State of Blockchain Governance Breakout (Devcon5)

[Applause] all right everybody time us I have a very loud voice that this room is not so large so I'm not familiar the microphone and you guys it about your being clearly okay perfect great so thank you for joining our governance breakout session thank you also to all the other presenters we actually have a really exciting lineup today you're going to hear from a number of people very very hardworking very intelligent people who have fought a great deal about governance from a huge variety of projects I think we had about ten projects representatives that's that's quite exciting before we kick off before we dive into governance I thought it would be very helpful if we start with some basic introductory material and so I'll just take a couple of minutes now to introduce this concept of governance share some basic terminology do we have is it talks up are you checking the time of the timer or yeah okay and you'll give me here your huh 19 minutes [Music] sorry yeah thanks okay this is 46 month hello okay cold alright let's time it very briefly but with background my name is Lane ready I first and foremost am a blockchain core developer I've been writing software my whole life and so kind of the way I got into the blockchain space was through the technology and the code is still the main lens I use when I think about the blockchain however so I mean I sort of have had this crazy journey over the past two years I worked as an ethereal core developer for about eighteen months to two years and more recently I've been working on another project it's Hurley I bought my first copy but so what I kind of discovered as I was working on some of the core technology is that you know technology is not a solution by itself to anything okay technology is a tool that we can use to solve problems but fundamentally those problems are social problems and I think it's very critical that we attack the social aspect of those problems first one of the problems that I think is sort of unsolved today in watching this governance and that's why I care a lot about governance and I've done a lot of thinking and reading and writing and speaking about it so this is what we'll talk about in this quick talk so I'll just share some goals for the talk we'll talk about what governance is and what we're trying to cover in some terminology quick glance at the agenda and then if we have any time left we can talk some more about hearing permanence as a case thing so my goals for this talk are pretty straightforward first of all everyone just warm up get some caffeine and network though cause I just want to get people on the same page about governance right because governance is a very subjective complex topic and the reason I call this talk governance is because many people in different things when they talk about governance so just just to get your juices flowing we'll kind of talk about some of the different angles of governance ism of the different definitions of it and we'll we'll get some common terminology as well because you'll hear a lot of these terms used in some of the talks here today so let's start by answering or trying to answer this difficult question what is governance does anyone here want to offer a definition but you're paying attention you seem awake what is going to get to you how we make decisions [Music] okay yes so so max has a very good point which is that so it's very much about making decisions but and you also offer it another piece which is that it were not alone right it's how we do this with a penny more John 20 what is that what does Governance mean to you collective decision-making process execution yeah process as well cool so um I don't intend you to read all of this but this is just to show you so this is from an exercise that John and I and some of several other people never participated in recently a roundtable conversation about governance where we one of the things we tried to do at the beginning is we try to define governance we came up with all these different answers grouped into categories so it's partly about decision-making it's probably about collective actual problems it's partly about power and authority rules change management so it's a very great complex topic again I don't we don't have time to go through all of these you're free to review the slides later but the key takeaway for me is that what governance really boils down to is exactly what these two folks over here brought up which is we have to make decisions together as a community and that's a very difficult thing to do right because we all have different needs we have different values we have different preferences and so we're trying to sort of aggregate those preferences and make the best possible collective decisions we can and enact those decisions together so another very very important question to answer before we dive into governance is like what are we trying to govern and I'm going to use etherium as a case study here because it just helps to have concrete examples not the most familiar with the evidence it's kind of all these things right so like again just picking on aetherium there's the governance of the etherion foundation right and the resources it controls so that's kind of a meatspace idea it's very very specific there's also like the community which is also neat space in the sense you know human thing instead of building in a room you know around the world but it's much bigger it's very difficult to define that community there's the governance of the core protocol right that's a separate question and if there's a specification like the yellow paper in case of a theory there are independent client implementations right it's very opposed something on the order of seven or eight of these entities to house others and they each have their own governance processes there is the network itself right so this is you know individual factors running nodes and software upgrading those nodes there's the data inside like the box that's the blockchain and so this is where we have questions about accountability and things like that there's applications I'm sure you could have more things to this list for the purposes of today will mostly be focusing on these two things and obviously each speaker has their own take on this each project has their own take you'll hear about other pieces but kind of the most relevant and concrete pieces are protocols how do you govern the protocol how do we make changes to the protocol and the data because again there's very interesting questions here around availability and around property rights so this is this is sort of the main takeaway right is that governance is complex it's multifaceted it's subjective this is my own opinion there's no one like when we talk about governance we have this desire to kind of say there's a good governance right good governance is inclusive good governance is democratic governance is representative and bad governance as other things are none of those things it's really not that simple right governance is very situational and I think that different initiatives need radically different forms of governance you know if if we in this room here that's or 30-ish people in this room were to get together and you know we had a task we didn't build something or construct something maybe you know we don't need complex governance structures maybe is a small enough room we trust each other well enough and maybe speak the same language that you know maybe we decide to do something in a more efficient fashion we elect a leader and let that would either be a dictator for some short period of time and that's maybe perfectly okay again in this small context of a small group of people on a small time period but of course when we scale out to the level of a blockchain or even further to the level of a society or a continent or a nation-state we need very different things in our governance so I just want you all to reflect a little bit as you hear these talks today on them like like what is good governance but it's bad governance mean what are the criteria like thick while there is no absolute good or bad there are certain things that I think we can say or certain properties of many or most good governance systems and these are things like inclusivity and restoring a new permissionless participatory nature of these systems another very important point that I hope sets the stage for the talks today is this interesting question right so so when we talk about governance in the context that blockchain there's two very very different ankles on it there is the idea of governance of a blockchain and governance by blockchain there's a really incredible researcher named Primavera that the VP who has done a lot of really just mind-blowing mean excellent work on governance in general on blocking governance I very strongly encourage you to Google her read some of her papers and it was her she's spoken very eloquently about this topic governance of blockchain is how do we go in the blockchain itself right and that's kind of what I showed you a moment ago when I was talking about what we're governing governance by law changes have a much bigger idea which is that once we figure out how to govern these block chains then we can use them to govern things in the real world right maybe they offer an alternative to some of our existing institutions and governance structures whether its monetary whether it's you know ways to build better democracies a lot of the ideas that are being explored in the radical exchange things like that but for the purposes of today we're going to be focusing primarily the governance of blockchain right so how do we cover in these complex projects and my personal goal was that you know hopefully we come back a year from now and we figured out how to govern blockchains and then we can begin using blockchains to govern the world using projects like democracy earth which is not these projects yeah executed precision all right cool so let's just try to talk about some very basic terminology there's a lot here and a very limited time I'm not going to go through everything but this is just the core most important concepts but I think you're going to hear one of today's so very very very briefly at enemas ation is a big part of governance you know how we incentivize people to flow to participate to have skin in the game how you know in the context of blockchain are we offering block rewards or validator rewards or something like that legitimacy and authority are just really poor sexual questions in any system of governance what is kind of the source of legitimacy right why do we believe that in the context of my home country of the United States right why do we invest a power in the supreme or why do we invest power in the office of President or in the Congress what is the source of that is that the Constitution is it a set of shared values is it something else what gives those those institutions authority and what does it mean for them to have authority and execute Authority that's Francia credibility you know they're fairly self-explanatory but accountability is really really essential in governance as well so I would say a property of most good governance systems is that they are accountable and no individual no governing governmental mechanism or body is above accountability everyone's accountable is someone else's right that's what the system of checks and balances that's a very essential characteristic so I eventually checks balances right kind of different folks different mechanism keeping each other in check balancing power stakeholder this is a very controversial contentious kind of question who is a stakeholder is it just people who have a seat at the table is that people who are directly impacted by governances at people who are indirectly impacted by governance again in the context of aetherium glads happier I'm sure many of you are familiar with because you know a lot to say on this topic has suggested that sort of all human beings you know alive today and any point in the future potentially stakeholders in theory on governance because you know to the extent that in theory abhi comes a network that you know governments are built on or that's used to govern things off the block Tanner that money is built on it's a very expansive definition of stakeholder and some people have a much more narrow definition this concept of on and off chain governance so very very briefly on chained governance means when we we make decisions in you know through the protocol and they're implemented or enacted long chain this purpose takes different forms like coin voting tezo's their area maximal version of this and Carol are baptize us today off-tank governance is the old-fashioned type of governance with with meatspace you know people have been conversations online or in person this is tightly closely related to a concept called tightly coupled or loosely coupled which is also related to binding force it's non-binding governance Vitalik that's a good article on a lot of this stuff but again just this question of like when we make decisions today take effect immediately or is there some interpretation layer around those decisions we have signaling and voting rights of signaling is generally regarded as non-binding it's just a signal input into another governance mechanism versus voting which should be binding I think if you look at like what's happening with brexit today it's a very interesting question there was a vote you know and there was a single vote and you know is it the case that the government and the entire all the citizens of the United Kingdom should be bound by that vote or should there be another girl friends finding formal informal governance we have a lot of informal governance in networks like aetherium Bitcoin today where decisions get made in some kind of complex ways that aren't super well documented and understood versus more formal systems where we have you know legislative bodies and election processes you'll probably hear a lot today about different types of forks are for softworks they can be contentious or money contentious we have this concept of like user activated software Bitcoin I finally an idea I really really like which is wet coded dry code this is an idea that comes from Nick Szabo who is a legal scholar and a computer scientist he's the person who invented the concept of a smart contract as well and proposed this idea right when code is code that is interpreted by human brain right so that's like legal code in that perspective the word dry code on the other hand is code that's determined by machines and so there's this very interesting balance here between these two different and how they interact in the context of blocked hands which we could talk about for hours that's super interesting strings he's gonna come up and join us a chair a bit on her work on system it governance is super interesting an important topic it reduce your self as well I mean everybody who I am you sure the oh yeah I'm a crypto economic conference researcher and III bring to this space of blockchain all the concepts that I thought about in the field of complex systems so I'm going to talk about governance as a means of coordinating multiple agents within a system and that there's this concept of guided self organization which is basically when you allow agents to evolve by themselves and to govern by themselves but you guided a little bit so that that said that the gun to them so that they end up in a desirable state and easier manner there are several ways in which you can actually guide these agents so the first way is just to interrupts and then the second way is through the design of the dynamics of the system itself solely by implementing some sort of systemic control and then the third way is by constraining the structure of the entire governance system so I'm going to kind of mathematically characterize this so that it will be easier for you to grasp okay go alright so it just blasts who here has played with board Reno's Chopin okay closer than you might be familiar with interrupts it's basically this piece of code that whenever something goes wrong within the system or if the arena is running out of jumping processing power then that come code will come in and it will modify a certain parameter so so basically interrupts is just when you want to change for example if you have this control variable X then you change it to X Prime so that you put it in you put the system at a more desirable state so for example if your system gets stuck in a local minimum like this if your system gets stuck in a local meadow and say this is X basically you you go and intervene into the system to put this back here so then it's a it's in a what is our goal state and governance can just hop it from from there on so that the agents can just coordinate themselves from there on so then you have the problem of or another way of guiding the subarctic system using systemic control so this is when you don't just change the parameter you change the function that controls the parameter so you change f of X 2 f of X bar or f of X so instead of changing or moving at this point to here we change the function itself so if you had an initial function that looked like this you can make this new function hook like this or any any kind of functional modification this is usually manifested as an art form solid watch-chain and then you can have entire digital constitutions so this is what you want to change the entire structure in which the government governance is operating under so you can go from a democracy to occur Oh a car key or anything of that sort and this is something this is when you predefined the structure of the governance itself so now you're changing the entire set of governance policies that is defined by F 1 X 2 X all at the effects of all of the policies that determine or underlying the entire governance mechanism so you change it to G Prime so this will become basically all of the differences two sets of functions in which its moderating hunter and then you basically transform it to things like this so so that is that although it creates a huge enough amount of change you can see how limiting that is so basically in the whole field of complex systems you have this you have to spend out half self-organisation where you allow the agents to govern themselves so that you can observe emergent effects however if you if you go ahead and if you change the original Constitution itself you are guiding the system too much in such a way that the governance of that system or the behavior of that system will be too constrained or too limited in order to for you to actually observe any emergent facts so although that's high impact interpreting and highly constraining it's not also systemic control is kind of in a medium level it has some executional challenges so the executional challenges with systemic Controller standards requires a lot of coordination amongst agents do you know arrive at a consensus for you know executing a hard work whereas with interrupts it's it's very it's very low impact but at the same time it will it will definitely create a change within the system but it's the thing it's also highly flexible in such a way that you will be able to observe emergent effects even if you do change the interrupts or if you change the control parameters so those are the three ways in which you can mathematically think of how to guide self-organizing systems and I think that next layer will be talking about the different ways in which constitutions can or structures of events can be can be designed within itself of their movement thank you shitty and you're gonna do a talking later today right we can dive more into this with you later yeah okay cool so make sure not to miss that there is an enormous amount that we can learn from researchers such as Shruti who are exploring these ideas of network theory and systems theory of complex systems I've just tiptoed into this space myself and I encourage all of you to do the same check out this article is this your article there should be that's a big italics article into a constitution cool yeah okay so I'm gonna end this talk but I wanted to just show you guys a brief snapshot of what the rest of the day looks like so up next we have a talk from that it was going to talk about history of democracy and random selection is really exciting you hear about history of blockchain governance John I left that Snoke a title I think I may have throw that up there but is that accurate yeah repetition approximates that see that's approximately right and we have a bunch of sort of lightning talks of it or protocols and then we'll kind of conclude with a few more talks 50 indicates Ilya and myself and so my understanding is that this session officially ends at 12 but there's nothing here after this and the venue is open until 2 p.m. so I'm happy to stick around than anyone else else you can stick around we can go a little over time and maybe we can do a palace so feel free to go out grab lunch come back if your student sticking around I'm out of time so I'm going to put this on hold for now let's continue with the other talks and if we have any more time later that I'm happy to share more on a theory of governance with everybody okay thank you very much for this thing are you friends here you can't stop her being shorter than this myself I'm Rico I'm CEO Anthony Rose we do in dry sports but I'm going to speak about this now and we'll just talk about this later but I'm going to speak about now is and some of the ideas were widget aerospace which is random selection right somehow we think about poaching governance we have to think that we are thinking out governance and humans have to serve governance problems for basically centuries and millennia and one of the key features of early day Republic was that they were based on random selection of people it is very slow exploding [Music] so my background studies economics political philosophy then I did a PhD in collective intelligence and this is I think what brought me to this type of Tommy's so it's the person to the status is rationality is always a good thing for making decisions I tend to think that personality is everything perfect decisions but some type word for reasons can be very bad with race racism rules are trying to just move forward from interests as well randomness maze is that we have a fullest option the option that is going to be chosen he's not going to be chosen because of reasons to be chosen because of randomness so any of those can be selected and so the brain what introduces is the apprentice I what it's called a personality at non personal decision or in the selection process this means that a lot every decision is going to be impartial to be a moral different things that may be important for for some political systems especially when we fear that what reasons may be used to make a decisions so this is what's called about reproducible you may want to consider lotteries when you fear as some pathways from interfere in an additional process right so we spend a lot of time watching Lawrence debates about what is the best way to create a body system and quadratic like it's forming system in the end it's a question of how we are we get preferences so molding is a process that is based on reasons between the good or bad and lotteries is a process at this pace in other regions right and is excluded both good and bad reasons so let's see now a bit of some examples of how this has been used in history of particular systems because you know with sometimes think that we are inventing stuff but we are just discovering since Harvey will work for working for a long time in different regimes so this guy is the guy who created but you know essentially democracy no there was this connector called ideas he overthrew he gets retained in a pavilion and then he created what we know of the Greek democracy or the assembly and how it will evolve etc and you know what you did after doing these reforms of course but anyone who disappear so no one know what if you want but the things that he created the system and then left it for the citizens to vanish so you know who did that by two so this is a basic structure of the system citizens can participate in the assembly all of them are allowed provided they are like of course made and the slaves and the assembly is going to choose courts Council and magistrate and how important was random selection in the city singing people for public office to the 10% of all the people who were of the party copies were chosen by lot and what do you want percent chosen by election only those that work the very high levels in the army general specialized so so that's my note every year was like the executive power was the charge of the day-to-day running on the police and they had this really specific selection process no this is the napkin is Greek I think open and she says not one of these with her name on it and when there was the day of the battery process they want to do lottery machines no it's cool I've been talking to Sonny for years about this machine sign this is a machine and they use for random selection you want you with your token it's like a brass plate and decide to put this into a slot machine and then can some guys on the political process and good some white and that dies into the shield virtue ethics aside and they have like here is like I co-signed a nice pretty face guys and if you have on your row of white eyes you were selected black guys he went home and is it worth the council name away why was this used was this not this way so death in young like different families that weren't extravagant for power and they were very afraid of one of them concentrating too much power into the police right so that's going to do this was okay instead of making elections which can lead to patronage or can lead to pollution it's just selected randomly and they use metal I don't know about that if there is some even so Ronald Cotton's can be in favor of someone it's changed every year so the world works rotate this or any potential gain that will be done in a sharpen band some very lucky random selection was then destroyed the next year when it changed all over again so the two keys of the Greek democracy were are no selection in rotation if you want to learn more about how this process work and every command D status in a book about the atom is in the classical news is from the 1930s and if you want to learn more about how the political system work in Greece this great book by Josiah over personal knowledge of everything and all of the things that we are discussing dodging ordnance know this guy's new already ok let's move forward some time another important city where they lost the Hydra use of repetition was was Rhaenys no Venice was a trading empire it was known as the Republic asking any seaman why is that because the mostly Republic was intended to give all the merchants of the Middle Ages element of the Renaissance the confidence that rule of law was enacted there right number Shylock's Merchant of Venice there is a trial scene and in the try the scene the judge says okay well I know that this contract is not call upon the flesh but a contract is a contract and if we don't comply with contracts no one is going to come to Venice to trade it right so the things that this image very some very tricky offshore place I'm very that spirit was built on the second order because this social structure were again of some families that were struggling for power and this families you know what they have private armies and they hated each other so that they had to find a way for this guy to like coexist in peace in Venice and preserve the rule of law that was very important for all of them to prosper from trade you know this painting and what is this building and who put it there scores George it was the president of the Venetian Republic and the interesting thing about the doors is that most of the political positions most of the office were selected by not events but the Doge selection process was very specific failure in the office so this is how it is problem that donkeys are like a blueprint for how you select the door I'm certain the conceit of Angie this is harboring 1000 people upon the patricians participate here was the parasitic alley and then you have table selection of all the thousand people 30 members selected there and this 30 guys went to a different room and draw again by lot only nine of them so this nine then went on to 14 nominate 40 members out of all the 1000 members and the reader listen when most at ease so these 30 members they went a different room and then they selected by God to add members writing and these club members do you think it ends here selected so defined member faculty and you know disenfranchised in scintillated nine members up to 25 very loud and these nine members then nominated 45 member by faulty and this 45 members through 11 of them by that and this 11th book or the undici and the only chief nominated 5 up in 41 members and the 14 members know what they did [Music] process recovery companies to make sure that no one would dump her from the process right there was like a shuffling machine of people right you know and it probably happened in Venice was that you don't want me to run for office what they often say man I this made politics another perfect career for people because you could do nothing to become the daughter it was so random and you could not like try to create your alliances and the random selection also gave all the families the chance to rotate in the door so this times you this time is you and so it rotated and is created like peace among that right to move you learn more about how the process works and the mathematics behind it this is very good research paper from the protection but who knows and these guys and the CCC's that the Doge election process like okay I'm sorry you're taking a future tense they come they call that security together okay when you are in urgent and you are thinking of various are good place to do business when you see that they have this very sophisticated process and you can trust that the rule of law we stay right so this is what we call a security theater even if the process didn't work one morning one it still gave the impression that is [Music] if you want to learn more about the Renaissance and sortition the logistical tiny but Machiavelli praises his discourse on living he was a Republican everything he did he wrote of the prince he's contrary to what he actually did a separation he was a Republican and he believed strongly in people having the right to government and use news of randomness in selection and so this Texas to the United States efficient most important discussions in the time of the early days of the country so you know they were from the English food and now they have to figure out how they create an estate but that works basically first time ever and let's say democracy and we have like these guys the felony row for basically intellectual traditions writing on okay how should the u.s. worked out the critical system world president achieve the Congress to Chandlers one charmer all these questions they wrote papers and each one one by that it's not a very well known it is well known but not as much as the others and he's called Thomas Paine and this guy among other things he created so many things based on universal income are based in some races from him and a greater agrarian society and she is a method of selecting the president in order to avoid the federal government will be captured by the name of the powerful currents so this is what he suggested and the colonies who choose delegates to Congress and then we'll talk a start in the you select by the drug one colony out of the thirteen and then those thirteen members from that colony which was one member will be president for one year right so this is what it suggested because he was thinking of how the Greeks did write the rotation class formal selection would tend to break tradition of power this is the last time that rotation was really discussed and a serious level did a mass of course as you know and anything climb for extradition declined in the political world history because of two reasons what because look to be seen as application of a possibility length it should let trivialize looks like more like can be done but then she like something this is made way to select people for office and also because the classically the Republic people like working for the common good fell and what we have is liberal democracies worried how the people selecting from representative and the sky governing for other fears and then the people who selecting again another that even the more title is wetland or housing there was garbage in the world so this ended in but you know as partisan politics and that exactly what the ranch and wanted to avoid when they use this partition so then I should Greek wouldn't recognize our systems are reported right these days there is a movement is really bad early ideas of partition if you want to learn more these are called claret Aryans you know a lot more French wine and grapes but these guys are writing for all these I hope it works today you have what they call it mini buggies you select a number of people for to the cents and then these guys probably are consulted in policymaking right there nicely doing one of these in France now I'll end on the morris and this is for making policy for climate change and it's just last week all this ideas of Sartre Isha and how to create these political processes that are more transparent and less prone to pollution and very likely to pass in existing democracies now but the thing is that we have the chance since we don't have to reform all legacy regimes i we have the chance of they when we were through this monarchy suspect and he was still in the century we've got bill this just dealt with that we need to build for the coming time of the internet to be the absolute we better government so this is the blockchain thing so we're building these institutions and we can choose whatever we want because there are no ladies now right no legacy to reform so i think thats artesian can be a really good way to do it and how we should think about this well when do we want the reason to be part of the decisions when we see that there is a very high chance of bad prisons becoming part of then this you certainly so we sanitize those butter business now when we want people to express their preferences and we don't see the possibility of but risk of being important then yes we can we use traditional balking systems and quadratic or whatever it is to be this constant so you want to learn more about they say yeah there are like two Bibles of terminal selection one of them is the leg of the drum a bit of stone professor of the University of Dublin is great and the other one is a liver dominant the political resolution and this is a history of how random selection was used throughout history of politics we can learn a lot from this thank you very much Jonathan actually using your laptop you fell down dramatically thank you all for coming so early on Friday but last day of death huh this week was great so my name is John light I work on governance for the Aragon Network and I'll be giving a presentation about that a little bit later but my talk this morning is about a brief history of blockchain governments so this is this as the title implies this is by no means going to be comprehensive although watchings have only been around for ten years ten years there's been a lot of really interesting events as it relates to governance and a different block chain networks and so I'm going to cover just a brief selection of some real events that have stood out to me over the years but again this is by no means comprehensive if we could probably talk about this all day so thank you so [Music] the first one I'll cover was the CBE by 2010 51:39 southfork in August of 2010 so this was a bug in the midpoint that caused about 80 184 million Bitcoin to be created basically someone just exploited to create some transactions that created you know all these Bitcoin out of thin air and people notice this and work understandably alarmed and a patch was quickly developed and circulated in the community Satoshi gave the patch his blessing and and it was very quickly adopted a soft fork for those who are familiar with the term is a fork that restricts the ruleset of the consensus rules and of watch-chain and [Music] in such a way that it's backwards an apple so so basically transactions that are created under the new rule set are compatible with old notes that have not adopted the new rule set yet but transactions that violate the new rule set that are created by old moves are rejected by the Dinos so basically this this this fork said that any transactions that create these 184 Billy Bitcoin or or create these Overflow are transactions are invalid and everything else is valid and they basically kind of like rolled back the blockchain to before the piece behind an ad for Bitcoin were created included all the valid transactions and then continue on from there and this was kind of done in and I think in kind of like to God a very good community driven fashion so this is the patch that that Satoshi I published and put out and the blockchain pretty quickly over it's off the bat block team so then there was the one megabyte block size limit southport in 2010 September 2010 so this one was done kind of quietly that's good so she didn't really announce it he just kind of like published this made this commitment the code base and then pushed it out people adopted it it was bundled as a soft fork again along with some unrelated changes and then it was scheduled to activate at a specific block height so once the block ID was reached in the blockchain the soft board activated and from that point forward no blocks could be created that we're bigger than one leg quite so this was time done basically by Satoshi almost in secret and this is the exact code where it adds this limit so you can see that there you can see if the network height is greater than seventy nine thousand four hundred blocks then and the block size is bigger than the max block size a constant and you get it returned in error but yeah this was done kind of sireesha Slee so Toshi did this a couple of times too he just kind of like slipped in consents rule changes so that it wouldn't be too controversial and they wouldn't have to you know debated so they said then there was a proposal to increase the block size limit because people were like this is a kind of scale so of course once the block size limit was activated you get people dependent kind of talk about it in public and so Jeff Garcia comes along and he said he introduces a patch that would enable Bitcoin to miners to produce as a type of produce valid blocks larger than one megabyte and the community kind of pushes back and says hey people don't like download the install you're gonna become incompatible with the network because it would be as hard for it at that point wouldn't be backwards compatible and so the network would split is basically everybody did not install it at the same time so Toshi kind of it also pushes back on the idea so Toshi says if this is gonna make you incompatible with the network don't run it but here's how it couldn't be done however it was never done the way that since I she suggested it so the one megabyte limit persisted for quite some time and we'll talk about how that says that that big one over the years so here's you know Jeff Karthik's post saying like oh this is how we could do it and then Satoshi is like don't use this patch you if you install it you will make yourself a compatible the network to your own detriment we can feign something to change later of course if we invoke certain eating it so then there was the mid-30s south born-again ass off the board whereas before Satoshi would activate it by block height this one was activate by kind of a flag days so it was based on the time stamp that a walk was created rather than the exact walk height it's 30 I think this was basically a change that prevented two transactions for having the same transaction ID with the exception of two specific blocks that they didn't want to have to like refer about transactional is confirmed in the past but from after it 30 was activated from that point forward two transactions could have the same transaction ID and so this was activated on a specific day and it says right here like this rule applies to all blocks whose time stamp is after March 15 2012 at 0-0 UTC and that was published by Peter wheeler so then there was the fifty hard work and 2013 no notice most of this is Bitcoin because like Bitcoin was really the only coin of significance at this point sorry to all points so then there was a 50-word fort in 2013 to March May 13th so this was kind of the first like big bug like this was around the time that bit when I shot up to like 150 200 L or something like that so it was happening in a lot of like and a lot of like price drama bid 15 AK there was a there was a bug called the Murphy DB bug that caused a chain split it was the longest chains plate of England's history so far that like accidental chain split and then 50 was gonna activate it on the we're using Flag Day of hardboard which which which created a basic backwards incompatible change to fix this earth BBB and like here's the code to do that once again has this like rule where like you know if the block time is greater than one whatever this time is 11 March 2013 then the unit one in this world and then after May 15th will lack salute that will actually relax the world so when they relax the rule that was a hard work because basically any anything created after that point was incompatible with software that's running before that point so it's technically a hard work although some people might debate whether that was actually a hard court so then there was a really interesting event in a coin called fair coin it's the first rollback that I know of that actually kind of like was was almost like a a kind of like that justice related rollback so basically there was an exchange called mint mint ow that was hacked and 30% of the fair coin supply was golden now very poignant was a proof of state point so if 30% of your proof of state coin is held by somebody with perhaps less than good intentions well they're locked in some trouble so they decided you know we're going to roll back the blockchain and reverse that that transaction is not so very controversial in America entity and has anyone ever heard of bear coin and see how you know successful that it's made there blockchain but but in any case you know a lot of people did think that it was a good idea because again 30% of your coins and a previous state watching being helped by an attacker is maybe not the best thing so I thought that was really interesting as the earliest time an example that I could find him a kind of like a reversal of a theft rather than a kind of fixing of above the way the earlier buffer overflow rollback was was done a big one so then moving back to Bitcoin bin 101 was added to Bitcoin XT so Bitcoin XT the the main Bitcoin client in the Bitcoin network today and back then was called Bitcoin QT or Bitcoin core this was the derivative or I should say descendant of the client that Satoshi Satoshi himself wrote big when XT was developed by a big development team so a former Bitcoin core developer named Mike Hearn had this client called Bitcoin XT that he was doing some experimental stuff with and then there was a bit or a Bitcoin improvement proposal 101 that was implemented to increase the block size to 8 megabytes now Bitcoin court did not adopt this if it would have been a hard fork and or against a hard fork to increase the block size of the men at that point but there was some movement within the Bitcoin community to increase the block size limit so Bitcoin XT implemented this and was basically trying to convince people hey you know Bitcoin core isn't responding to the community's demands for an increase in the bus estimate you should run big planets instead and so this was kind of one of the first examples of a Bitcoin client kind of going broke and going against consensus in the big news network so later 2015 miners and physicists were signaling support for bigger bought plots so mining pool operators like signed a letter saying you know we all support up to 8 megabytes or even 20 mega byte blocks in tune and then of prominent businesses kind of did something similar a bunch of popular Bitcoin wallets and payment processors and such also signed the letter saying you know we support bit 101 or a megabyte block size of the mint this is what the miner letter looks like you can see f2 pool and pool party and there's a VW and kind of a date stamp there they represent it as a pretty significant share of the hash power in the network and then also blockchain bitpay and a bunch of other businesses assigned this industry letter also supporting bigger blocks nothing really became of this because the Bitcoin network is hard to change okay so in 2015 August 2015 the - now goes live so I think this was perhaps the first example of a blockchain that basically like to hook a portion of the block report so the new coins ever being generated and then gave it to a specific kind of entity and said like dude do it you will witness and that specific entity was a network of what are called master nodes which are - she knows in the vacuum network that have locked 1,000 - tokens in their wallet once they've done this then they get a voting rights to vote on how these this portion of the back reward that has been split off kids is spent fast-forward to July of 2016 Athenian splits after the DAO incident so basically here you know someone figured out to think of like you know why are you unilaterally withdraw money from the Dow which was a smart contract not that they did not deposit and they use this to try to Train like most of the money out of the Dow the etherium Network reacted by basically creating a hard fork that was trying to reverse this change or like reverse this event and that's the the network ended up splitting into what we call aetherium today which was to change where the funds were returned to the original owners and then a 3m classic which which was at the time you know the original chain where the the person who originally tried to withdraw money from the Dow actually got the money and and on the etherion classic chain that that history is still preserved today so then in 2017 there was the the block size debate in Bitcoin was kind of coming to a head there were there were kind of the three main competing proposals at various points of time throughout the year one was called set with you ASF or user activated southport one was a b CH or Abednego cash and the other was a segue to X and these were all backed by various factions of the community so a set the story here is that sec wit which was a change in bitcoin that fixed transaction malleability and and also happened to decrease the block weight limit to four megabytes was really intended to be activated by a minor activated southport so basically the idea was that miners would signal up to like I think it was 70% support and once they've got to 70% support the change would activate well segwayed failed to gather enough support for miners so Bitcoin users decided to activate that with themselves basically they would run software that says at a certain block height or whatever we will start rejecting any blocks that don't conform a segment sorry miners say with 2x was a group of folks that proposed a compromise of we would increase the block size limit like double the block size limit and implements that would everybody gets what they want well I think work out when the when the was looking like the user activated sophomore was actually gaining momentum and was going to get activated some minor is that felt threatened by this decided to just create their own heart Fork to increase the block size limit without set with and created this new point that we now call Vic one cash for BCH and now with a new chain that had you know more a bigger block size limit and said with activated through a user activated Southport asset the wind was completely taken out of segment to exit sales and the segue to export was eventually expanded by the people who originally proposed it like to more slack so yeah deke Ren then in June of 2017 activates its first upgrade using an option governance mechanism so this was a way that basically what are called like take a whole craft block chain to vote on a change to the consensus rules and then but just by voting the consensus rules would actually be changed automatically people didn't have to upgrade their clients their clients which is recognized oh this is the way that ticket holders voted these are the changes I'm automatically going to accept these upgrades so this is kind of the first example of successful and honoring evidence in action or like on chain tightly coupled earnings over the rules specifically and then most recently password to your June 2018 idios has launched it was launched they also have this idea of like on chain governance over consensus rules they wanted to pick a constitution that was intended to bind how these rules would change and of course block producers like the equivalent of miners immediately violate the Constitution they decided to you know I really freeze some accounts that had been identified as potential stammers in violation of the FIA's Constitution which had actually intended for that kind of action to be taken by a separate arbitration body so they kind like routed around the Constitution to extra legally you know impose justice in this case once again a fast wording to April 2019 this year illegal use legally scraps their constitution for a new user agreement the reason why you know it's characterized as illegal is because they adopted this youth new user agreement with only one point seven four percent turnout despite the fact that their constitution and actually required them to have a fifteen percent turnout to make this kind of changes so so far you know the blocking governance is not going so well for refer for us and this the end of my presentation because we're a 20-9 team now and there hasn't been anything like incredibly new or novel that's happened since then so with that I will end the presentation thank you for talking favors with me and I think we'll hear more from Tesla's better stay that was this year yeah yeah I think the reason why I included it is because it's while a certainly a landmark event itself it wasn't the first time that I wrapped my suite we have Alfonzo avenged speaking about also speaking about hook it up governance so this is the first of our lightning talks and then from this point forward we're going to hear a series of talks to learn and do a little bit of a deep dive on much different protocols so we're going to get so high percent their visits about the dangers of I use computer scientist and mathematician betrayed me working things related to dimension algorithms and also some his real reviews the governor's populist taste in staccato quality don't run for it so it is not perfect but it's the best cut I'd say some of the problems that people like to point out with commodities that is usually learn to not it's too slow governance and it has to be able to curse it has to keep our to win a lot of points so I'm going to present ways in which we combat this produce some of mr.

Hogan potent we're going to use time ops which means that it matters not only how much we cut but also how long you're willing to lock these points because you are actually you are very much committed to a system we have several governance bodies that has some advantages first one is a increase in speed because there are more channels to decision-making and the second is that there are more checks process because they can check to each other and we try to give power to minorities and we obtain that in two ways why proportional precipitation making sure that minorities are as well second is an acquittal rate I will say more about that later so who are the stakeholders I hope you are well coconuts I respect complex and I don't have time to go into it there are validators that it was a brought the consensus protocol there illuminators coin holders who supports the election validators and they get rewarded to medical validators their parents franchise also have to uphold God's because they needed to secure conscience that so the projects that's are gonna be given out at least some of them are going to give given out through just actually okay and of course misters there are others and their own account holders and I would like to point out the first ones are love at Second Sight liquid we want to give having more voice to whatever there are not because as I said people with love stake have more skin today and we can trust that they meet they that I care more about the future of okay so decision making governance is going to be based in referendum they are going to be different about once a month and please there's a public proposals anybody is free to propose there's sponsored proposals oh there can sponsor a proposal that they liked and then once one we're gonna take the most popular proposal addresses to referendum just when we voted one month and there's really not many late that is the time between deciding something deciding our proposal and actually implementing this is important because it is our two people who didn't agree with it to actually leave the system so that they know that something is going to take place in two weeks some days to decide to move to sell their goods in there like it so this is some protection for some protection there's a voluntary type of editor so everybody else and we has to lock the cons which they but if they decide to talk for a longer fuse and it's high time that it's faster yes take this body council can be elected by stakeholders their motion is to represent the interests of the stakeholders and something I want is that the way we elect the custom universities through something called the Russian representation which basically means that if this 10% of coin holders that have similarity twists then they're guaranteed to be represented by at least 10% of the seats in the crossover or the same 20% or the same with 5% this is very different to some other kind of representation systems were only really two big majorities the center than the one that says no sample so we really want to stress various because also this gives checks and balances because the council has some power and we want to make sure that it represents everybody and if there is no limit in the console then they basically have no power well that's a good thing it's very hard to for the console to have supermajority silence on the things this is so nice laughter of a sense this personal presentation can imagine that I recall it represents something ideal has some different point of view and each one of them is going to get one wish that even possible oh the gentleman over there I'm not sorry just say what the thing also can't stop can mitigate artificially dangerous inhalation proposal to confess directly for proposals but as he said mostly mine it doesn't have a lot of power so yeah so just be passionate as how so a lot will never obviously so it's very long time what it is but basically I'll hear about process of competitions us like guarantees and improve state not he was multistage on shade covers my resident and getting a said it's also an architectural thing those governance it's actually that's a metaphor to call it can technically accentuated Lakshmi's bird calls theoretically but basically it tells us you know the underlying you know the way that Bostick rated and you know consensus through this notion of baking and little bit mistake so you have basically the mentorship of Baker's joining pesos the first year obviously there's a big increase in the first few months and that sort of a study enough it's not as delegation so people can you know move their stake designers take to you know these various speakers around the world but it's not depots in the notion of another way of do a search on or listen anything like that I fell obviously funded by that point of inflation appreciates that and so then those make it uses in practice it is actually officially almost 500 elevators and all 35 countries at least that's what we know publicly you know a leaders stay where they are what they're you know what they're what they're doing and so you have to sort of the participants in this government system are basically across many different there is additional folks running really complex you know copy setups there's books on Raspberry Pi there's folks just with ledger and dresser you know in there in threes men and there's 110 of these public delegates you know of these four so they go for 450 to 500 as it varies very big town of the Republic and vote on other people's behalf and then you have about percentage of the nura that's involved in this process about 71% of the Joel supply I think it's about 80% of their activity and so then what's the actual process so it looks you know very you know complex but it's actually much simpler than that it's a basic Rises for periods and someone this is changing potentially in a week if we activate a new upgrade but basically it involves it starts with this proposal period each of each of these mercury is a months for about 23 days I think basically 20 and the proposal period is this period where basically cannot put as many people succeed like I think agent I'll go into some of the similar detail in the next talk but basically you have this core face period it's a very conserved on like this or the polkadot model it's a very very conservative sort of a governance process by which easily have to hit this this quorum you know very very high bar of consensus it started about 80% and some of the original Athens votes it was as high as I think 2% to the quorum I mean we talk I had about essential estate is about 86 or 87 percent above the stake actually voted or participated in the vote basically on this proposal period even have a yes/no maybe both yes them over passed but really in the second period testing period which you're not going to get into another yes no or maybe a state confirming that a protocol in our proposal should make it to become the new protocol and set aside about three months to complete so going back to you know such earlier so what was a sentence was our first proposal I went from at the end of February to the end of May it was basically just voting on changes to constants so it was just changing in both sides which is just the either them account for previous statement SS that I have mentioned earlier and it was doubling you know basically Oh Paul doubling the Gosselin poseable not that basically the participation as mentioned earlier 87% of stake in the expiration vote about 84 percent a stake in the promotion code and the reason is so high is because bakers are mediating beginning to votes for for folks there's not as a required every single person holding a token to participate in this it's mostly symbolic so there's just a little you know we have the significant inflationary invoices well I won't go into that right now but as mostly symbolic just about 100 xdc reward and it was really just changing some constants and why only one team was really involved in the you know in the creation the Furcal tournament and but you know obviously pretty landmark about this is that it involved coordination etc communes own circle 35 countries and about 200 meters you know and so then the newer upgrades are in a new upgrade network we're going to now instead some operating just like change our no constants you know to actually like constantly the notion of crossed upgrade so actually hopefully every also babies every form of revised every six months even you know some regular cadence of pretty much a Nissan feedback and a new innovations that have been refined in you know engineering his basic engineers that prepares core dev team so can propose to the stakeholders also there's the vanity fashion because the original proposal and now see a haven't unfortunately had an issue in this one so we're actually been voting on a slightly different one another another time coach all these each other supports in there but basically there are a lot of challenges to this process so one of them is that you know one with you know it's very decentralized is actually you know there's actually you know nearly 500 you know different enemies that are all around the world participating in this and there's also the issue sort of some some minor tires fragmented and that we we've found determine doing this in the wild around you so for example what happens if you find a bug you know some way through the process we've been going through that recently and they you know the most recent case we start we found it before the final but they know called confirmation quote but in other cases you could imagine this being having been a consensus solution and so then you know also there on the court you know you have served questions of coordination Ecija you know all these different forms in which people are or discussing amendment you know that many thought you know across you know us that their country so about language barriers a lot of cultural differences that you including you nobody sustained the experience of you know with voting praises and in terms of democratic norms all those kind of things you have different different tastings and then also we've had ever serve proposal sisters I mean breast see breast and in Edina Paris Perry started in France and this is from the you know from June so you surf clubs notion of new people sort of trying to attack so it's you know potentially capable for other purposes if you can get your proposal if you want you to want to work off you know you can insert a proposal about it you know you know not fruitcake it tells of the process and then you can you know basically that gives you social charity before about we're going you know serving serving this kind of dynamic for a while now and then other questions you know obviously about tests and other mechanisms that form only say cos we're not the rest right so you know the answer here is really I think a little different than that I think I think it's not just about the question of the doctors whatever it's actually intangibly how do we ensure that we have flexibility against sort of hard upon chain rule so you know you look at things like Bitcoin where you know originally mining was actually really widely distributed you sort over time there became a companies of scale that's not quite analogous but the point is you don't actually know who's going to come to and if you have hard coded rules you don't understand Oh who's going to come to a control system long into the future and so you need other mechanisms are potentially other other systems to ensure that enough flexibility and so a few of these are you know that the discuss are in terms of things you know sort of inspired by it it's sort of now Ellis is sort of inspired by dowel stock that is like you do prediction games on proposals to write proposals you can use this to mitigate you know certain governance by state potentially you can also do that you know there's all sorts of you know if you want this to be you know sort of this economic infrastructure that can upgrade itself very conservatively you can basically set higher approval thresholds for certain parameters or other characteristics of proposals that you don't want to change you'll be able to change and then the other question is like you know basically our small stakeholders and smart entrepreneurs just curl and this is some sort of well you know who's looking out for it is or other folks whose was you don't have as much insight into it so you know just to wrap up to that someone things for a while scholars is basically how do we do we get easy for many many staple from the world to understand what's going on the process and also address their different preferences and so you have you know initial laser focus on telling surface governor's Explorer of flora but later into the ideas to build you know sort of a full speed of signaling tools so you know as well as your visual on prediction markets and then also things like house for governance as well as for Commons governance it looks like domain names and registries and other kinds of things like that and then the last thing that things like I don't you sort of a more such resistance yeah awesome thank you yes so I have two slides because that mostly go to wipe out this so I'm Adrian a month two naps so very briefly 50 laps is for engineering team that also happens from now they ask you to sell me start occupants and banal gives us love inside these government systems were because we set up having to run every single through a state can be only one of the things that are technically interesting and we're very heavily involved in the technical governance on these systems so I must defer to mr. on and in June respective of micro just aging detective these proposed evolve over time since G have said that I should briefly talk about the technical settings so tell us government supposed to call it to that as well top 10 works is for white votes cool all right let's start with a brief over your fault options are right we have some networking stack normally can relocate and we have [Music] then we have some consensus death and afterwards we have some economic state machine [Music] stay cheap this is front one because this is completely agnostic so when you think about what those have better features Ryoga is networking out we see calls everything better is local to your note it's totally up to you that's we have many very tiny mutations that right doc changes generally have many clients the only two things that they do agree upon is consensus and in our protocol so for example in the example of cosmos this will be 10 min consensus and this would be the cosmos hot or gaia depending on you succeed to naming incorrectly we'll see that's currently some contention about this and there may be new government's proposed about this as well but specifically the economics eat machine success what is golf it's actually how do you get to move funds around husband statement ok cool now that you know this I am and when we talk about governance in many cases we talk much more about this and this so many systems have modified their governance the consensus systems over time those are mostly stapled but I think we should most experiment also improving a little time for guiding tell us governments this is quite interesting because it effects the long this time and so what happens is that there's a tough shell which you can imagine that it's a local thing that everyone have their own version of and it as important takes some protocol where the protocol is combination consensus and economic kernel and this protocol is written on panel and what that happens is that the note will Michelle and all this makes a signal what happens is that the shell takes a bunch of a camel sauce files and that runs the restricted subset of the camel compiler to turn the protocol into something that can be dynamically linked into the run itself and then execute attendant but ever shell receives network messages from other peers of Excel blocks in transactions and drives the single-threaded state machine which is the protocol the cool thing here is that due to this you can build a binding onto a governance system where someone or anyone through all really can inject a bunch of calluses files everyone votes on the on the hash of those sauce files and if everyone in the net worth enough people whatever your acceptance criteria is and take we talked about this earlier agree on the sauce funds the know that a predefined block again given the upgrade will decide so the shell will return the protocol over time this at the next clock which should be using a neutral color and at that point the shell will use the sources that it currently has compound them on the fly and then dynamically linked them into the running binary and that way towards camp Red Cloud is to infect the same thing with an wasn't where people vote on about what code and them know dynamically will switch to the new protocol but this is how you get binding on to governance because in order to opt out of this change people have to modify the shell and then they can say well like the shell should not great to the steep vertical but the thing is in most cases you will also have to slap a significant percentage of your total us because what can happen is that say you don't night version a like critical aid which is the protocol and so you'll only go and part by this and you now have only four people ten percent of never this but you did modify the balances on the new protocol aid and you can anyone can reject what the community wants to upgrade to and then they you exactly the same vote and by default all notes again will upgrade to view photo so you effectively either have to cut keep hot forking to prevent new protocols are being injected or you slash 80% token balances of the people that actually want the new change this is why all of this is cool and that many different ways to implement this tells you this is a restricted subset of the account compiled a blocker abilities wasn't as long as the important thing has to be deterministic and properly sandboxed because otherwise if this isn't properly sandbox you're building massive plot that where anyone can upload code tune that would then automatically get executed everyone's machine and through a stick this is specifically scary because all of these machines fault hotkeys that are using content designing and kind of incur significant slashing analysis if they were compromised yeah we have to be really sure that code probably sandbox account compiling from the sandbox to an interpreter for all these programs cool without this is a quick intro to technical spective one minute all right then really quickly we caught this so cosmos goals [Music] new whiteboard series so there's a 40% form okay for example and strict majority so 50% and 33% veto power as quick explanation it means so cos the weight works it's a signaling process signals Gannett system why anyone in the world can upload a text proposal needs to pay five from 12 atoms as the deposit this is to prevent spam but once they've uploaded any one can all the values can build on it and hopefully delegate us can override the balanced choice but by default they inherited so it means that if you want to delegate your voting power to felled it or you can but if you validate them does something batshit insane you can overwrite this to say in order to be valid it needs to have for 20% and of those 40% at least 50% at least half the audience not half forecast and that is rejected and if partly if something is rejected do not get you to college mark as he just felt like one and a half thousand dollars if that happens and also due to the way est works if more than a third ever vote no oh no we don't everything it won't get accepted by them because in either case if one third of the network doesn't like something they can always fault the chain so this is why there's a no veto threshold here all right then yeah the cool thing about having signalling proposals is it kind of many of the same time so do these kind of governance upgrade binding on Czech government operates very voter code you can't have many at the same time because it is incredibly difficult to figure out how you merge two distinct code bases into each other to form over here in protocol that still maintains properties like the design properties of either so the same MO many fun at the same time the deposit face runs for two weeks and afterwards the voting phase run to another two weeks the downside is it's very clear what couldn't happen after vote has been successful right because we don't actually know the specifics so due to this the way you upgrade the code bits of the cosmos up is that you first had bunch of votes on we want these new features and then hopefully someone builds those new features and afterwards you have a secondary vote but where you vote on the specific half of the code that you wanna run and if you find cousins governments at all this was the very I don't want to say funny I spent like six hours sitting in audience anyway there wasn't vote for the cousin seventh grade which turns out wasn't properly tested the migration procedure was probably tested and due to that the new constant of three didn't actually start and so we had to roll back to cosmos up to this cost down to two hours at mass months confusing I was very sad as I said it very loudly that's in a cage for six hours while trying to figure out what to do that so in my opinion honestly some of the best government models will combine both so you will have some sort of signaling proposal proposals because it allows error in the community to have a voice to suggest changes to get ideas of high-level goals that you want to achieve right like do we want a picture wasn't do we want to have any consensus mechanism is how do we remember one and once you saw a broad concept are drawn agreement over where you want to go then someone builds it and once they've build it vote on the space specific implementation so ever on increase everyone upgrades to it automatically yes okay cool I think I counted most of the points and only thinking like five minutes all about the thing so thank you very much I'll be around later if you have any questions I can talk to you most about I can talk to you about either $10 off government systems we happen to spend a lot of time on them so here comes miss a meal Thank You Ellen and so for those of you who are unfamiliar this here it is sleep in the deep reading ecosystem stately represents a ticket which is a float on the network and it's kind of like a community a big mess now before I begin the talk I just want to extend a special thank you to be there and community for extending an invite to us D cred doesn't have any explicit link to atheria so something that I do find the degree I probably a third committee is not only its positivity but also its willingness to welcome ideas that exist outside of its immediate ecosystem as I know that the cryptocurrency space can often time to be quite tribalistic it types of things so for the talk today I'm going to focus D creds model has quite a bit of complexity to it so I'm going to focus less on how it works and more so why we implemented that implemented it that way okay so for a bit of historical context before have some of the for the developers in the room you might be familiar with some of our developers previous open source work so Meyer 2d cred many about developers spent over 15 years in a way tell people be as but yet they then moved into very early Bitcoin development releasing BTC sweet and Reese's T at btcd which at the time was the first alternate full node implementation of the coin then they moved on to release Christiana Tomac swaps so that was released and made open-source by Davis one about the girls tends to be one of our more prominent open source contributions so the reason why I bring this up is that for de credit governments wasn't really an afterthought it was something that was carefully planned because the team had spent quite a bit of time prior dealing with open source communities and having to deal with the various conflicting stakeholder groups within the Bitcoin ecosystem and so for that reason it said so I lost my chain of thought but we'll just go to the beginning so that these deep rivers originally conceptualized around 2014 so that was roughly around it at the time that the team started to transition away from their Bitcoin development then we leader underwent about roughly two years of development we later released it quarter 1 of 2016 then in quarter 2 of 2017 we had our first launch chain voting process so John alluded to that in his early talk and this was really the first time we actually got to demonstrate the core of Ekron sales process which is our ability to implement user activated hard Forks now to my knowledge this was actually first time a user activated hard fork has ever being observed in the cryptocurrency ecosystem and then since then we're starting to focus a little bit more on off chain governance which is specifically relates to the coordination of the various different contributors and the products resources so whilst we were fairly early in recognizing governance as a problem I want to make it clear you know that we're not so arrogant as to assume that we're some kind of governance in a sale I think that just like watching itself there are many correct ways to implement governance and depending on the particular problem that you're looking to solve the effectiveness of a particular governance solution is going to depend very heavily on that so in the context of de credit we suppose that we focused specifically on a bond chain quaint halter led governance specifically as it relates to the consensus change process and so I'll just briefly give you an overview of how that works basically we utilize a hybrid model that blends both the proof of state with pro court so probably easiest way to visualize this something like that assembly line so what happens is whenever a minor about produces is producing a lot they have to select a number of tickets over votes and random from the stakeholders into their lungs now in order that want to be considered valid in order to actually successfully posted and receive the love reward a majority of the votes they include within that block need to be in favor of whatever clock particular block type of this event and those votes are selected at random to the minor can't go into select every choose the votes that are exclusively in favor of whatever is invasively now so that the whole process is on chain and binding so once an approval threshold of at least 75 percent of the votes within a which of the voting window have been accumulated then whatever change gets automatically implemented so an example of this might be pro or anti segregated witness okay so the thing but coin holder blood governance is as Lane alluded to it doesn't necessarily take into account almost all the possible types of stakeholders that might exist that's definitely very true but what it does do is it it does constant paucity wider net to program work miners alone and so that was really the point behind is that we didn't want to eliminate - because we felt that they play an incredibly important role and we're still huge advocates or group of work as a consensus model we just felt that they need to be a great level of democratization in the governance process okay so in the context of coin will have led to a governance of course the the distribution of the currency itself is incredibly important and that's why earlier I stress that the for us governance wasn't enough Authority something was very carefully planned and the hybrid model and the distribution of the block reward was carefully planned such that would have as wide and as fair as possible of a initial acquaintance distribution and it's also for this reason that I kind of urged the etherion community not to give up on proof of work just yet because it's an incredibly effective tool for implementing fair and litecoin distributions so certainly considering a point hopeful that governance model it's not something that I would recommend moving away from just yet but something else that's oftentimes overlooked with proof of work is that it extends a lifeline for those who might be relatively persecuted so I suspect that for many of us who are probably pretty fortunate to have the Liberty to pursue an interest in cryptocurrencies but for a lot of people around the world they don't that luxury and for many of them the idea of having to submit your personal identity in order to participate in ICO or to access an exchange platform can oftentimes be putting their either their liberty or even their lives at risk and so something that oftentimes gets overlooked about proof-of-work mining is it actually provides a discrete mechanism for individuals to obtain cryptocurrency using hardware as a proxy and then so in the context of a point quite all the Landtag a government system what you really want to have democratize access to the consumer for the governance process again for the work is excellent so just a few closing thoughts before we end for those of you that are considering implementing coin all the lead governance systems a few suggestions that I would have is implementing a coin coin holder that government system becomes exponentially more difficult after you've released your protocol so if you if you can try to really really carefully plan out your initial pointers distribution and your governance process before you launch the second one is that to make sure that you consider your projects ongoing resourcing so I think a lot of a lot of projects that I see you know particularly ones that are raising outrageous amounts of money in the form of an ICO is the path across that just provides instant gratification something that a lot of them probably are considering is that those resources can actually go like with it and then you can find yourself in the Paris situation of having financial pressures being applied from external special interest groups which can get in the way of your governance process so for us we had 10% of that of our local Lord goes into a decentralized Treasury fund and that's why they off chain component about governance comes into play we released a governance platform we call polity and so Claudia is the Greek word for a system or ancient return for a system of government and politics just interface where stakeholders can vote on where the various different funds get allocated to and funds our ongoing operation contribution efforts so if you want more with where can you go to find out a little bit more information definitely the documentation is your best resource we don't actually have a white paper so this is the closest thing to it the next best resource we are all form and form and our credit and then of course our bridge comes so the bridge communications channels are kind of cold we actually have our slack discordant majors chats all bridge together so message on one will show up on all the others and this is a really cool place to hang out because this is what you see all about governance activities being and operations being coordinated in real time it's very transparent very cool and finally Cohen stated just something that I really would have urged before we end is don't move mustn't break things that we should sort of transition away from that Silicon Valley mentality shift quality code and considered some implications because implementing major consensus changes in this space is not easy it's not it's not quick and no matter how would we make our government systems I don't think it's ever going to do so really really carefully consider code before you Shiva and don't compromise you know don't compromise to fit gimmicky you know outrageous transaction throughput and silly features don't forget what we're here for it's censorship resistance and decentralization and thank you if anyone has any questions or wants to know more about specifically how to credit the current governance model works I think more than happy to take questions afterwards you can comment on each other anyways thank you very much very much Josh that was super interesting you guys are some really exciting stuff thanks for sharing it I really like your clothes they thought that governments can't brush government as I said we did we needed to have patience and be very thoughtful before we're kind of incrementally involved yeah I couldn't agree more strongly with that all right up next we have the one and only light coin again John my talking to us about Aragon governance I'm sure probably everyone in the street was already familiar with Aragon probably needs no introduction but their project that has been really blazing a trail and just doing some of the most interesting and exciting work in covered it's engineering space with dows and many other things I'm gonna plug your slides up again it's a pretty common great thanks a lot Lee so for folks that were at what three summit or this year perhaps saw the video that came out this presentation is going to be kind of a repeat of the recap of Aragon Network both that happened so far I'm going to briefly cover but however on network governance works and then just kind of recap how it has been working so far for a more complete review of how their network governance works I did a presentation about this at our annual conference our con earlier this year you can find that video on YouTube but so yeah let's jump into it airline Network folks recap so some background Aaron on network is the the now that that oversees the project so this is a decentralized organization governed by holders of the Aragon Network token Aragon network is funded by proceeds of the sale of that token back in 2017 there was a sale and that's how ante was initially distributed so both before area networks have and holders could govern the network we needed the tools to govern the network and so that's what we've been working on building is tools for creating and governing decentralized organizations on aetherium and we have one of those tools lives today at app dot Aaron on border so once we have tools live on maintenance that Aragon network different holders could use to participate in marinids we decided to formalize our governance process and so first we wrote kind of a foundational document of or governance of the Aragon manifesto this was ratified by AMT holders in June of 2018 and then later that year we wrote up how the governance process [Music] serious I've been doing here thank you for clarifying Syria and so later that year we formalized how the governance process would actually work under AGP one two approaches the Aragon governance proposal process which was ratified in November of 2017 so this is roughly how the proposal process itself works so there are six stages now there are the the first three stages are just basically information gathering and proposal drafting then Stage four this is slightly out of date Stage four is a community review period that all proposals have to go through after the community review period the urban Association which isn't a nonprofit that kind of oversees the project right now or to the proposals and then any proposals that get passed the interview go on to a final ballot and get voted on by any holders in the network mode and any proposals that are approved get executed and any that get rejected go back to square one so that's a high-level overview of kind of how the process works today so so far we've had three votes under the area of governance proposal process the fourth coming up at the end of this month actually 33 proposals have been submitted on time so like before the deadlines 26 have actually made it onto the final ballot and then 21 proposals finally were actually approved by AMT holders and so far about eight and a half and then they die have been distributed to this proposal process and about three and a half million ante [Music] participation rate on average across all of the votes is about four point seven five percent of all ET tokens in existence participating in the vote and our highest turnout rate was seven point eight four percent the top three most contentious proposals which I define as like the closest ratio between yes and no votes was a flop funding proposal for a team called autarkic so this was a team that was seeking a relatively large grant to join around one which is the team that I work for as a full-time team working on Aragon project software and their proposal was relatively close in essence no votes with 54% yes 46% no AG's p16 which was a procedural vote about modifying the governance since itself also relatively close and getting rejected and then a to be 37 which was a retainer for an awfully or a network security partner this would be like auditors that are auditing Aragon software at an ongoing on an ongoing basis and then maybe like a a honorable mention with the the proposals to reject or prevent the aeronaut project from building on any blog gene that would that wasn't a theory that that that one also had I believe it was like 69% no 31% yes so some lessons that we've learned so far it's it's good to have a direct communication channel with voters to cut through the noise so we set up a mailing list called the airline Network voters mailing list so that voters can sign up to give like very low volume very high signal alerts about when important events are happening in the governance process in particular like when to actually vote so the Aragon project is doing a lot of stuff if you're following all of our channels you're getting a lot of noise and you might not see the important announcements about the boat another thing is to put a thaw retainer of information about a boat in like one place and then repeatedly tell people like where that one place is located so they can find it again it's just good to have a thoriated like a source of truth that people know they can always go to this spot and fight the most up-to-date information about a vote all these scattered channels and maybe finding out today or out-of-date information another thing is to keep the process as simple as possible to lower the barrier to participation and reduce the likelihood of mistakes and I'm sure we could you know spend time designing some elaborate like group Goldberg governance system that looks sophisticated but doesn't actually accomplish a lot because people just have such a hard time navigating it that only like either extremely dedicated or perhaps manipulative people would actually get through the process and and finally ask participants for feedback and use it to make the process better after all of those that we've done so far we sent out a survey asking people several questions about their experience in the new governance process whether they voted or not if you want to hear from them and as well as like suggestions about you know what what it would improve about using the governance process itself or the user experience of interacting with the governance process we've gotten a lot of great feedback from the surveys and actually incorporated that feedback into our product development roadmap as well as our governance roadmap so this has been really helpful for us and then some open questions that we have that I would love to discuss if folks wanna chat after this would be like you know how do we increase participation rate while maintaining or improving decision quality you know one thing we could do is like just pay voters to show up that we'll probably get more people to show up but will then actually result in better decisions it's an open question how do we protect against various attacks like vote selling bribing or collusion bad voting how do we run meaning experiments while protecting the integrity of the airline network you know add as the last speaker mentioned we don't want to move fast and break things we don't want to break our governance process but we don't want to stand still either we want to continue iterating so how do we run meaningful experiments without breaking the governance process and then finally you know how do we continually improve Vogt communications and user experience the feedback answers have again have been helpful for getting some direct feedback from the voters but you know how can we how can we make sure that we're continually doing this so that we're we're always improving so that's what I have today about the airline network governance process like I said we have a folk later this month so if you want to see it in action just kind of follow our channels jump into our forum and you can see how you know the governance process is working in real time this month thank you thank you again John yeah you're the very valid point which is that a lot of the governance ideas you're clearing up here today are sort of still in the design phases but I think what's really exciting about Aragon as well as the credit some of it of course of course is that you guys have I've been doing this for you know over a year now and so jump in and just payment and observe governance and Ashley's been really exciting to see all right up next we have Ilya a co-founder of near protocol yeah near is another really exciting project you guys are very close to launching I mean then I think right you guys have a very different vision for you know the future of blockchain to charting all that fun stuff but also governance so you have to get away a show of hands how many of you know above near so which bill that's kind of not even a part of the talk Sameer is kind of the way we started when we start looking at kind of Crichton space of what changes yes there's like scalability issues there's a lot of people working that actually one of those main concern that we had was that is pretty much like proving hard to build applications on consoles all right and coming from that too right little modifications like firebase parts like different clouds there's so much to me there's no much libraries and make a system we kind of developed here the kind of associate Roasters right and it comes into the cart and it takes weeks or a month special board and then doubles is like you cannot actually target to me abusers right at the end it's all critical users which is still walking into you so figuring out how to get people to use this is important now the thing is like obviously you cannot figure this out in it from the beginning from a start like this is an evolution of the process and to do that you need the process copy evolving protocol how do you all your catalyst to hack the governance now looking from our perspective defining governance oh we haven't like Wayne asked what is the governor's but the question is how do you define governance like what is like a in our governance is a blog like from our perspective it's actually about a defining condition like would retract achieve and then culture of how to make decisions towards an adult right instead of like oh its own chain governance you're going to be voting on stuff it's like hey we want you know every single person in the world have a wallet and self custody their data and assets and we want every single developer to be building applications of launching representa submission and then the culture is how do you actually get there what is what are the rules to follow so on the other side is two new tools right we are pretty much the space right and we all love building tools and the thing is like tools can be very different but we have Swiss nominations which is just a tool for organizing people how to actually make decisions and be compliant and that's the following still relation to the physical world there's often tools like Twitter got this great action to know okay then make some decisions and there's my coaching and different content but those are all tools to actually facilitate the process and I mean overtime incentivizes right behind some rocks order so kind of one thing that's used an overload is that different effects before and different methods right like if you think of it the best decision process is not it's actually consensus and everybody around the table agrees on the same thing come into this different view that sort of conversations we were kind of figuring out what was the difference in views actually figure out what is the best option I want everybody together and all this is done scale right you cannot put you know hundreds of thousands of people in one room and decision even those 100 people that's already pretty on scalable and it actually works way better any person because like we have you know millions of years figuring out each other in person and my chats and Twitter etc become extremely well just solving over time now doc said mister those tender doctor sooner we elect somebody presumably is fast at doing this function right and this is for example like for technical decisions right and like you know Damocles knows a lot you know I've been thinking about this a lot I can make those decisions and then this is great and like this is made sense for a lot of tasks but in kind of more global consensus right mr. interview to still mean to where one person in on half attempt to capture all the possible roles and then dessert oxidizes voting is kind of what we used to it's great to get decision to make to build a decision from there's a large number of people but it's inherited device right in Lincoln's I think yes or no there's no way that kind of had a nuanced conversation and figured out maybe there's a better proposal and also subtle very often the proposal itself is written by a single person or entity and kind of in currently has some biases of that and container of suffering humans it usually has some kind of nested interest so that is to kind of combine this message right and figure out how to kind of follow the principles and get to you know submission the goal we have right so like just to you know exhibit just those that you're trying to be like elevated we kind of talked a little bit about the tools that we want to use for this but the principles gonna follow what is to make sure that there's clear goals like their mission and they're kind of pokey are symmetrical metrics that you can target as a community that's everybody in here like hey we want to get more users going to get some with developers and be able to measure it that's important coming to developers write down actually see your system clear your them into decisions that's bad right so right now like it's actually really hard to be technical that's been technical decision sided because of so comedians conversations it's weight on way better done was in the room right like with whiteboard deck into discussing but like making it action since paradise replay exists putting it in about like showing how the decisions are made not just by K this is a home is it's safer community Congrats you wanna make the strategic decisions right by bringing people for representing different roles and like goals talk about this again later but in person right and get to consensus like for strategic decisions you want this consensus where like everybody agrees that this is the best option right and they bring whatever the concerns and half up front and get investment and for technical decisions right like let's say hey you know like Louie like we need to think some five minute this is not something that like you need that huge community support right this is something that you can have an elected people who are held accountable but at the same time have can have a really good decision and it's kind of finished out is that like all those tools into building like Aragon is new great job right does be grab but they all kind of experiments right we don't really know what the parts of investment and what you need to do is we need to test them first I'm kind of a little bit of state and see how how like what decisions I make is it moving towards a goal you set up right and then if it does that we can actually have like a clear path how the state goes a system or treatment so you can imagine like what set out where you put in some amount of money you could say hey you can manage this down as a floor making decisions to work towards the progress of the goals and set up and then over time as is now it makes one more decision to improve the metrics you actually can fund one right to the sole would you not programmable and kind of this idea and to just finish up like one of the things we've been doing we're actually trying to bring some of the knowledge in this space but it gives its parent is a whiteboard series where we pretty much interviewed one of our homes and a lot of projects I think is sitting right now in a whiteboard series we want to continue doing this as well as what's been published on all content around different spaces like comments etc so check it out and if you have some ideas what other content would be right Thank You Millia Federico is up again to tell us more about the Larsa governance or Greeks already nice again the suitors hope someone interrupted time because Rebecca long degree bright sunny Carol what do you know yeah we're out looking for us or somewhere [Music] good so the internal start with the problem of incomplete contracts and objects no length talk about wide our wealth and right all there are some things that the computers cannot hear is I mean they're really completed this alone is humans because everything is recorded a lot of trucks and many contracts with regard to need some human input or making them unfortunately this becomes an important thing if you think that three to five percent of transaction online dispute right annually some type of penetration and that's for this type of problems so this is imaginary Zimbabwe website the pavement and this crow account and they both agree that injectors a dispute each one go to Clara this bill amends tell it's a jury of experts and they're going to see the evidence and inform on who is right and then this Esther is broken up you pay is because you were right okay understood for now so how do you select yours and that's the question now and then about how it used to work for Greece and they had this concept of coming up trials very sing sing will go together in a trial but first there was a very special mechanism so you wouldn't go to trial you friends to develop them right so there was a random selection for of tours so the first word to the court and they protect you and to be rude or not and then after you selected and decided again by blood work going to sit in which port right there's a done selection you know what they used so this woman who wants to be a jury in this beauty signer so she gets to fight as tokens and deposit this token what is token universe one select money very well-attended aspirin well done so Curtis has many courts and see deposit system and they spoken like a quirk of websites dispute and so is taking the son of how it works so this is talking Thomas theis take into the court and many people take the token and the doctor gives you the chat with drawn randomly in sewer and some of them are going to be selected randomly and these guys are going to be the traversal is okay and the token stays long until a decision is done so how do we say device people to do as both of the you make sure that we know how to do know in the grant randomly aibee aibee just to collect money for this we use you're a nice guy come on this is a blockchain conference so totally the lyrics of the fifties and sixties and he developed this concept of focal point this is a public record innate when there is uncertainty when they have to make a decision independently right so each of you choose one number and if you choose to say that the majority to get twenty dollars which one do you choose very well so that's the simple one the number would be like money to choose but we expect other to choose 1,000 so we chose that one and so this generates and coordinating mechanism it's not done so if different tourists got independently on the same dispute knowing that they have to know that the majority then this creates an incentive in them to vote on the truth about the dispute good these are some interfaces about how works and there's jurors world with the majority they get it okay bad and arbitration see and the jurors are both different they lose the trophy the worst possible so this creates basically situational work users who try to abuse a systemic reporting randomly they will lose the token it was mid-morning or average a statistically more cases and users who make the one sort of analyzing the evidence important correctly they will make money so the vision is create justice system can solve all the disputes of all the dolls that are being created and curves has a cool side and another top side are always like this were you have like dubs but have disputes and they send those arrows intellisense not the decision about those visits right this can be used for escrow transactions this is an interface with for you can't wait an escrow 200 that is going to be for like girls you can use this now you should prepare a contractor for example then token released this is a people that same token at least and other can challenge them if you don't comply with rules and there are rules for these is really smooth and we should not kind of application of these to create a humanities how do you make sure that people are not on the internet so this approach if you're interested used squares for detecting making this list and it's use them to that tonight at what time is short we have the little for the humanity system if you want to come to the fellows house many person going to be there to collaborate in meeting this italic this is creating something that we very suggested into the stockin is periodically they are use of Parros to create at least a few months the internet so this is you need to come to this place in go to collaborate tonight at 6:30 at fill ourselves I tested Civic Center and finally Paris can be used for parties now there's a dispute about what is it were provided in the two participants can I start this with this product so this is how the trail system looks right now and this is how it will look in the future when all of these other tasks connected to theirs so basically these to solve the problems of the dispute of all of the graphs and this is the standard way to pitch crepes but there's more to this than resolution unless this is what I want to tell you now and I told you before how they Brittany Marcia world but I didn't tell you all the story because remember Christ in his reforms that he created the assembly and all that but the democracy isn't working that no one didn't work became the captain Ernest the majority the assembly was voting like blocks it was prosecuted rights of the minority and descendant regime that later called it Theotokos Marty being over my Twitter are the two people Twitter like every day like yeah decision right that's how it working is right after the reform like reference and it ended up in a very disheartened leadership of the thirty tyrants that Killaloe people and in the restoration and you know how others became actually a real democracy and a trade war because they make a small change in their solutions they created someone called a man no more tonight and this was a judiciary review for all of the seminary's this is hard work you have did the proposing innocent education to the assembly are phony assembly and then after the route was an almost passed it was often in the middle of the Agora where every citizen will receive and could really and if they thought that this built on family Constitution and two challenges and when they challenge it they'll open to a trial so you have jury of citizens but conducted a trial on the new law and some important thing prosecutors other defendants and then actually decision so this decision will not the dog intercept and it was all powered by the people this is why very famous problem is if you control the courts you control the state because you will join what laws can be passed in your community so a very important use case I imagined Cantara dollar governance is critical is judiciary review and the promotion vote now but if someone comes and says ok let's raise it to medium or something like shouldn't X Dow invest or give money to some project so this can be passed by the buddy commutable split sale but it passes so those who voted yes so they have their token that stays locked into their world and then the community can see the law that was passed and if they don't see that they complies with the Constitution they can change that law and this will send it to trial of course Tara's right and the earth would create a jury of randomly selected users and these guys are going to decide if this proposal is compatible or not with the tower Constitution and the trial different parties arguing about things and Israelis went home and if you voted for the proposal in the promotion code and then this is overturned by defended by the directory producer deposit right and this and is distributed to those who challenged and the drug participated in the trial so this is how a magic clear us to be used in the middle of the governance john was asking before how do you prevent from but those pass a patent for to be done for buying so if we have this layer of tradition based on disruption our mechanism that this is a solution for that so basically imagine that besides although we know about Gareth about centralized course for website and that kind of stuff I think it's going to play a very important role but these vows generate now some kind of centralized support services you can approve and then you get the decisions made right and ACC's a Supreme Court that is controlled by the users right this is controlled by people who are in the Dow I think it's going to be very important to have solid governance for the project so thank you very much about governance do you have those slides I did you send me okay sorry I will get the second circle you would be director yes Nancy passion foundation so yeah we're really excited to have Josh here with us today why don't you kick off introduce yourself and all you evil eyes what to do Twitter DM yeah and thanks to all the other presenters for their great great talks so as I mentioned I am the executive director of the C contra nomination as honestly I think this is probably going to be the most boring lightning talk of everyone's because it is our governance process is decidedly the most off chain is the most sort of meatspace consensus and actually it's also one that is much more I think legally enforced that get it a little bit of that in a second so first off a toast to governance the cause of and solution to always performs much like alcohol a little bit is great but too much it'll kill you so let's talk about that I think generally speaking in you know cryptocurrency systems you have this have a number of set of stakeholders and it's obviously you mean a little bit broader than this but at least in my rooms he captures the way that I tend to divide up different stakeholders that may have different conflicting interests at times may have common aligned interests and what we're kind of relying on is that each group relies on trust co2 in some fashion but they also have some kind of ability to ameliorate any kind of disagreement that you might have as as John mentioned before about bigger wine there's the UAS mm and every segment that was a clear demonstration of users overriding what appeared to be minor and corporate origin so what in the Z cache like at least in the easy cash foundation side and on the electrical intimate side which is in the for-profit entity that really has been responsible for the vast majority of developments in cash attending and we focus more on the development side so we have the sort of aspirational model and give me in the community of this to of to whom all these central governments and yet idea behind that is that you have these two separate but allowing organizations of development side one feel like a coin company as mentioned there they're the ones that really started everything on the sea cash side and they are answerable to shareholders the agency cash foundation that was set up about a year later after what several years after happen even appear after as he catch the protocol that launched and we're a nonprofit that answers to our board an issue and we both are dedicated primarily to certain see cash so in you know 2019 here's kind of a list of where I see the roles and responsibilities of guilt your coin company on one side and the c-catch foundation on the other and where there's an intersection in between and you know where where this really comes down to brass tacks in terms of how the protocols govern is how the electric coin company decides to build and maintain the note software that users choose to run how we the c-catch foundation choose to build our independent note software that we are the process of developing now and then how we decide to enter process which is similar to the myth and ent process and how we come together to cite future development on the roadmap protocol so what I and this is maybe this is not indicative of everyone in the Sikh educated necessarily but my personal view is that users running nodes are the ultimate expression of who has power in the system it's really up to users to decide like what kind of rules they want to follow and I think it was most clearly demonstrated in the Atlanta SF situation in 2017 so in essence the most like real impact that we have the foundation have in terms of governance is attached protocol is in our ability to build and maintain a consensus we've had one note implementation for a physiatrist deck what we're doing with and what does that mean for sort of the sip process tomorrow so right now it is impressive today for all intents and purposes you know we we do have there are only an editor of this oppresses that's represented by the foundation but ultimately you know whatever the electric point company decides to integrate it into CRT is pretty much what winds up defining the product line there's a wrinkle to this that I'll get into about trademarks but for for at least on the on the pure developments that that is what that is what matters and firm you know from the beginning till now a lot of that process has been kind of opaque and it's etiquette lesson needed to be more open because it's really been more about like technocratic decisions being made about things like privacy prudence exactly so we're going to go in the future is there's going to be this mutually kind of selective process about what ECC decides to XE catch da what we decide to add to zebra and then there's a mutual upgrade to sort of network so this is how you know we keep that band together there's the power of the actual power of users to run nodes on one side is the that plausible threat of an intentional chain split but there's this other legal enforcement mechanism with the trademark which is basically the right now the trademark is fully owned by ECC but there is this there's a current agreement that's being negotiated in order to give both the ECC easy cash foundation power deciding what represents its in cash from a legal perspective so this is a little snippet we actually wound up Tulane they whatever talking about of a second a community center the collection because there was disagreement with ECC about moving forward on the trademark and this is like one of the most important things that we could have done it because a foundation in order to legitimize the process by which we go through future upgrades and right now the reason this is such a hot-button issue is we're in the process of discussing in the future of dev fund for the basically an extension of the Founders Award and who would stand and benefit from that sort of awarding me the foundation I want to make sure that that city is being made with the degree of legitimacy of hair so just going into like how we'll decide what we're gonna put into zebra there's not my personal ones and everything ultimately escalates to the board of the foundation but the board to these valuable feedback and this is that community sentiment process that they were talking about earlier and that that I mentioned that like very very briefly with the idea that there are many ways that we can collect the kind of both on chain and watch-chain sentiment that can then be used to and the Board's decision but we make no mistake that ultimately like whatever gets decided about what the foundation decides to put in its software is going to be decided by by the board and I suspect that it won't go against what we view to be community consensus but that's ultimately where where that power lies users can still have the power to fork away and and choose to and choose to operate and potentially needed sort of a you ASM style new verb but you know ultimately there's this trademark issue that that makes it harder to do that and thus really I think I think kind of compels both PCC and the C cash foundation to deny entry to some kind of consensus about work oh okay actually I mean it in time I worried there was pressure but anyway thank you everybody that that wasn't me kind of trying to blitz through that but there's there's a lot more that's going on and there's a cash side I wholeheartedly recommend that if anyone's interested check out some of the blog posts that come out they like your point company from the sea cash foundation check out Florence Nazi cash coupon if you want to see a lot of the debate about the future dev fund proposals which we're currently in a standstill until this tree park agreement gets happen very very soon okay thank you very much cool so I'm going to talk about governance obtains so so it Lane asked me to be super quick anyway can't you givemea a new research from my city for economics and I also built the cosmos appear in my direction rich people so what is governance so governance can be designed if - had the decision-making or coordinate coordination of multiple agents so that's what we discussed earlier today I'm sure you're familiar with decision-making can be defined mathematically by just talking about our function it which maps to a set of outcomes why do I beat the desirable Aksum I'm coordination can be defined as among agents just tell me where multiple agents have to coordinate in order to achieve a certain goal cool so um so let's say we are playing a very generous business is our game and the game is defined as so so the fashion space the space we cooperate and in fact and the AMD airplane the business so the Nash equilibrium which is equilibrium and through which the either player doesn't have any incentive to move from its it I defect effect so it's not zero service America job like I mean the bottom right corner and it's defined by that by that function right there cool so how can this game be modified so the sister concept of being morphing where the Nash equilibrium of a game can be shifted and this game can be modified as a third player that has information about the games at least you guys are playing is able to make an offer to change the utilities of the initial game and this is especially possible with trucks because it's not contracts and publicly visible strictly enforceable and also they are frictionless to implement means that you wouldn't have to expect any money with with legal contracts and winning authorities and they're also strictly enforceable means that any debt that you make on this particular work will be credible so let's say it's player C comes to be antes hey B I'm going to give you one point five utility points if you cooperate with hire a well they're a defects now even though this is not the most rational strategy for for be an us C doesn't exist or if seeded hadn't made the offer now by proposing this utility if he makes the freshmen cool so so then we have this constant game where since the C is equal to offer what provides any points for cooperate defect C will be able to modify the game that a and B are playing thus the painting the new Nash equilibria to arrive a defect equality corporates so now it has essentially changed to modify the game that it does is not the traditional business and not my anymore and this is just one way in which games can be work it's gonna be work even through three agreements made between two players that are just attracting with each other without the third player takes the sting and there are many other ways as well in which it's gonna be worked which I wouldn't go into details right now but the point is that any spot contract that can be computed will be computed at this is kind of the double edge of this of during complete launching or completeness of small contracts because anything that computers will be computed so we arrive at this dimension what would you do we consider good power to be money so I sort of loosely defined of how the appropriate configurations can be extremely bad so the number of offers that have potential players Cerf came Warburg inmate is defined by the number of actions that exists within the game times the wealth of the maximum the maximum wealth of the war per times a combination of the players that the worker chooses to work and this will be divided by the computation power the worker because that's a key limitation that is to attain the number of a morphing officer why do you make so okay so on out there cuz this is the game I'm gonna have the room to make the number between 0 and 100 and the person that makes the number closest to a half of the average wins alright go ahead make all right yes ok cool how many pay people picked about 50 show hands ok how many people picked about 25 ok level 1 you guys didn't make a random choice if you picked it if you make them up a decent it might be a random choice if you picked about 25 it's another one choice how do you think people picked about house 25 okay level 2 choice how do people make 0 okay cool you guys probably on or you're really computationally smart okay so the little gate games is winding on you're able to make inferences that about your peers about what your peers are choosing so yeah yeah exactly so so the grass is located way to go math Shanthi one of the one of the key limitations for that is that humans are usually studied or empirically it has been verified that humans are usually level three and computers can be as level high as the compute power that they possess so also when we're dealing with a lot of these watching our smart contract systems I have tended to work under the assumption that information is complete because everything is was a wonderful thing about chain but for information is actually incomplete because a lot of billions can be private even though the briefs are broadcasted they can still be private because you don't know the true belief so you can assign a high degree of certainty tenant and also reality is a fabrication of the collective perception of all of the agents within the system so there are things such as the value is also a perception is that it's something that we have assigned the definition of a thing is also other perceptions it is supposed to define by the agents and so essentially we are not able to meet very definitive inferences about those things unless what we do do so by Americo study in which case it would be a probability distribution cool so and then there's also this big challenge of formalizing that irrationality so so why do I call this humans and machines in humans it's basically human designers designing machine systems that are supposed to coordinate other humans and the big challenge with that or mapping through this is formalizing about irrationality and the way we can do that is two ways one can use Gibbs free energy in which case you look at it as a constrained optimization or you can measure effectiveness if it gives you got payout divergence which is basically the Delta between and expected outcome versus the true outcome of the game and the constraint optimization is basically you end up at the constraint it's a compute power that of the agent that means kind of calculation and then we also have the complexity of value this is basically an argument saying that you cannot represent value that a human has or what a human body is mathematically and thus it becomes hard to implement that in a simulation cool so so we're essentially when we're talking about these kinds of systems they do not a scale-free networks being their networks where 80% of the nodes for 20% of possession and 20% of those the connections and there are ways in which these networks can be resilient but first we have to define resilience so resilience we can measure it us up as either of the ability to not be fragmented or the ability to tolerate faults or the looking to survive attacks so we are not going to consider around the networks think of usually ball chains are most and largest scale-free networks so with the scale-free networks the attack survivability of watching is pretty pretty bad so that's the that's the one thing that we should consider with with thinking about resilience of a block chain so basically attack survivability is the fact that since since there are such few nodes there that possess most number of connections then if you attack those notes than the entire system essentially fails however with regards to network fragmentation and fault tolerance because of this property of a few nodes having high degree of connections the network within would essentially not really change if you remove a couple of notes about the system or if a few random notes get influenced are attacked cool so this is awesome and he in 500 BC he proposed South organization and South governance so how do you hide me self-organized so we aren't very good at some organization as we have observed in current systems so but then there are ways in which we can self-organize and we can also guide it so I have to give credit to my friend Virgil Griffith for for introducing me to the concept organization which first implemented in terms of studying some information theoretic systems but essentially self-organization can be guided in three ways so either you can talk about or change the change the control parameter of this is due in which case the X will be made and just another X which is better so earlier I explained it actually graphically I think that that might help a little bit better so essentially if you have a system where it has been stuck in a local minima and it's just not even know from here you just take this and look but it but it up here so so that get system goes back to that Nam except better that are more or just eat that's more desirable or you can have or you can actually change the function itself so this is changing X or you can change the function that governs X so instead of having it like this you can transform it to something like this or any other function so isn't to you you would change the dynamics which governed any specific control parameter and you can change this for any number of functions or you can change the entire structure of the self governing system itself in which case you you change the set of all the functions that that constitute the government the governance model so all the policies that are defined within the system can be changed and that case is extremely limiting in the sense that it will not allow for you to see emergent effects because your constant want to find the way in which the coming governance model is worse with regards to just interrupts you can you can be able you can still observe quite a lot of governance and flex or emergent effects despite there being a little bit of intervention within the systems so those are do you ways in which you can guide the self-organizing system to better to better States or to having a better governance model okay cool remember this guy so so think about guiding the process in which systems can be governed instead of allowing it to complete the self organized by itself thank you my name is I'm a software engineer at court and today I'm gonna be talking about the other half of governance that Lane talks about whether that watch chain can provide governance and this they're watching and provide robot so what is Google bot this is a very nebulous topic so there's the straight paper called micro foundations of the world walk and by Gillian Hatfield and very wet nest and in it they basically say that Lola is a classification institution so what they mean by this is like it takes the facts of the case it's it's a function that takes the facts of the case and then it outputs our decision so in this case it would be is this lawful or unlawful is this constitutional or unconstitutional and they submit a good classification institution it has these six characteristics so it makes the decision-making Hajek publicly available so if you're trying to decide whether or not to do something you need to know whether you know what you're going to do is lawful or unlawful right it results in computing its Abel it's impersonal it's able to produce new rules by soliciting information for users and against critical results for novel inputs okay so they say they say importantly that it's a mistake to presuppose that government is an essential feature of law and legal order so this is firmly multi-point and you might notice that these strangely but the reason why they are acting this way is because the heat my project didn't use to instruct them on how to do things it just cents to give them the whole of moving forward without falling and so you can see they you know we got really really different behavior because because we focused on the goal and not the mechanisms of how to do it and we can actually apply the same things a lot and this is a natural approach it's called the functional approaching comparative plot and what it says is that law is comparable if it performs the same functions so if it solves the same social problems I'm just going to give one example of this so this is the law speaker and this was around the Year 1000 years old in Scandinavian countries like Iceland and what the law speaker did was as you might imagine spoke little off so this was how they carried a lot down through generations was that they had a law speaker it wasn't hard today so this is very different than what we're familiar with but it's still counted as well okay so given that that definition let's talk about the social problems to solve so there's this great paper by Anthony Carlin who's a Illinois Austrian contract law he has this paper called contract law in the state of nature and vinicky says that there's two problems in this goes back to Hobbes he says that one of the problems is vulnerability of possession so you know people can take your stuff great and the other problem is transactional security so this means that trying to make promises with other people they may break their promises so how can we solve this so let's get the definitions out and play so I'm going to be defining a blockchain very loosely and very abstractly as a state machine so it takes all the states and new information it has a transition function and you get a new space I'm also going to be defining manches vs. off change assets so as unchain asset by that I just mean that it watching is the sole source of truth for ownership or access and by off chain I mean that's something else determines ownership for access so this is really about social consensus and source attribute okay so let's make a simple on a piece cryptocurrencies let's say that Alice wants to get funked into enlisted rank so the whole state Alice has to involve a zero it goes through a transition function now about the same rate varies reporter let's look at it invalid transaction so let's say that Bob tries to take ten tokens from Alice without her consent so as we all know this would not work great so because Alice has not signed the transaction it's not going to be validated by the bot producer to dominators fingers whatever was at every so what's really cool about this is that it turns out that for differences because they units they're actually enforcing property rights on the internet in code and without traditional law so agent honoring has this great tapeworm called ownership and it makes talks about I think there's like six or eight different rights that are in the bundle of ownership and it turns out that particular duties have three of those rights so there's the right to use there's the right to exclude others and there's the power transfer so a Bakura we decided to see what would happen if we try to suppress more sophisticated property rights so we chose to implement the pencil demo based on right into our place this is a picture redditor place and in this demo we decided to allow users to buy and sell pixels as well as phone pixels and can't create whatever they wanted to create but what we discovered was that this was actually implementing another one of Monterey's rights and the bundle ship with ownership and this was the right to to alienate the you straight maintained ownership but allow someone else to use it it turns out that this is kind of the the owner tenant subtenant relationship so this is very important so we talked about 1 million possession proud parents what about transactional security in contractor so the simplest example of transactional and security is what I call the squad and there's this great example from Raiders of the Lost Ark it's not actually the squash that's what happens right after it so I had a video but I want to try to play it for time reasons but it's all enacted pretty guys but Indiana Jones is trying to get over this pin right and he has the idol his system is on the other side it has the win that would help them get across and so he says give me the whip and this guy says throw me the idol so Indiana Jones throws the Idol over and as we might expect so this is the problem of transactional and security and we solve it so it gets all this if we use a smart contract so what's really special ears that a smart contract and essentially bones the assets and allow us to transfer them so if alice has X and broth has one we can send it to the smart contract then the smart contract can actually do the dispersal safely so this is really really cool cuz that means we've solved the social problem of transactional insecurity without using traditional context and so you might be saying well you know that was just a simple swap what about what about promises that unfold over time what about mark complexly and and you would be right that's a big questions let's open up the black box of contract enforcement and so there's two steps there's a classification step and then there's appliance and control and this comes from a great talk by Professor Oliver Peck not called ambiguity and legal specification but what is list is that so there's the event classification step break that says has X happened or not and then there's applying the correct rules so if X happens then dy and it turns out that humans are much better at classification than computers aren't so like for example in entender law it's really important to know that the apartment is happening so you're doing you would have to have sensory or like carbon monoxide for vermin for you know you can remote you can imagine all the things that you have to do about a trap but you can actually just have that you might mean that you can inspect your going on saying oh this looks popular right so that would be a lot easier so humans are graded classification but they're terrible at rural application so as we all know there's a lot of corruptions misunderstandings all sorts of constraint so it turns out that we can have the best of both worlds and this is where things like lettuce come in so we can have any human classifier human classifier saying yes this is habitable and that can be part of that input in the smart contract we can also have human dispute resolution systems such that if something is triggered to gets indexed in dispute resolution and then comes back into the smart contract so we talked about vulnerability of protection we talked about transactional security and help property rights of contractors solutions to those but do we actually have you a lot so going back to the rules of the go to the class of each institution so number one is the decision making market publicly available this is obviously true for watching right we have to be able to replicate it so it has to be publicly available number two does it resolve ambiguity so things have to be determined this you can't really allow for anything committee so I would say that this is yes number three is it stable so or anything on watching to be used to solving social problems it has to be long-lasting so I think this still remains to be seen okay number four gives predictable results for novel infants so this is kind of yes and no so on a watching we can we can we can say FX and we can say if not X and that's the entire universe so the possibilities right but at the same time there's probably going to be things that we don't expect so I think this one is a baby we're working on it number five so a smart contract for anyone watching it isn't personal right done so on and watching you don't even know do someone else we don't even know if it's a machine or a person so it's very impersonal and number six it can produce new bubbles by soliciting information from users and if this one is also one that watching ecosystem this week on we can produce neutrals by transitioning to be block chains or news or upgrading to new smart contracts but that's very difficult that still remains to be seen how how good we are so inclusion we took the functional approach we talked about the rule of law as a classification institution we talked about the social problems to solve right so the owner ability possession and transactional and security and it turns out that for on J assets we can require sophisticated property rights that we can solve simple transaction on security we're still early on as I'm sure all you know censorship resistant articles often and we're working on solutions for off chain assets but the really cool thing is that I'm watching as a smart contract platform can provide at least parts of the robot so thank you so much [Applause]