve front running but i'm not sure that's that's the the current thing i'm not even sure it's the big thing i'm not sure if you if you'll be thinking about d5 c5 arb whether that's might not be a bigger opportunity than the front-running individual transactions of people on d5 i don't know but i think so or it's at least a possibility that uh i mean your note on sort of like c5d if i arbitrary like a lot of the complicated strategy that we're seeing now is maybe a good segue i'm kind of curious you know what you guys are seeing maybe specifically uh joey and avon that sort of like the frontier of the bot space um you know i think generalized front running seeing some of these generalized front running bots um i'm operating the mempool was like been pretty surprising to me and i think a lot of other folks but are you seeing like other novel technologies that people are employing or like what do you see as the end game um for for sort of you know uh in in d5 right now i can take a stab so yeah so far all the pending transactions have been public and so my understanding is like most of generalized running bots have essentially been copy bots the idea is like oh can i send the same transaction but like from my address and make that make that money and then then it becomes like a cat and mouse game where it's like if you if you kind of invented this strategy yourself you want to sort of complicate this so that people are not able to steal it and then you sort of try to like decomplicate that and so on uh i think flashbots is a major major change in that landscape because uh again all the strategies you could submit privately and so you a these like copy bots would no longer work at all and i don't think they do anymore even even right now at 85 percent hash rate there's just no point and so uh i would say that now these generalized or i don't even know if it's like the most money to make or whatever but at least kind of the technological and frontier and sort of the frontier of what's interesting is would be the bots that just like take the new block and try to figure out okay like what the hell are like the new opportunities that came up in that block and i think the first approximation to this is mithril if you guys have seen this tool it's like a security analysis tool that just like magically transforms dvm into this like symbolic execution and tries to find pathways to make more money and it it already has like all the tooling for that and i think the the the author bernard miller even built this into a tool that's called like a scrooge mcsteel or something where you like literally tries to like you know do do that thing and sort of extract the money uh i've looked into it i haven't had such a great experience if somebody manages to like use it even to like birth a cryptokitty you know send me an email i'd be impressed but there's definitely a lot to like work on but oh scrooge mc ether face uh but yeah yeah i think kind of that's at least kind of the the way to think about it in a way we built deep blue and alphago we may as well build something like this yes i i see um i see a lot of separate ecosystems forming and even co-existing um similar to how say you know our oceans consist of unique marine life um ecosystems all within the same planet you know so we have a variety of strategies that you know historically would thrive on public mempool you know nowadays we also have strategies that thrive using tools like flashbots but then there's also even more specific like task oriented automation projects say like numer ai or gelato these are maybe less related to mev but still very much related to botting um but then i say generalized um front running does kind of seem to be an end game for some ecosystems but then uh private mempool um kind of changes the rules and economics so you know for example we're building a keeper coordinator that essentially enables you know users and keepers to kind of coordinate together it prevents things like gas auction spring triggers so it's essentially a walled garden right but the idea here is you focus less on competition and front running and more on just efficiency but in this type of environment you really want to cater towards the the coordinator's algorithm right so the algorithm is essentially designed to maintain a healthy ecosystem so it's like it changes the strategy right so but again back to you know separate ecosystems i think i think you may ultimately see generalized front running kind of just solve certain ecosystems but then private mempool is kind of totally separated there could be you know tools and technologies and skill sets from generalized front running applied to even private mempools but at the same time you're kind of more catering to whatever the coordinator is you know whoever's setting the rules in that ecosystem in the you know the walled garden um tom um we kind of like jumped question three which i really wanted to get like i do want to go to i just thought we were talking about bots like i want to go into yeah if you guys are down we can we can sort of jump to question three or question four now i guess um which is good but uh basically about sort of the shift to uh proof of stake uh which is you're sort of rapidly approaching um i'm curious how you guys sort of view uh maybe the second order effects of the move to previous stick with respect to mev um what are some things that maybe we're not thinking about or not seeing right now so so i thought of it a bit and i have my own opinion which seems to be again like not a lot of people think that way and i would really like to like like definitely join yvonne and look like um i'm your own i know you're less of that but really maybe get some pushback on this but my perspective is that we saw that mev he was what 700 million dollar in the past um 18 months or something like that and we all talk well 700 million that tons of money but then when i'm thinking about the move to pos and it's kind of like i'm thinking okay we're going to have stake like validators run by really large organizations that's going coinbase is going to be a big validator minus is going to be a big validator a bunch of others are going to run the validators and when you think about the large stakeholders okay just think whether they are centralized or decentralized okay if ease is worth 200 billion dollars or so and if d5 tokens on top of it is another 50 billion dollar and coin just coinbase is another 50 billion we're talking about a total value of businesses and tokens and econo economies on top of if which are worse in the order of 400 500 billion dollars so 700 million dollar per year is nothing i would argue that those who are betting big on if and stuff built on heath are better off running vanilla nodes not capturing mev because the value it generates is larger than capturing mvv if you think about the legal risk for coinbase to doing these kind of things instead of i just take yes i run it or not yet because like prism or whatever and i really don't want to screw anybody over because the legal around it is a nightmare i'm not going to risk it for 700 for my share of 700 million for you so you're not going to get any from me i think i agree 100 and people there there's this phrase that cryptocurrency works better in practice than in theory i think it's one of those cases where kind of honesty assumptions become even more believable as we transition to prove a stake and so anton worried that you know like what if you know one of the flash boss participants and ends up kind of trying to screw the system i think it's kind of even less likely in the proof of stake shift and so you could just run flashbots on like the coinbase nodes or or you know back on me or sort of any kind of private mempool and that that might just be the the simplest end game but i do expect you know like regulated regulation concerns or legal concerns where you know these days regulated exchanges in the real world do give different priority classes you know to different users yeah i think that is that is true if it were uh you know we were talking about something like a unit swap or something but this is like coinbase you know running you know you have like you know nasdaq exchange giving different priority classes to different players right so why can't they scan i i mean i'm pretty sure that coinbase centralized exchange you know we give different classes of service right now right i mean so so it's not really something that is unheard of you know in the real traditional world even in the regulated space i also think that you don't want to assume um the value of mev in the future just because it changes dramatically one thing to keep in mind is that um every time ethereum scales um you get more users more protocols more products more exchanges um and history shows that every time that happens you know you're multiplying mev opportunities um and which then you know further emphasizes the need to to capture and distribute the mbv um but you know an example would be kind of thinking back to the days of you know the first few decks is popping online and the first you know big mev opportunities um you know it was great and then all of a sudden the third and the fourth and the fifth came online it was like like a lightning striking and just kind of just rejuvenated everything the bots were going wild and more bots were coming online and you know everyone was reverse engineering other people's bots and and so it's like i could see and then add in the fact that um steak is fundamentally more liquid than hash power um so you know someone could very easily double down on their stake but you know with with you know mining hardware you can't you know very easily do that right so if if suddenly mev just multiplies and multiplies multiplies and all of a sudden you know you maybe you have people kind of doubling down on their on their stake and trying to grow their pool um maybe they are now you know incentivized to to use that that ability to you know just instantly increase their pool size use that to somehow capture med with some of these tools that are available um that's that that could be you know that could be very tempting for a lot of folks even you know like a coin base so to your to your last point um you talk about hash power being less liquid but there's a giant difference between mining pools or capturing this value and miners and so miners make what 10 billion per year so even for them like it's nice seven percent increase is nice but it's not then like it's not that big for mining pools who capture just one percent out of that that's a whole lot of money and so that's a bit of that and to your rome's point about who you are one point about um um well coinbase is already in nascar giving like priority i think there's a big difference between giving priority and co-location and like access to flow compared to oh accepting bundles of sandwiching just from a legal perspective or i think there's a difference maybe i'm wrong but i'm i'm not sold on the fact that that the value of mev is great enough in order to push really really really big like people who are betting billions of dollars on each and protocols on top of it but what if these um these tools like say flashbots or mining dao you know have nice privacy features where you know all of this stuff is just kind of wrapped in and they're just you know they're just mining they're just kind of running their software and everything's built right in you know they're not intentionally doing anything it's just kind of happening it's a good question i don't know the answer but i'm i'm not i'm not sold on that the obvious answer is of course mev is going like as we see it right now we'll be in pos the same way that's kind of like my point yeah yeah it's certainly going to change yep yeah but always saying that you know and it is only a hundred of millions where you know east will be trillions but you know it will be is trillions because there is some expectation that you know most of the future financial you know transactions will be on ethereum and then also mvv will be you know orders of magnitudes higher so i i agree but it's ice or i think and correct me if you think differently i think that mev is subtracting from the value of ethereum okay the fact that you can't just transact on uni swap but you have to do all sorts like oh i have to make sure that my you route my transaction for back running and i have to use services to avoid front running and all these kind of things and even then that if value is extracted it's extracted from somebody so my argument is that if we become more valuable and the protocols on top of it if mev is mitigated minimized and not happening so that's kind of my argument that they're betting more on east and the value there rather than benefiting from capturing mev value does that make sense what better time to uh talk about you know fixing things when you're adding new features and adding upgrades right that perfect time to uh you know introduce something new to fix something is when you're saying transitioning to you know eth2 proof of stake a little bit yeah i agree that ethereum will became more variable with all these protocols working on top of it but um i believe also that miners no matter proof of work or proof of stake but yeah let's talk about proof of work they are not they will never be properly aligned with the network uh like uh interest and inspiration uh because we also can see this on this old topic of uh block gas limit you want to talk about eagle let's let's not dive deep into it because it's a hollywood you know and uh uh i'm also not sure that uh right now flashbots works not to hide that uh mev is happening but i believe if this would affect someone's reputation then some system will appear that would uh allow to hide that this mev is happening it will not be like easy to prove that miner is doing this mev it will look like someone is from training someone i'm not sure if miner is involved in this right now uh flashbots were not trying to hide this to like uh uh you know what i mean but if this would be uh if this would affect reputation they would find a technical solution to prevent trekking of miner and also uh switching from proof of work to proof of stake i believe that proof of work uh guys they are not properly aligned and i believe they will never be aligned with the interests of all the ecosystem because they don't care if this just transfers of other transfers of tokens or a or really complex defy uh transactions but uh proof of stake uh guys they are more likely to be aligned but this is also mature of uh network upgrades because right now everyone is waiting like next hard fork and uh this uh affirmative improvement proposal one five five nine but uh there is also a case that miners will not like this uh improvement proposal and will upgrade to any other hard fork excluding this because right now they are forced to get this hard four with all these ethereum improvement proposals just because of this uh um time bomb of proof of work and uh at some point in future they will be like able to exclude some ethereum proposals possibly and everyone in uh who are ethereum developers they will not be happy about it uh i think that that's uh a fair question i think it's a fair point to end on um we have i guess one sort of point or question from from youtube uh uh lauren says anything's gonna be more pervasive in proof of stake as selected validators will be able to reorder transactions over several blocks instead of one i'm curious what you guys think about that isn't it harder to reorient proof of stake that would be my impression but so it really i don't see the logic in it being easy on on like multiple blocks there is going to it's going to be easier in terms you're going to be you know your turn is in three blocks from now so it does open an angle which isn't open right now on the other hand right now with proof of work and like the the probability around it if you're one of the top three you know you have like well 10 or so like if you're right now ethereum right with the change of hash power moving away from china that's 25 of the hash power so in 12.5 of the cases they might like two blocks consecutively so i i'm not sure it's going to be more pervasive there that you're going to mine like it's hard to say at this point how decentralized um the validator landscape is going to be nobody knows i think um but i'm not sh and it's definitely opening an angle but i'm not sure yeah reorgs are honestly pretty impossible but now that already mentioned it you could have like a multi-hope uh agreements right because like if you not only you know your turn other people know their turn so if you want to do like a 10 block sensor in you you could have a service that's like opt-in and once kind of people doing the next 10 blocks opted in i think that could be an avenue for for nav energy you you can pretend to be multiple right you're you're running ten different validators sometimes like there will be consecutive you'll know it coming ahead of time so the reason that that much is the same as mining right it's like okay you run a bunch of them with the probability of like you'll be stacked like all of your validators are going to get stacked it's very low on the flip side if you can sort of scour the whole world for for for people who like also want to opt in and find the next guy after you and then the next like that that could be an attack that's not a happy thought well we're not here to hit think happy thoughts okay sorry i i came up to idea uh it's related to what he was just discussing uh let's imagine that uh mev appeared with one billion of us dollars how many uh network reorganizations we would see in next 24 hours possibly that every every miner would try to remind this block and that's why mev is dangerous right like originally i wasn't in favor of mev but like that's definitely one of the top two reasons for for some something like flashbots the other being flashbot they did an amazing job removing the whole gas bidding like where i am in the block and now we're all enjoying really low fees because of it so yeah but but actually reordering is one thing that is solved by proof of stake right true good point and like more on your example i think if you like actually think sort of this i'm not sure if it's that bad right if there's like at least a few honest minors it's like they ma they mine on on top of like one of the blocks just by being naive and then you have like a bit of an advantage and then the others are at a disadvantage so that's one defense and then the second defense if literally everyone is reminding i think i think you sort of the miners quickly realized that you know i'm not winning this no one's winning this and then they could do a thing where they sort of shift them ev onto future blocks that are like hey i'm gonna like take take like let's say like 30 of this and then 70 goes to like you know the people who mine after me and then that 70 is also split it's like okay i'll mine on top of you i'll take the 30 you get the rest and then it's kind of this actually you thought about it a lot that's why i'm on this panel but yeah yeah let's bring out the killers should this be also implemented inside know this kind of logic and also test it i want to see so i think proof of stake kind of like solves it anyway because people are not going to be reminding this and i think flashbots uh were also thinking about this like a while ago they had the idea that that was then scuttled to like route everything through a smart contract and par part of the things you could build there is kind of you like programmatically enforced in a smart contract that you know you like stake something or like give something to the future and i think kind of another way that they came up in practice was when binance got hacked for 50 million people were also debating it's like oh but like what if they sort of instead of instead of just taking the loss they essentially like offer the private key as like a bribe to the miners but then the miners would fight but then they would like pay a little bit to the next blocks and so kind of that that debate came up and kind of people thought of that solution and i guess it's doable in theory at least i think uh that's a happy happy thought to end on the billion dollar mev um thanks everyone for joining this is a really great panel really great team and um yeah i guess we'll see everyone on twitter