MEVconomic Panel: MEVconomic Security in Liquid and Restaking Protocols

foreign [Applause] [Music] thank you so much and this is going to segue perfectly so you can hang on here uh we're going to have a battle now on economic security and liquid and restaking protocols so it'll be by self-moderating and we're going to head through them um and then we're gonna be bringing on tarun Ben and possibly for this one how's it going everyone hi yo all right sounds all working uh so your last slide actually segues perfectly into the thing that I wanted to ask um for the first question um and it is around that centralization risk um both which exists for both um for both restating and liquid staking with both of the topics here um liquid staking so far has been uh somewhat limited um in the amount of operators that are generally like actually working under their hood of some of these with faking protocols um so there's going to be a challenge there and you know Lido has talked about in their V2 things like the staking router starting to use DVT to try to decentralize under the hood um and then similarly for restaking um there is that centralization risk of ideally we would like to have these super horizontally scalable things like eigenva that are easy for does to run um but someone could also show up and put Solana on restaking and now there is effectively a massive incentive out there to be a really sophisticated restaker um so where it's supposed to take advantage heterogeneity does it just been incentivized that kind of lower bound to actually just move up um so I'll turn it over to you sure I'm to kind of continue where you left off on the last one to start yeah no I think uh if you look at like aspects of decentralized trust there are two distinct aspects of decentralized trust one is just coming from the amount of economics and the other one is it comes from a certain amount of decentralization or collusion resistance and I think different Services rely on different kinds of uh security like for example if all you want is for a for you know for for example for certifying that a certain execution condition is valid and you want somebody to underwrite this risk as long as there is you know a significant amount of Economics underpinning it it is enough like if you had one billion dollar restate on like a validity condition which is checkable on chain and slashable then it doesn't really matter whether that one billion dollar comes from one node or it comes from like thousands of notes I'm talking about this from the point of view of services building on top of Wagner and that for those Services we would expect basically like they would you know there is a significant benefit to centralization so there is like a small centralized committee or just like coinbase or some like few nodes which can just opt in and provide these Services which are primarily just economic in nature and uh there is a another set of services which simply do not uh you know it does not suffice to have Economic Security you need decentralization-based security and some examples there are you want to have an ordering layer which has censorship resistance uh you want to have a secure multi-party computation where you're splitting up some secret and information into different nodes and the core assumption is that these different nodes don't collude with each other uh there are other examples like uh you know the threshold cryptography we saw earlier where like you need to split up a key into crew into secret shares um even things like data availability Reliance to some extent on our honest majority or like honest certain fraction assumption and you know these examples all demand a decentralized quorum so what we expect to happen is on more expressive risk-taking platforms like eigenmare people will specify that they only want a decentralized column for certain tasks and this can promote an additional yield to a crew on to the decentralized Quorum and you know basically instead of all of us just you know uh talking about the ideology of decentralization there is an actual value of decentralization and if the users can just pay up for it that's really the best way to promote decentralization foreign to you on the kind of first half of that question I'm curious for your take on the liquid taking tokens and kind of the underlying operators of those um particularly because it's unlikely that we're going to have a million different types of liquid saving tokens so it is important if we want to do centralized validators that most likely that kind of the underlying components of Lido rocket pool Etc um that they are able to more sufficiently decentralize that validator set underneath um and kind of how you see that landscape of how do you see that flying out going forward yeah great question John um I I think that um first of all it's I agree it's super important that um the liquid staking provide us uh decentralized because there is a lot of centralizing pressure on them because of the network effect of the underlying token and we have seen um a range of different designs from completely centralized providers um like coinbase on the one end to arguably very decentralized paraders but less scalable like rocket pool on the find and then later maybe to the slide left of Rocket pool making another trade-off in more scalability but um yeah but but less decentralization and so um it comes down to a trade-off and the question is um will those trade-offs remain or can we have the best of all words right can we have scalability and decentralization and I think um the answer is mostly yes so there might always be some the need for some amount of governance that cannot be removed but um so my favorite mental model for thinking about this is basically um thinking of a staking pool as another variant of the lending Market where you take money from uh from stakers and you you basically give it to node operators right and and there's different types of of lending um there's one that's secured by reputation um and then you don't need a lot of collateral or I you anybody basically can can borrow and and then you do need more collateral to secure it and um so I think um whenever you want to have scalability um you basically can't have over collateralized Landing only and so you need some way of dealing with this reputation Challenge and I think it would be interesting to see how well we can bring um these kind of you know attestations to someone's reputation um how how well we can make that trust us or however we can bring that on chain entirely um for example through the use of uh inspecting you know performance stats uh building reputation over time but also minimizing uh the harm that faulty node operator can do through techniques such as DDT and then in the center I see something like um the staking router that you alluded to it in in light of V2 that's basically the central Hub where anybody can um where anybody can add new modules um new combinations of uh um of node operators and collateral and reputation and whatnot and then there's some Central mechanism to allocate those and uh to to allocate the Eve that comes into to those modules and I would be very interested um Twitter runes talk because I think he's uh what everyone thinks about this because he's one of the most one of the leading experts on uh on lending markets and um and parameterizing parameter parameters um basically the the relationship between uh you know the collateral and the borrowers and so on um yeah I mean I uh I yeah I kind of think the lighter model is the the end game the the router model sort of the the end game for this um you know it's funny you actually you mentioned um hey you could Implement Solana on top of a restaking mechanism well I don't think running Layer Two sequencers is that much less difficult than keeping up a Solana node if we're going to be completely honest if you look at all the arbitrim posts if you look at all it's like not that different uh and I think in the roll-up world sequencers and providers to roll ups are going to have to do a lot of operation have a lot of operational overhead so I think the centralization aspect of like oh I don't know how to correctly restake or allocate my assets is a problem you will have generically in a decentralized sequencer roll-up world like those users are going to have to be just as sophisticated so I'm I guess I see it as less of a concern from from the perspective of like we're already moving to this kind of extremely complex ecosystem of chains and uh in that world you're inevitably going to have to do solve these allocation problems no matter no matter what participant you are um and you know based on that I think yeah figuring out what the collateralization looks like will change over time especially if you know a lot of Lido node operators are restaking to also provide sequencing services for you know particular uh particular Roll-Ups um and you know I think of course Ben has a a pretty wrote a nice post uh about kind of opinions on that and how to Think Through you know how the Strategic decisions when you're in a decentralized sequencer so foreign yeah I just one thing to add about the I mean the question about so uh you know what if a protocol like Solana which favors centralization were to run on an argument or whether that favors centralization of e-staking I think it really depends on the uh relative you know fraction of uh uh you know of of value that's accruing to staking youth from participating in ethereum itself versus another protocol so it would only really become an issue for centralization if the value of like value coming from Solana was like much greater than the value or it's equal to or greater than the value coming from participating in ethereum itself um so it's I I mean yeah that's just a very important part to uh to take to take into account uh Ben do you want to say something about like how lightweight decently sequencing can be perspective yeah I think I think this is sort of the I mean I think that it's it's anyways the deciderata of centralizing sequences to make it lightweight so that it can be you know fully decentralized I think there's a bit of a different question from the concern that something like Solana could also come onto Easter staking platforms but yes um you can never you can definitely try to make decentralized sequencing as lightweight as possible so that um and that's what the E3 stakers would be participating in like ether stickers would not be participating in complex roles like proving that would be participating in the sequencing you don't need to have Easter stakers participating and proving if they are participating in the sequencing yeah I think the even more uh that's mediating the idea that you don't even need to hold the state of the roller right like that you don't even need to participate in execution just ordering and data starting and ordering is a stateless operator so you just order a bunch of like transactions and as long as you're collecting the fee for ordering the transactions those transactions are kind of like forced to be included so that's how you can scale sequencing I I mean the reason I would like slightly push back on this is like looking at say the arbitrum example of like the sheer amount of network bandwidths that the sequencer had to handle it very much reminds me of the Solana DDOS level bandwidth like you're talking about people sending like 100 gigabits a second to a single single entity so it there is we still haven't gotten to that point where I I would say I believe that they're they're that different to a node operator I'm sure you know hetzner probably can which is like a big data center operator I'm sure they have the exact statistic on like how much bandwidth arbitrim has had to deal with versus Solana and like uptime statistics and I bet you that's not that crazily different I I especially after the airdrop I think they're they're not so different in terms of operational overhead that like which is that's sort of my main point right now I think that there will be one thing to it but I I want to just say that like there is a the problem of not having me auctions is what is contributed to that and uh you know to to segue into your next talk and as well as the decentralized sequencing system has you know reasonable Mev management which Ben has taught a lot about uh I think you know you would not have a problem like that I also wonder how much that needs to correlate with the uh the value of staking like you could also have as a public good a uh you know infrastructure or server that's doing a lot of a lot of work in terms of routing messages but the but in order to participate in stake in the protocol you you uh you you just need to do lightweight operations and so in some sense that public service is uh real real it's just a public service that's being subsidized by everyone participating uh and it's not so that you need to that by staking more you can then run that service and therefore profit so I think it depends on the um relationship between staking and and participating in different roles yeah Jonathan Jones I was gonna say the 1.0 push back on a little bit from earlier is in regards to how much the rewards actually need to be for something like this to create a centralizing force um where it should be equivalent to or possibly greater than the type of rewards you would get on ethereum um I would say that doesn't have to be the case I mean this is exactly what we see with Nev boots and you can kind of think of any additional restaking Revenue to be viewed as a form of Mev to any kind of potential rest acre um and we see that with Med boost where hey if I could earn four percent or five percent of my own but I can earn six percent with my Boost 95 of people are going to run that thing um and they don't even necessarily need to create that value particularly if that like this restaked Solana if they say they have an inflationary token that they're giving to the rest acres and that subsidized it's like a high yield for them um so members still studies does still exist um somewhat in my mind I don't think there's I don't think there is a perfect answer to it um one of the interesting things Anna Nursery we've talked about before is actively incentivizing um decentralized committees with higher rewards uh most decentralized ones um such that there's actually an explicit Advantage which is a very difficult problem to do but theoretically not um and it's a very anything to play around with uh I would have a follow-up question to that so how do you uh how do you identify decentralized committees reliably yeah I think this is going to be uh a whole fun another like service which would basically do it and and you know just to clear our perspective on this is eigenlayer wants to be uh you know the one of the paradigms that we lean heavily into is intersubjectivity intercept activity is that like most subjective decisions are made at the edges not at the platform so we don't want to make a judgment saying somebody is more decentralized and somebody else is less decentralized and each service needs to consider its own like requirements when making these decisions and these could be supported by decentralization articles which then like steer people in in those directions and for the particular needs of each of the services like a secret chatting as an example you know if you send this well you know and and shares of the secret to the same person you basically can end up getting no guarantee even if those those set of people are geographically distributed there are other use cases where you know for censorship resistance or legal and other purposes you want people from different jurisdictions to participate that's a different kind of like a requirement so each service will have its own requirements and they will lean on a new ecosystem of oracles which just try to do this thing and there are you know it's hard to identify decentralized nodes it's easy to identify the centralized nodes we will know what the exchange wallets are we'll know what the some of the biggest operators are and so on and just excluding them just still gives us a long tail of notes to work with so there are all kinds of ways that Services can uh can do this and there's no one universal correct good answer and it's going to depend very much on the films so actually one thing I I've kind of wondered as a sort of a research direction that towards this that you know I don't think we can do right now that that maybe you know in a couple years uh we'll be at the place to do this is you know there's this line of research on doing Secret leader election and mistake with threshold homomorphic encryption and there's a question that I've always wondered is of like can you do private elections of committee is not just single leaders for this type of thing if you had say threshold fhe and like would that be sufficient for the type of thing you're talking about because I because I actually think you could generalize their method to multiple participants but no one's done that yet and that I think that would like be like the foolproof obviously you know relying on for anything is always scary but there's two aspects to this why if you start with a centralized taking pool and just uh choose like even many leaders randomly still not gonna do any benefit because all leaders are basically the same person so there is a kind of Baseline of decentralization that you absolutely sure sure out of which you need like uh multiple signal election Pro to make it even yeah yeah sorry I I agree I'm not I wasn't that definitely you need to kind of have the state distribution be you know more uniform over unique identities not just addresses but I I guess there's a lot of this other stuff that I think has been lying in the shadows around this type of stuff that you know uh maybe we'll see live in one to two years hopefully turning directions a little bit um I just got a rather spicy question someone sent me uh just a few minutes ago during the talk um it really relates to so I know the shroom you've spoken in the past um how eigenlayer could particularly later on be viewed and resaken broadly as some kind of like free market upgrade to ethereum where particularly as it gets more difficult to upgrade ethereum um validators Can effectively opt into it as a free market and do it themselves um the inverse side of that I wanted to ask everyone States on is does this give a kind of additional unearned governance power to validators where for example if ethereum developer is in the community there's some upgrade that they view as rather risky this is not something that we should be doing um but the restakers say hey I can make a bunch of money from this thing I'm wrong and opt into this um where do you kind of see that kind of tension between that governance power which they may not we may not want them to have versus also that flexibility the positive thing of being able to kind of free market upgrade over time I think the the real answer to this lies in the full notes okay so you know as we all know like there is a powered in the full node which is not fully specified in just the internal nodes which is that if there was an invalid State transition the full nodes can reject it and imagine now there is an upgrade on top of like you know which comes from something like eigen layer which like everybody opts in and all the validators are doing it but at the full node level so buying opt-in for example at the full node level gives you like a significantly boosted security Beyond The Economic Security that you can get by the stakers opting in and you know it is at that threshold that really the buy-in from the rest of the communities needed and I have some like uh ideas you know untested ideas on how a new service for example might be able to do it for example a service May commit to burn eat if like all the light nodes upgrade or like you know full nodes upgrade to you know by in when receiving the fees is not fees is not just distributed to the stake as some fraction of the fees just burned as a compensation for the externality to the full nodes which then need to upgrade to not only check the validity condition on the core protocol but also on this protocol extension so there are all kinds of interesting things that can be done but also the flip side is for example if there is a censorship Market built on restaking where you just say that like hey I'm gonna pay to like sensor somebody's liquidation transaction so that I can earn the money and think this can only be dealt with socially by like whatever flashing these uh social slashing these stickers and so on so it does become more complicated one thing I guess I would say is like in what world have you know if we view sort of restaking as sort of Bridging the Gap between like clients full nodes and archive nodes like you know each of those levels had different governance rights in some sense in almost every Network all you're doing is you're taking like this discrete type node types and like making a continuous Spectrum um out of it and in some sense light nodes never really had governance rights before right they they sort of were just forced to to eat whatever Merkle tree is shoved at them and uh I I think I think like you know it's sort of the same all you're doing is just like widening that Spectra from these like three Delta functions I would also note that uh validators do already have the uh the the the the agency to run another protocol uh E3 staking is subsidizing that agency right it's saying you already have East State so now it's less costly for you to run this additional protocol but they already have the agency to run other protocol and it's also not clear that by running another protocol this necessarily is is equivalent to an upgrade because it's it would only be if that they were running that to the exclusion of running ethereum itself so it's a it's a protocol add-on you could think of like if everybody's running it you could think of it as a protocol add-on and that's why I was going with but full nodes don't check for the validity of this protocol add-on and so you could ask them to check for it by like uh you know doing this uh fee burn you know there are some fans of 1559 and feebled here uh so that's basically a compensation for the externality to the full nodes for having to check that you know they're continuing to do that great uh another question I know that a lot of people have kind of had uh trying to get their head around is this idea of Leverage quote unquote in staking and restaking um noting the clear difference in that um obviously you know you take on a leverage trade or something like that like you might get liquidated on that due to just market conditions if you're restaking and you're honest you shouldn't be slashed assuming everything operates correctly but you are increasing the leverage in the sense that you potentially have a very high ratio of value secured relative to the amount of like stake actually securing that thing which is moving in this direction of old security um and that works primarily under the assumption where this increases the value of something like with the value that it's occurring because more value goes to it um but the other side of it is something like restaking one of the interesting benefits is you could do dual staking uh tokens with it where there's some other kind of token that captures value so do those things kind of become at odds with each other at a certain point where now eth isn't necessarily capturing that value which accurately compensates it for the additional risk that it's taken on economically where some of that value starts going so the second token or more and they want to kind of move in that direction okay so I think you know there are really different so you know like like I said from the Staker point of view if they're honest and if you the protocol code is correct they'll never get slashed so let's keep the sticker out of the picture from the service point of view is there like are you increasing additional profit from corruption by like adding new services on top I think that's the high level question and I think that it is a lot more nuanced question and I don't think we'll get to this uh thing share the idea is you know if you look at ethereum you know it's securing 400 500 billion dollars of value with 25 billion dollars of stake and like first we have to get to the bottom of why is it okay to do this it's okay to do this because you know we are the the total value secured is not what is protected by what a state the total value of transferable out of the system within a short period of time within that act duration is what is being protected by staking and by having this mental you know this crypto economic model correctly programmed across various Services you can actually get very strong probably correct guarantees on what uh the crypto economic conditions are for safety um John I think another way of looking at this uh that issue that you described as leverage so just from a different angle is that uh because uh an E3 Staker is now participating in in you know many different sources of revenue right for an individual uh chain that it's securing uh the value on on uh the value that being generated by that chain is low relative to the to the to the value of the East overall being restaked because it has many other sources of revenue and so this becomes an issue of the fact that the uh if the the relative value of this one chain that it's securing is low relative to all the other Chains It's securing then the marginal utility is too small for it to care that much about that one chain so in essence like it's from the perspective of the chain the risk arises which um and dual staking can lower the Leverage of the of the E3 stakers right and it can uh it then shifts the security onto another source when whoever is what this other token is and uh and so that is helpful for the chain itself I mean it's one different is that it's I think it's the same issue as of being over leveraged but just from a different angle yeah I I would just add I like thinking of it as you know even though I I'm sure by mentioning this word people will suddenly get scared but I like viewing it as like the sort of like tranche style Insurance where like the second token is taking the equity style losses Beyond a certain point and the E does not which is that's sort of this over leveraged piece like there's not going to be some like huge Heath restaked eat liquidation versus like some fraction of that gets absorbed by this other token now the question is can the other token ever get to a market cap close enough for it to be meaningful relative to eth and like that's that's a different question like will there be enough liquidity for it to actually be this sort of like lost asset um but but in theory that's sort of what what you're kind of hoping for is kind of this split I would um I would also point out that you can't really prevent um validators from taking on additional Leverage so for example um we've seen the rise of liquid sticking tokens and those liquid staking tokens are now the primary form of collateral used in ethereum lending markets in order to borrow anything and so we already have an implicit amount of Leverage in the system today and so people are blaming liquid sticking tokens for that which is I mean it's just inevitable but so to those people I would say even before that improve of work there was already a lot of Leverage in staking in mining that is because all of the the the big mining Farms were all deeply deeply leveraged so they were buying all of their machines um actually on credit and they were they were borrowing against their machines and they were using their machines to collateralize as well as their future cash flows to buy more machines and so um this is something that all protocol designers have to keep in mind that you just can't um control what people do outside of your protocol and um that's why you have to operate with big margins of safety next rerun was saying like ethereum protocol does not secure all of the money that is uh sort of part of the ethereum state somewhere it's it's it's not even all of the money that is currently being transacted it's only that which can be controlled by the ordering basically because not even 100 malicious uh bad letters could force an embedded State transition um so yeah um that's why I think yeah the gist is basically Leverage is always possibly there's no way to prevent it and you just have to design around it curious quick follow-on uh for anyone if you and I would agree on this that like with something like liquid second tokens where inevitable in hindsight um are liquid restaking tokens inevitable looking forward um where you have a position saying that yeah I have my heat stake but I'm also restaking to these four other things and this like gives me the right to the associated cash flows of those and there's all these different liquid tokens with an additional layer but I I think you know it's much more uh likely that liquid sticking protocols will integrate some of the services under the foot which means existing liquid sticking tokens kind of eat the additional reward by just integrating the under the hood for that Southern Services which are highly yield bearing rather than you having to go and create a whole you know liquid sticking token for free stick so I I guess I I sort of think of it as like if restaking is successful in the sense that it has hundreds of applications using it um there will inevitably be some notion of like etfization where people want different classes of ethyl they'll be like the the most high grade ethy yield but it's just pure staking there's like the slightly riskier ethio which is like maybe staking plus submitting Oracle updates that there's maybe the slightly higher risky version like data availability plus Oracle updates like this all depends on what the slashing rates are and so I'm so the relative ordering is not is not perfect but I could imagine people basically like fractionalizing like at what level of Youth risk do you want um yeah I would agree with both of those I I think that um the liquid staking protocols were internalize restaking if it turns out to be profitable and useful and I think also down the line maybe in a few years those same liquid sticking protocols were come out with different tranches of of Eve that give different levels of Frisk and seniority um to invest us I think that's one of the main things that we make remains in the design space for these protocols after after stuff like that the liquid liquid sticking router and DVT has been figured out I think great so one of the applications uh that you guys are very familiar with um that will be secured but potentially with reseking and have been talked about a lot in some of the previous talks of something like shared sequencer layer something like espresso has talked about in the past week um even in simple forms of a shared sequencer AKA effectively based Roll-Ups where you're using the L1 as a shared sequencer one of the interesting points in the value flow of Mev as Justin was speaking a lot about earlier is that in the simplest case that value now effectively goes to the L1 itself so in base Roll-Ups it would go to Heath in a shared sequencer the value from the Roll-Ups Meb that they would normally get from their own sequencers in the simplest case would go to the shared sequencer layer itself um and so the question that becomes kind of around the incentives for Roll-Ups to use those things if they want to keep that kind of value for themselves and more values should be created in this system because as I know a sure amount of some great tweets about this the other day it's like kind of the Baseline is what they would have already had as Meb and now you should have an additional mvv that's opened up by the interoperability between all of them see in theory of more value graded um but that kind of incentive alignment issue of like how do we return that value to Roll-Ups in some form such that they're incentivized to opt into this thing um and it's not just nobody wants to opt into the thing that will optimize everyone because I want to keep most of the value for myself like how we kind of think about those trade-offs and value flows I could take a stab at this uh if I um to go first I think there's a lot of analogies here too you know like you have a music festival and you have all the bands showing up to the music festival and the music festivals selling tickets right and how do you allocate how do you pay the bands to show up and it's also not a One-Shot Music Festival it's a repeated game So eventually if bands realize oh the music festival organizer is taking all the cops in uh we're just we're just gonna run our own music festival so I think that before uh we can talk about the economics of shared sequencing and how and to whom the value of cruise it's important to identify like who are the players right um I think Barnaby has like a very nice post on this for Roll-Ups uh which distinguishes 3D parties like users a roll-up operator the base layer and here with shared sequencing we have another part right we have the shared sequencer um and the node's operating it but I think we should also separate at the roll-up operator level between the provers who are who are actually incurring the operating costs and the governance of the roll-up right but it has the power to decide two things like how do you define the VM right and uh and which sequencing layer is the role of going to Runa and importantly not only do they have the power to decide that initially the governance has the power to decide to move away from the sequence of layer and that gives the governance to the role of Leverage that governance could be encapsulated well it could be a Central Central company uh or it could be encapsulated in some token then let's just call out the governance um so base fees covering the operating costs like proving uh plus some Epsilon profit that can be easily directly programmed into the VM and they need to do that because they need to get privileged to run um but obviously that base fee doesn't capture Mev uh and so then there's it's the negotiation between the role of governance and the sequencer the roll-up governance wants to know you know am I going to make more running on this shared sequencer then I would make running my own sequencing layer right and obviously there's a I mean there's a there's a cost of building your own one-time Capital cost of building your own sequencing layer But ultimately you want to know that you'll be making more you know going to the festival rather than running your own show um and so I I think it comes down to a negotiation and and that can manifest in in many different ways um one way is if uh if the average Lev that the roll-up would make on its own can somehow be estimated or simulated or it can be adjusted dynamically based on historical average then that can be like hard-coded into the base C of the role of VM um but I think that's quite hard and that basically would not be covered by users be subsidized by the by the sequencer nodes maybe they go into a deficit sometimes but on average they would be able to cover the costs and and take the Surplus that comes from shared sequencing another way would be probably at the ideal option uh but but maybe challenging to perfectly achieve uh is if the allocation algorithm okay the the mechanism that the sequencer is running is transparent in other words if there's transparency in the Mev auction or the block building process and if it can calculate and verifiably Report what is the marginal contribution of each roll up to the total nud and it distributes that proportionally to each roll up you know giving a cut taking a cut for itself then that would Foster the strongest trust and incentive alignment between the roll-up governances and the shared sequence but I think that's like an important research question and um that I think is like the ideal option but it may be hard to achieve I think it's a little some inspiration from the atom uh uh item build on the Chain security here which is uh basically like doing dropouts like you know randomly dropping out like one of the chains and then calculating both the average Builder value is and then like you can use that to uh to calculate or estimate what the uh uh looking at the chat here estimate what the uh marginal values for the different ones another way is that having actually like combinatorial auctions and then now I have to segregate that sounds very expensive for the participants but yes that is possible so I I think that's one um option we haven't discussed it which is just allowing um roll ups not not enshrining a single um sequence that they are but just having the ability to profit switch between different ones um and it's a it's a funny thought how sequencing Mass could kind of um be destroyed and be created on like a pro per block basis uh so I don't know if that's why I mean or not um but I think definitely in the future of of multiple sequencing layers um nothing speaks about uh speaks against the sequencing that's competing on a public basis for the um Mev and just beating up um that you paid to to the proposal uh or to the governance as it would be in that case right so um yeah I think I think that's another option probably got in trouble for asking one more question because we're running late but I want to ask it um I'm curious for thoughts regarding uh it's something that I had talked a bit about earlier as well um and Barnaby has discussed in the past of this idea of Pepsi on the idea of like protocol being able to enforce hip and proposal commitments and like the first part of that abstraction that he's talking about is this kind of idea of an in in protocol eigen layer um where you can make the protocol aware of these commitments such that you don't end up with this problem where the protocol is not aware that hey maybe this person is slash um and it's like not really aware of what's going on with its own security at that point um so I'm curious uh as to any of your thoughts on is it helpful to kind of build these things in more um to a greater extent to be able to just give the protocol more awareness of like what's actually going on with its own security um or are there other externalities to think about and there where they may not be attractive yeah I think you know the first part to that is how to make ethereum a layer of a slashing event on something like item layer I think is the answer to that is actually simple and thankfully coming up uh in an upgrade called smart contract triggered withdrawals right now withdrawals are validator triggered not con you know withdrawal credential triggered and once you change that the awareness can be kind of instantaneous as soon as the contracts however that there is a slashing it immediately like goes and triggers the thing from uh ethereum so that's the answer to the first part but there is a second part of the benefit which I think your crew by having it PE uh enshrined as opposed to being on a kind of like a secondary layer like I don't know is the benefit is that you know suppose somebody makes a proposal commitment that I will only include the decrypted version of these encrypted transactions and in the block and but they actually don't they actually don't include the decryption on either layer all that we can do is to slash them for 30 to each so the maximum liability is like bounded by 32 in Nigeria whereas in if you make it in protocol I think this was mainly Barnaby's idea the idea is that if you make it in protocol it can be part of the validity condition of the block itself that the proposal met the condition or not this is just a much higher path there are ways to I think therefore if if and when such a thing is possible it's actually beneficial but the problem is that you know uh if somebody writes a bad like opt-in condition which had some smart contract bug you know you could lead to mass slashing events and things like that and the only protection we have right now is based on on eigen layer is based on a subjective flashing veto and I don't think ethereum would want to internalize you know such kind of subjective committees so at the evolution that I imagine is going to be that initially people play with a lot of these models on a opt-in layer like Eisen layer and once that is much more like robust and stable some aspects of it can be basically just enshrine default into ethereum there we go awesome uh we will cut it there thank you everyone for this this was a lot of fun um and again we will perfectly transition we've got tarun we will be staying on for the next one who in his own words is going to be talking about how to kill Fair ordering