J3 AG 03 Federico Ast Kleros A Justice System for the Decentralized Internet

so hello how are you thank you for for being here and we're going to talk about Claro's you know I discover a couple of days ago that my talk was supposed to last for one hour instead of the 20 minutes I had thought in the beginning so what I did is bring you not only talk about Glarus and how it works and what it does but also the why it's important for us to build this and at this moment in history so I'm not of this material is part of my forthcoming book so I'm going to tell you more about that if you want after the talk so the story starts with this guy I guess we all know right this benedict cumberbatch in the skin of Alan Turing he was created a enigma let it be machine to the recover the grip the Enigma code that the Nazis used to communicate with the submarines so he was the inventor of the computer science on computers and after this big computer that was an entire room of course we have Gordon Moore saying that the amount of chips that was inside a microchip doubles every two years so we get computers each time smaller I got first into the computer world like in 1980s when my grandfather bought Commodore 128 I know if any of you had one of those so computing cost performance goes down the storage cost goes down of course we get to have smaller and smaller memory cards and then 1989 this guy comes you know who he is yes first it's Tim berners-lee who creates the hypertext Transfer Protocol and that's how the World Wide Web is born then if we add the diminishing cost of bandwidth we get of course that the internet starts to take over the world and that people start to have smartphones everywhere right this is a very interesting image it's taken in a favela in Brazil so these guys and very poor kids they still have the same phone that the like Larry and Sergey at Google right because most design it has the same apps so after the technology comes then comes intrapreneurs and starts the most important transformation of the economy of all times Marc Andreessen has this famous article in The Wall Street Journal where he says a software is it in the world and the early days of the internet came with a lot of very high expectations because we could see the crowds taking over the power right and the internet seemed to be disintermediating very old and very powerful intermediaries one of the first big teams were the record companies basically were seeking slaving artists industry of the music went down very very fast second of course the media and the newspapers with big monsters of propaganda look how the newspaper industry reaches the peak in 2000 in the US and then look how fast it crumbles to the ground and we have these two actors first Google and then Facebook that start to take over the world right any one of you know this guy Jaron Lanier he's one of the inventors of VR in the 80s and he has this very good book I recommend you'd read that call who owns the future and he says that yeah this internet that was starting as some liberating force for helping the small guy eventually ended up becoming the big monster because we have all this huge centralized global monopolies just take a look about the size of Amazon yeah it started in 1994 selling books and look now it's bigger and all the competitors together yeah including Walmart which was one of the bad guys of the early days so you can see that I guess in the how this guy changes his attitude to life as he came to be like a Bruce Willis off of retail so um I sometimes ask this question I get different different answers depending on what's the audience who could hear things that Trump is more powerful okay one the rest are you too lazy to or do tringa Zuckerberg is more powerful that Trump too lazy so Facebook is a community of two billion right now since last year they know who we are they control everything we read they start to control how we transact so the e-commerce they are building they are starting to chance to handle payments and when you start to handle payments then you can start giving credit to people and when you start giving trade we will then why not create your own coin right not very hard for you if you are such a big platform so some people believe that this big platforms actually instead of companies are starting to look more like States this is a wired article published last year speaking about United States right for example Facebook has become like a government now and if it was a government what kind of government would be what's the form of government of a very big platform owned by one guy right we're so Rica tours had this country he basically owned and he used to make the law and he also controlled the enforcement mechanisms right he has the most ideas for that let me talk let me the force should continue with the athlete so you have this very big platform that makes a law these are the terms and conditions of Facebook I know if any of you took the burden to read to read this look at the web how it dislike the design it's awful so they don't even pay attention to that of course they make the rules and they have the enforcement mechanisms right they have the right to ban you from the platform as the old Greek when they had a trial there and you lot you could be banned from the community ostracism no so some people think that Zuckerberg in Paraguay has become a kind of modern King and this picture actually is really this Philip Philip the fourth it's an actual like Spanish king of a 17th century it's not that it drew a Gerber legs it's really this guy was exactly like him and the Empire is of course larger that any other Empire in the history of mankind because they control most of the tools we used to communicate except in China Oh in 18th century so it's good that were in France doing this because you know in the 18th century had these revolutions the overthrew the centralized monarchies and then the revolutionaries had the decision to make of how to rule a large-scale modern democracy because there were no previous experiences so you have the crypto economists of those days were the Federalists right they were trying to figure out how you make a system that can work for governing a country of millions of people and that can be saved from the attackers because we don't have attackers you have collusion right and they had to figure out how to make it work and they figure out that a good way to do it was deletion of powers right executive the sister did judiciary was a way to have a control of the governance system and this worked like this for a long long long time so 2008 comes of course we all know what happens we get financial crises and then we have this guy publishing this paper or this guy or guys publishing this paper in this cryptography forum with the proportion and new technology for money and then we have no guy propose you know this works for lots more things we could be doing governance on these and now all of you guys are building the new decentralized organizations that are going to rule our lives in decades to come for music right for sharing economy stuff certain combs sharing etc whatever share whatever platform that works like some marketplace today centralized is being decentralized as we speak so this generates new questions how to govern these platforms and we have some answers from this government side about liquid democracy for example future key etc but there is one thing that has not been treated sufficiently at this point that is the resolution yeah you know every society every community has to solve the problem of social order and thus that is how legal systems were born let me take you to ancient Greece for a while and you know how the trials work in ash in Greece they have popular trials right every citizen of the police had the right to judge of course except for slave and women but every male citizen of the police had the right to judge so the Greek were very concerned about one thing so if everyone has a right to judge how do you avoid like mob rule right you go to the trial of your friend so you go with your friends and so you vote for him to win so these guys were they were aware of that problem and so they created a quite sophisticated mechanism to avoid that people could make this kind of collusion so it was based on this token they had platfrom token called p-nut it was like a bronze plague like this one and that was with your name on it and so if you want it to be a juror on a Greek trial you went on the court day and at the door of the court there was a stone block called Clara terraeum and this was like a big stone block with a number of slots there you put your your ID there in one of the slots and then came justice official through some black and white dice like 20 faces dies some of them were white some of them were black if you have on your Roah a white dice you went to the jury if you had a black one you went home so you were dismissed interesting right so the key concept of the gray of the Greek justice is that it was as we call it today peer-to-peer the idea of professional judges lawyers and stuff actually starts when nation-states start to consolidate in the 17th and 18th century and the legal systems created at that time worked for a while actually they work quite well for a number of centuries like neutral Revolution 19th century and then the economy started to because of a number of trends connected to the Internet right so the economy freelancers working from everywhere in the world right and of course capital starting to travel across the borders real fast without limits so we have now this very big interconnected global economy and let's talk about one case that happens every day so you have Alice she's an entrepreneur from France and she hires Bob with web developer from Guatemala they make an agreement so she wants him to do a website for her he delivers the website and you know what she's not happy because she expected something better for her money so what happens then as you can imagine dispute and Alice Alice is frustrated right because she's not going to Guatemala to hire a lawyer right to sue sue the guy for like a five hundred dollar dispute so and this brings us to clear us what if she could put the money into a smart contract right and this mark contract selects an arbitrator in case something both wrong in the dispute and this arbitrator could be Clara's right so imagine they do the deal so Bob creates a website everything goes right so the transaction is signed everybody's happy money is transferred and good but what happens if there is a dispute so in this case the money is going to stay locked into the smart contract and both parties are going to pay an arbitration fee that is going to be used by Clara's that which is an autonomous organization to select a number of jurors and these jurors are going to start to arbitrate the dispute they're going to vote who is right so it's crowd-sourced jurors right and these guys are going to be expert in the type of dispute at hand and they can come from everywhere in the world so in this case imagine that the jurors analyzed the evidence so they analyzed the contract and Alice and Bob did they analyzed the product that was delivered and this because of their knowledge on how to build website they can know who was right about this and so they vote and in this case Alice wins and the money from the smart contracts goes to her do you understand like the basic idea of how it works good yeah great so I'm guessing that you have tons of questions so I'm going to try to start answering some of them the first one is who are the jurors and how are going to you are you going to select them right hint you know kleros is randomness in greek you remember that big stone block called criterion Clara's randomness tyrion is means kind of altar so it's like the altar of luck or chance so we have this woman who lives in Kenya and she works she has to learn how to develop websites in her spare time and now she wants to make some extra money I on the side and why not become a juror in disputes about websites so if she want to be a juror in klaris she needs to have this token that's called finicky on of course IRC 20 token and she's going to put this token into she's going to deposit it into a sub Court specializing in website this pool so klaris looks like a big tree when you have a general court and from that court you have many different sub courts and in sub court is going to be specialized in particular kind of this place so this is I always use the example of the freelancers because it's very easy to understand that Claire is a multi-purpose system that can work for all kinds of this place right so in this case this woman it's going to activate the token into the freelancing let's say sue court and with her other 3,000 jurors and may activate we talk and write and so klaris is going to randomly select a number of jurors to arbitrate it imagine that the seven of them are selected so why are jurors selected because they are incentivized to become jurors because for each dispute they solve we are going to collect arbitration fees in it right that the money that was put by the parties as arbitration fee and how are you going to how do we make them participate honestly because the big risk here I don't know if I mentioned that they are anonymous jurors so and there's no identity reputation so how do and we make sure that they don't just press randomly any button like a or b and collect the fee for arbitration right of course you know Thomas Schelling he's the guy on the right from the day she was receiving his Nobel Prize when in 2005 in economics he's the author of this book this great book strategy of conflict where he were out game theory book and in this game theory book he proposes the concept of focal point the big most famous example is to tell people to people to meet somewhere in New York tomorrow but you don't tell them where or when exactly so any part of New York and any time would be good but he found that people in general they would meet at Grand Central Station with the information but it wasn't because of how people coordinate they make they made there of course in Paris I guess that the normal selling point will be Eiffel Tower maybe at noon or in midnight like the movie we didn't even Paris and on this principle of the selling point so you can put in ceramic incentives so two guys had to pick a square here so if they pick the same one they each one make twenty bucks so who of you would pick like b3 see 586 okay so are you sure there was no collusion here do you know so that's how it works some previous work made on this is in the truth coin it's a paper that used them a coin that based on principles to incentivize people to answer two questions and of course augur as an Oracle that uses a principle of selling a coin so in Claro's jurors are going to vote independently and they are going to analyze the same kind of evidence and they are experts in the same kind of field so it according to the selling point principle they should be assumed to vote for the same result right which is the truth about their dispute so so the incentive works this way so if you are a juror like imagine you have seven jurors right you have six vote one thing and one bolt in another thing so we could assume that this guy who voted different probably he did not take a look at the evidence or like he was not voting honestly and this this shows like a case where you have how the money is distributed so remember Bob lost the dispute against Alice so he had one if deposited into the dispute and he lost the arbitration fee sorry and so this arbitration fee from Bob it's going to be transferred to other juries that participated in the decision so it doesn't matter how they vote them but they are all going to receive the same amount of it right and then you ha we had five that voted the same thing right and the two that vote different so the two guys who voted differently from the others are going to lose the token that they deposited for being selected as jurors and this is going to be transferred to the guys who voted coherently cool so basically the main point of this issue if you ourselves it you say select into the right Court depending on your specific skills and then you behave honestly then you should make money if you try to game the system by voting anything whatever so you just fault randomly then you are likely to lose money so that's how the incentive work based on the selling principle so our speaker for now is good yeah so we're speaking about how they go system of a centralized companies enjoy platforms being mint Kujo music eventually starts to have disputes of like one guy uploads a song and another guys I say this song like it was myself you just upload it again at this belongs to me so YouTube has a Content ID yeah okay sorry YouTube has Content ID and a centralized system for solving this you Joe does not have this so why wouldn't you do like just like outsource dispute about this to Clara's origin has a sharing economy platform and why couldn't they instead of having to build an arbitration system themselves why one they like outsource the disputes to Clara's and all the other decentralized platforms that are being built at this moment they could very well start to outsource that dispute scleras including like world in vr so we can all live in this VR world and all the disputes the justice system for this VR world could declare us why because of a principle that we know from the time of of ironsmith we should focus so we are building this ecosystem together and we should focus on what we do best right so a vision that we have is so clear us becoming like arbitration system that's going to handle the disputes of all the platforms that are starting to to grow in whatever your social media you can solve that disputes between users who are ever travel displeased you can imagine that are rising in the decentralize economy we need someone to handle this what you see now is lots of companies starting to build arbitrate systems which I can tell you since we are doing this full-time it's a very hard thing to do right so it's not something that you can do as a side project in while you're trying to build a marketplace something that you should like be an expert in and so what we did is that we developed an arbitration standard because we want to every user in every transaction in this central platform users should be able to select the arbitrator they prefer so we're not klaris is not trying to build to be the Google of the total solution right but one of one of the options so if you want if you are running a platform and you want close to arbitrate the dispute we created a standard that makes all the contracts that you have in your platform I already troubled by Claro's but also by any other arbitrator that is going to comply with the same standards oh how does look from the point of view of the user so you have this is maybe a platform by some additional Clara is another newer place in our platform and they after the two parties agree on the contract blah blah so they have also to agree on an arbitrator in Casa dispute happens so we can imagine that Skylar is going to be a drop-down menu where parties can agree away I want arbitrator X Y Z Claro for whatever so this is yeah this is if we get all the decentralized platforms to agree on this smart contracts under all the arbitrator's are going to be interoperable and plug in and out as you want so you want to see the product well we have a proof of concept already built and this is a video okay so here is where you create the control of course this is very early stage but here you can see how it works you create the contract with another party about something enter the description of the agreement okay submit okay so in the blockchain now so at least which starts because Alice was not happy with with the website she wants to start the dispute resolution process so baba has to pay the fee for arbitration because they both have to make this deposit then he can I add evidence for the jeweler's to to see and you described what was wrong with with the product in the evidence and so they though this is what the part where the jury has to activate tokens to being drawn for the dispute and then the jury sure is selected and now he has he chooses a dispute so there are the Gherkin having his dashboard many disputes so now he has to choose one and he analyzed the evidence that is sent by the parties and then he vote for one of the parties and then depending the boat are aggregated and all the distribution of money and tokens is done by klaris did you understand more or less how it works good and so the product is already working so we are starting to do some experiments I see William here is a mathematician professor of diversity of Toronto of advanced cryptography and so his job is try to understand how people vote when you put them into this type of of settings right and we are starting to do a first experiment of a talking curated list because Clara's come work as this Pedro solution for talking to rate at least in the following sense we did an agreement within protocol that they have so the disguise were doing list here before so we serve like an e-commerce marketplace and they had lots of this beautiful and it also had lots of these good about publications so people that upload like publications of wrong items to the list right if I go to like listing of houses and I upload a car so that's a problem and so they always had people like employees flagging those disputes and bringing them down and the thing we are trying to test is how klaris could be used for this purpose so it is Listia imagine now that Alice submits an item to listing of shoes and she submits a shoe right and she states submit the item is accepted right and she gets the money back so what if she submits a flamethrower into the list right so she submits the flamethrower and she's takes the money and then comes Bob who challenges the submission and so now this has to go to the to the solution we have to use a jury that analyzes for the listing and the rules of the Soviet the submission and the rout of the listing klaris is going to be doing this with the mechanism use for before and claryce with in this case reject the listing so Alice lost lost and Bob gets the money so this is what we are starting to test now so we have many questions this is very new of course and we have lots of things to research one of dot is so can Clara's produce faster and cheaper decisions and other arbitration methods that's one because it uses a different logic a logic coming from our world as it's not a dispute resolution world it uses the logic of game theory to solve disputes and this has not been done before so that's a very big question that we have to validate through empirical testing and for now what we think is that klaris is going to work in this speech where there are two parties and the structure of decision is not too complex right and there are no the values involved about light so like there was a controlled about this commercial dispute this was the product this is what this is what was agreed so if you get some experts voting on this so it should work so this is has something we have to validate and also of course we are trying to analyze how to prevent jurors who are voting right so being but eventually came into the wrong place into the wrong side of the voting to be unfairly punished so William has this very interesting challenges and so the Greek had a concept called pacaya that meant that so sometimes you had an agreement but the circumstances have changed and then you need so they're women it's not longer violent it's not reasonable to to comply with it because of the circumstance change so and it has they had this moral concept so it's fine when circle has changed to not comply what was the district agreement of the people but we also like the cold is law right we also like that what was agreed in the cold being forced modern justice system captured the problem of the pacaya in what they call force majeure right we think that klaris has the potential of if every country every small contract can has have trailers as a retreat or it can like give an escape hatch when the strict enforcement of a smart contract will become also a reasonably because of a change of circumstances so this is something we see for a longer time horizon but if you want an escape hatch in a smart contract how do you do it without making a kill switch that introduces a new a new point of single point of failure in the system so every society every community had to solve the problem of social order and that's why they create a legal system the Greek had the theory of citizens having the right to judge in the time of the nation states so we started to have these trials run by experts called judges and lawyers and this is a 19th century illustration the thing is that if you go to the 20th century so it's not very different and the thing is that the communities we are starting to see now are starting to be decentralized online communities that have nothing to do with what we had before so we're building this decentralized justice system that we need for the blockchain age thank you very much I follow you completely until the point where you say hi you reward or punish the jurors okay I really think discussion the monitors is an important part of how you reach a decision dissenting opinions having like four against five is a very different position than having seven against one for example and the ability to kick out jurors for both parties can be interesting so why to try to fix the way it works instead of like letting people choose the way they want to be judged for example I could decide okay in marbet ration both of us will be able to kick out two of the jurors and as a party to a jury I would like to see the history of the juror for example you can see that the juror will vote every time against the defendant then that's also a problem right because it's based in a way you know how do you create that flexibility for competing models to emerge up until the point where you find eventually a model fits most people those are many questions I'm trying to answer so and why don't have jurors deliberate and because in some cases there may no but there may be no need to deliberate and easy dispute remember we thought at this point we are trying to solve dispute of simple things like I told you like the dead case of the website maybe a small car crash for a minor insurance thing where one would expect experts to have some and like some clarity on who is right in this episode and and we also expect them to be small clients right and because yeah so it's not a D system I get always the pressures of are you going to replace lawyers so this is going to help more in segments where like lawyers don't go and arbitrators traditional arbitration don't go there is an invitation is like a mini trial in the end so um in this in this like five hundred dollar disputes $1,000 disputes this method can I make a decision that we think can be faster and can be cheaper than any other other method so that's one the only one side so it's about so where this word this is not going to work everywhere it's going to work we think in a number of use cases as everything always works number of whiskey's and another another thing so remember the smart contracts standard we want so klaris is going to be one method if there are other methods that developed by other people so the the users will be able to select okay for this type of case I prefer this other one because it used to it works best for this other use cases the thing that is important and this is why we are creating this the standard is that people have the higher amount of choice possible for their disputes in some cases flourish is going to be the West one in other what you proposed the liberation or whatever or turn metal will be best we like we are at this moment at this early stage we are still trying to understand where it works so but that's a very valid question as a former marketing professional doing a lot of websites for clients choose another example because this one has a very wide array of interpretation but if where was all that was legitimately what happened etc thank you this one this example so we may we may do the test and it may not work here but you know what's the good thing about this example that everyone gets it everyone gets at once another question or you have mentioned that the in the era of illustration there came the legal systems and the lawyers so could you imagine that this could evolve into a full fledge judicial system where you also have judges do real lawyers and not only for resolving disputes on smart contracts but resolving any kind of dispute so having a body of law and then the lawyers would be the Oracle that tried to to insert the information of what the facts that happen in the real world into the system and have this body of law resolving what's the resolution based on the legislation and then at the end of the process you have a jury and a judge that given the resolution of the dispute by the Tomato system they have to cast a final vote on what the interpretation of what came out of the body of law maybe if it doesn't match with what they think it's fair initiate a process of changing the legislation that's a very good question so that's not what we are working precisely now we're working on the jury selection and this in devising system smart contract has have the big advantage that they give you enforcement for the ruling right that's have been a big thing however we have a partnership you know liberland the country I guess here everyone loves liver none so liberland is starting to build their justice system using klaris and they are going to enforce whatever klaris rules into their territory so yes of course this is not going to happen in like large nation-states at least for I don't know how long but eventually and if there is change in legislation this could very well start to be used in arbitration in small tumor iteration in existing governments like for a government of juha government I have discussed this with government officials and no cords are sometimes like they have bottlenecks because they have to handle like small insurance claims small like yeah this website this please go to course sometimes right and you do have judges and lawyers some charge in this stuff so some countries have decided that it's more efficient to and before taking something to court to have some private arbitration or mediation instance so Clara's at this point is still not accepted by the international conventions on arbitration because of the fact that jurors are chosen are anonymous and the relation on arbitration requires that people know who they are because to avoid potential conflict of interests so kleros solves this through crypto economics but we need to make regulators understand equipped economics can generate right incentives in even when jurors are anonymous but the short answer is not now but in the future yes thank you yeah hi so my question or comment is I can understand how your resolution protocol would work if there is a clear answer if there's a clear selling point with yes this contract was fulfilled or not but if it's not so clear then as a juror I have an incentive not to vote on what I think is right but to vote on what I think the others will think is right or even more so I would vote on what I think the others will think the others will think the others will think and get to this sort of you know Keynesian beauty competition so how I mean how do we identify so if we take that as a as a problem klaris right now only works in those kind of disputes but there is a selling point how would we identify those and as a juror how can i how can we align the incentives of the jurors to always vote what they think is correct and not start playing these meta games that's a very good question and we still don't have an answer to that one because we're starting to do the tests we have every reason to think that it will work and the thing is that sometimes we will have the six to one thing right well what we want is to have the least amount of jurors possible in this case right the problem is okay because there is a cost thing here if you have if you can solve something with three jurors don't use 11 right there any when you have three jurors is that you have like yeah two to one result right so in that case one switch from one drug to the different vote would change the result and that would change how to and how to reward or punish jurors so I said I was telling you so we are doing research on these what tells us now is an appeal system right if some of the party things that there is no that the result was not fair and there is an appeal system and this escalates who twice as many jurors and these guys are going to vote again and if there is another disagreements of the guy who lost want to appeal again he can do it again it has to pay it was a bit I think that colony system in that sense I don't mean that the result is necessarily wrong even if we have been on a 10-2 to result of jurors those two might have been honestly giving their correct opinion and they I don't want them to be disincentivized even if they think okay the other ten are gonna vote in favor and I think it should go against I want them to be able to say I vote against to show that their true opinion without being punished now right now they have the incentive of then going with what they think the majority will be and this is an unsolved problem at the moment so in a number of cases honest jurors are going to be unfairly punished the thing is that on average the stay honest jurors still make money and those who want to try to get in the system lose it but so this is going to happen an average but you we cannot guarantee that in every specific case that is going to happen because no system of arbitration can I guess warranty something like that but if we get to build something that is better than what exists now so we're going to give the world a big improvement so that is to go can i as a juror simply wait until vote was the majority as a juror could I not simply wait until everyone else has voted and then vote with the majority I'm not English speaker natively if I'm a juror yeah could I not wait and see how all the other jurors vote and then vote last to ensure I'm always in the majority if you case you can ask how they were voted no I see you say blockchain no so the vote independent you can and looked try to look but and so you don't you and their votes you you can ask how they are going to vote but they don't have to tell you a truth but they must submit they had go to the blockchain at some point is it mass so okay and as a plaintiff could I write a contract that bribes jurors to vote for me so that's the question you can you can answer that after William it is the Crypt economic expert and this is something what we are researching okay and and finally could I not just create a whole lot of fake jurors in the court that I know is going to be affecting me just before I file a complaint like civil attack yes so um the token so the token is intended to solve that so if there is some a civil attack so the losing party could appeal and then you have to provide more jurors and it can be appeal again and again and again and it would become increasingly costly for the attacker and in the end there is General Court that is going to vote on the dispute and if so this is an attack so they talking holders have the incentive not to vote for the attacker because their value sell token will go down thank you hi so that was a process that you described and would I be correct if I say that you assume that all the dispute parties actually know how to describe the dispute so what the matter is the parties the guys who does the website and the under customer right so you use mainly state they don't know how to describe the dispute and this could affect the outcome of the of the arbitration yeah cuz it's a common it's a common problem that parties actually don't know how to describe what the matter is yeah so um we think that eventually there is going to be like templates for that type of right if you do a website so you have the product that was a liver so and the messages that will send back and forth by the parties and yeah and the initial agreement and this is going to be a standardized as possible well that it's not that that's not a problem that affects Clara specifically that's a problem that affects every dispute resolution system online through social systems so lawyers cannot handle all of this because a lawyer is not going to do this for our $500 dispute because it doesn't make any sense financially for him so this should work in cases where lawyers don't go so sure but now I have a problem because I mean as a contractor then I would do two prices I would give you a price if you want a betrayin contract built in and another one lower one if you exclude that because it's one price it risk I have two risks the one that you're not just you not gonna be a happy with the website which is very subjective notion and the second one is that you're in bad faith I don't know you you're at least in France right so then I'm gonna have to make you pay a premium but this is the second problem we are solving so let's assume that it works right so this opens the possibility for lots of people in the world to participate in the world economy like this guy who is doing websites in India in Tanzania in Indonesia so you don't hire him now because you don't know who he is and so you're not going to take maybe the risk of losing everything but if you don't have to pay him directly and you can put the money in a smart contract which gives you the enforcement and then you have our dispute solution system that actually will analyze the evidence adult cost that is going to be efficient now the guy from Indonesia can work in the world economy and that is going to drive the supply of website services a lot higher and this is going to bring the cost a lot lower so in the end what this is going to do is bring the cost down of a lot of services deliver for freelancers this is already what reputation systems do like an eBay right number of stars reviews from people and I know I know with a fairly good confidence that the guy is gonna ship me what he says he would because he has already done that hundred times sure there there are some that are very billion systems but this did not do not solve everything so up work is a platform that is like centralized freelancer platform and they had reputations systems and they do have the true solution which is handled by internal team of the solution right so it's this the problem even if you are with a system and you know what lots of dispute actually happened because of the regulation systems so why you you and I do an agreement so yeah I which I comply you will comply over okay and then you rate me with a three star I do I did everything why why three stars oh and yeah a three star for me so this is a dispute that was actually created by rebellion system and this could be also be handled by Clara's and I will think about the question that was asked before and the so in terms of the strategic thinking of jurors who if they know the rule they that the majority is going to win so that they are going to get to have some meta thinking may quickly it'd be interesting that the rule is not explained beforehand and and so I mean another rule could be if there is a reputed kind of a reputation system for jurors for example the one who is the juror who is drawn who has the most reputation would be the one deciding the other so since there are anonymous and one knows and and so on and so they could be different rules and and and the rule which is picked is not it is not not public and and this way the jurors could not think in terms of I need to play by this rule you know just so you know I'm just suggesting like not this explaining the route beforehand does it make any sense there is no reputation right you reputation introduced like a friction for new jurors right so I I'm not saying that doing a system of arbitration with reputation is a bad idea I'm just saying that it is a different way no way of doing it that may work best in some cases and may not work best in some other cases right but klaris is anonymous jurors and can take gold you collude to vault to yet to go for a ride result in order to manipulate the distribution of tokens among them so that's something that William is actually doing research on the thing is that and still there is always the possibility of a party that feels that was unfairly unfairly punished to appeal and this will bring another juror on our jury randomly selected which is to vote on the same dispute and this is going to be twice as many jurors and so on and so on so that should solve with things that problem any other question I think we're good thank you guys